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ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS' IMP ACTS ON DEPTH AND INFORMED TRADING A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Timothy Shawn Strother December 2003 
Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) on depth 
and the probability of informed trading (PIN). The probability of informed trading and 
VNET, a metric of depth that determines the net directional volume necessary to induce a 
price change or return, are estimated for volume-matched samples of New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq listed firms. Trade and quote data are obtained for two 
time periods before, and two time periods following, the introduction of trading in 
decimals on January 29,2001 and April 19, 2001 for the NYSE and Nasdaq, respectively. 
The data are used to estimate VNET and the probability of informed trading through time 
for the NYSE and Nasdaq matched portfolios, separating the impact of decimalization on 
VNET and the probability of informed trading. Estimates of the immediate effect of 
decimalization on market depth show VNET decreased on the NYSE from pre­
decimalization 2001 to post-decimalization 2001. However, decimalization caused no 
immediate impact on depth on the Nasdaq. Over the year following decimalization, 
VNET increased on the Nasdaq, but decreased on the NYSE. 
The impact of A TS on depth for Nasdaq listed companies has been significant. 
Higher proportions of quote activity through ECNs are related to increased depth. On the 
other hand, higher proportions of trading through SelectNet are related to decreased depth 
· and increased spreads. 
I find a positive relationship exists between the probability of informed trading 
and the proportion of trades from SOES and SelectNet, and a negative relationship with 
ECN quotation activity. Therefore, informed traders' decisions of order execution venue 11 
are partially determined by differences in trading protocol between ECNs, SOES, and SelectNet. Estimates of the probability of informed trading for matched portfolios of NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies suggest that adverse selection costs are lower on the NYSE. 
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Introduction The goal of this work is to investigate the impact of Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) on depth and informed trading in the U.S. equity markets. Additionally, the long­term effects of moving trading from fractions to decimals are analyzed. Using intra-day trade and quote data from four two-week periods between 1999 and 2002, an investigation of the long-term contribution of ATS relative to dealers is undertaken. The results of this investigation will help policy markers determine if recent changes to quotation and trading systems have had the desired results. Regulatory and structural changes to the NYSE and Nasdaq have important implications for traders. The move to trade stocks in decimals was undertaken with the expectation that lower trading costs should result from a narrowing of inside bid-ask spreads. However, inside bid-ask spreads are an incomplete measure of trade execution costs since they do not incorporate other important aspects of liquidity. In particular, bid­ask spreads do not provide any information about how elastic stock prices are with respect to order flow. That is, inside spreads do not provide any information about the number of shares that must be traded to cause a specific price move or return. Therefore, a decrease in bid-ask spreads is not sufficient to conclude that decimalization has caused an increase in liquidity. Consequently, policy makers should consider the impact of trading in decimals on both inside spreads and depth before drawing conclusions about the impact on market liquidity and transactions costs. The evolution of the securities markets in the United States has continued under the general premise that the introduction of new trading rules and mechanisms will ensure that U.S. markets remain competitive in the international arena by reducing 1 
investors' trading costs and making stock prices easier to understand. However, the rate 
of change in these rules and trading mechanisms has been so great that financial 
economists have not had sufficient time to evaluate the effects of these changes before 
new changes confound prior events. For example, although only a few studies have 
investigated the impacts of the increasing proportion of trading through Alternative 
Trading Systems as a result of the 1997 Order Handling Rules (OHR), the Nasdaq moved 
from quoting in fractions to quoting in decimals during 2001. Without in-depth analysis, 
potential negative effects of the Order Handling Rules can go overlooked. 
Anecdotal evidence of unanticipated negative effects of the Order Handling Rules 
has already been identified. One issue relates to the SEC Division of Market Regulation's 
interpretation of the Limit Order Display Rule. The Division of Market Regulation 
interprets the Limit Order Display Rule to say that exchange specialists or OTC market 
makers are not required to immediately display a customer limit order that would lock or 
cross the market. Gerald Putnam, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Archipelago 
Holdings, LLC, has acknowledged a practice whereby Electronic Communication 
Networks (ECN s) do not provide Best Price Routing to orders that would lock or cross 
the market. ECN s accomplish this by suppressing display of the Best Priced Orders in 
Nasdaq, while continuing to display these orders in a proprietary quote feed. Traders 
refer to these suppressed orders as "Greenies". The result is investors do not always see 
the best priced order. 
This is not to suggest that we discontinue the pursuit of improvements in trading, 
but rather, to highlight the rapid pace of development in U.S. markets and our lack of 
knowledge about the contribution of ATS to market quality. ATS such as Electronic 
2 
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Communication Networks have grown from fledgling secondary trading venues to 
primary trading avenues. For instance, the ECN named Island claimed an overall Nasdaq 
share of 16.2% by trades and 7.6% by volume for June 2001. 1 Although Conrad, 
Johnson, and W ahal (2001) document substantial lower realized execution costs on 
external crossing systems and Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), and Huang 
(2002) shows that ECNs post informative and timely quotes, little else is known. 
Therefore, it is important to policy makers and market participants to investigate and 
understand how both regulatory and technological changes are affecting market quality. It 
is the goal of this work to analyze the effects of Alternative Trading Systems and decimal 
trading on market quality across two dimensions; depth and informed trading. 
The remainder of this document proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 discusses 
regulatory changes to the financial markets and the development of Nasdaq. Chapter 2 
introduces market depth and the related methodology. Chapter 3 provides empirical 
estimates of market depth. Chapter 4 introduces informed trading and details informed 
trading methodology. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results and analysis of the 
probability of informed trading. Chapter 6 offers a two stage least squares regression 
approach to model depth, informed trading and inside spreads. 
1 These data are available at the Nasdaq website, http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/mr_outline.asp. 
3 
Chapter 1 Nasdaq Development and Regulatory History 
Financial markets do not develop without externalities. For example, LaPorta 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny ( 1996) show that legal underpinnings in different 
countries affect corporate governance issues such as a shareholder rights. Furthermore, 
they find a link between investor rights and capital market development. Similarly, 
policy decisions regarding investor protections and trading protocol affect the 
development of trading venues. Consequently, an understanding of regulatory issues is 
necessary to appreciate why and how Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) have come into 
existence. The goal of this chapter is to detail regulatory changes that have affected 
trading system development. 
Since its creation in 1971, the Nasdaq has grown to become the second-most 
active equity market in the world. The period between 1993 and 2000 showed large 
increases in average daily trading volume and quotation message traffic. For example, 
over the period 1993-1999, average daily trading volume increased from 300 million to 
almost 1 billion shares. Similarly, from September 1999 to April 2000, average daily 
volume jumped from 1 billion to 1.8 billion shares. In parallel, quotation message traffic 
increased by 1,120 percent between January 1997 and April 2000. Nasdaq literature 
states that Nasdaq trading technology is "unsurpassed in reliability, capacity, and 
accessibility", driving its growth and success. 2 
While policy makers actively deregulated industries such as the utilities industry 
during the 1990s, regulators did not pursue the same policy for securities markets. In 
fact, it is arguable that the regulatory introductions of the 1990s were the most significant 
2Nasdaq SuperMontage Release 1.0: Functional Description, Version 1.0 
4 
since the Depression Era acts such as the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. 
The regulatory changes of the 1990s were driven by the finding by Christie and 
Schultz (1994) that dealers implicitly collude to maintain wide bid/ask spreads resulting 
in higher trading costs for investors. Consequently, the development of Alternative 
Trading Systems has been a function not only of necessity to increase market efficiency 
but also to satisfy increasing regulatory initiatives. 
The following section details quotation, order routing, and trading system 
development on the Nasdaq market, from the first Nasdaq order routing system to current 
proposed systems. Regulatory initiatives affecting trading system development are also 
discussed. 
· 1 A. A Brief History 
The Nasdaq Stock Market has undergone significant technological advances 
since the early 1980's. Some developments have been the result of technological 
innovation needed to satisfy market demands while others have resulted from system 
failures due to market stress. The more important of Nasdaq's systems include the Small 
Order Execution System (SOBS), SelectNet, the Nasdaq National Market Execution 
System (NNMS), and the Computer Assisted Execution System /lntermarket Trading 
System (CAES/ITS). 
5 
lAl. The Nasdaq National Market System, SOES, and SelectNet 
Smith, Selway, and McCormick ( 1998) provide a thorough examination of the 
history and operation of the Nasdaq Stock Market up until 1998. An important early 
change in the Nasdaq system was the introduction of timely transaction reporting with the 
establishment of the Nasdaq National Market System (Nasdaq/NMS) in 1982. The 
Nasdaq/NMS was originally comprised of the 40 most active Nasdaq securities. The 
NMS required the volume and price of each trade to be reported within 90 seconds of 
execution. Non-NMS (i.e. regular Nasdaq securities) continued to report trade executions 
at the end of the day until mid-June 1992. In 1993, Nasdaq/NMS was renamed the 
Nasdaq National Market (NNM), and non-NMS securities were named Nasdaq SmallCap 
securities. 
Additional significant developments in the Nasdaq market involved the 
establishment of order routing, trading, and reporting systems. 3 The Small Order 
Execution System (SOES) was the Nasdaq's first order routing and trading system and 
began trading in December 1984. Trading was limited to the automated execution of 
agency orders, orders executed on the behalf of customers, in Nasdaq/NMS securities 
with size of 500 shares or less. Market makers could only have orders executed against 
their quotes. SOES trading was extended to all Nasdaq securities with trade size limited 
to 1,000 shares or less in 1985, with a minimum size of one round lot.4 Market maker 
participation in SOES was voluntary until the market crash of 1987 forced reforms 3 Nasdaq was originally designed primarily as a quote-dissemination system. Today, the Nasdaq quotation management system " collects and displays quotations of registered market makers and Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) that are members of the NASD, " collectively known as Nasdaq market participants. "By agreement, Nasdaq also collects and display quotations in Nasdaq securities from Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) exchanges." 
4 Minimum SOES tier size requirements were not introduced until 1990. 6 
resulting in mandatory market maker participation in NMS securities. Mandatory market 
maker participation requires market makers to execute orders submitted to SOES at the 
inside bid-ask spread. This change created a venue for individual investors to 
immediately execute orders ahead of orders placed through other trading systems. 5 
Further changes to SOES occurred with the implementation of the 1997 Order 
Handling Rules (OHR). The Order Handling Rules, discussed later, set minimum quoted 
size equal to the size of the maximum SOES order size. SOES tier sizes, the maximum 
number of shares for an order submitted to SOES, are stock specific and determined by a 
security's average daily trading volume, share price, and number of market makers. As of 
July 20th, 1998, the sizes for NNM stocks were 1,000, 500, and 200 shares. However, 
SOES participation was voluntary for Nasdaq SmallCap stocks with tier sizes of 100 or 
500 shares. 
SelectNet "is an electronic screen-based order routing system that allows market 
participants to negotiate securities transactions in Nasdaq securities through computer 
communications. "6 SelectNet began in 1988 as the Order Confirmation Transaction 
service (OCT). OCT was designed to overcome the limitations of telephone contact. It 
was established as an electronic order delivery system that automatically locked-in 
accepted orders for trade reporting and clearing. 
In 1990, OCT was improved to allow back-and-fourth negotiation between 
senders and recipients of orders. Furthermore, the feature enabling participants to 
5 Individual investors that exploit the differences in trading efficiency or protocol across trading venues are often called SOES day traders. 6 See NASO Notice To Members 00-30. 
7 
broadcast orders to all market makers in a stock was introduced. Also, OCT was renamed 
SelectNet. 
Smith, Selway, and McCormick (1998) discuss the features and requirements of 
SelectNet as of August 24, 1998. SelectNet participants can negotiate a larger size or 
better price relative to the current inside quote. Additionally, SelectNet enables 
participants to limit the amount of time an order will be in effect from 3 to 99 minutes. 
This system also allows the specification of day orders and minimum acceptable share 
amounts. Participants may counter, accept, decline, or price improve SelectNet orders. 
Prior to July 10, 2000, SelectNet allowed subscribers to preference or direct orders to pre­
specified market makers or to broadcast orders to all market participants. NASD Notice 
to Members 00-30 notes that although SelectNet is an order delivery service rather than 
an order execution service, orders preferenced to a market maker at the market maker's 
displayed quotes create the liability for that market maker to execute the transaction at its 
quoted price and size. 
The 1997 Order Handling Rules (OHR) increased the importance of SelectNet as 
an order routing mechanism. This resulted from the linkage that SelectN et creates 
between Nasdaq and Electronic Communication Networks. The OHR introduced the 
requ�rement that market maker� must make their own best priced quotes posted through 
an ECN publicly available. The new rules provided two avenues for market makers to 
meet this requirement. First, market makers could improve the prices of their quotes. 
8 
Second, they could send the better priced orders to an ECN that will disseminate the 
orders to the public quotation system which is equally accessible by brokers/dealers. 7 
1A2. The Nasdaq National Market Execution System (NNMS) 
The evolution of the Nasdaq market continued with the SEC's approval of rule 
changes on January 14, 2000. These rule changes established a new trading platform for 
Nasdaq National Market (NNM) securities and amended the rules governing SelectNet. 
The new rules reestablished SelectNet as a non-liability order delivery and 
negotiation system for NNM Securities with the goal of eliminating the potential for 
"dual liability" for market makers. Dual liability is the obligation of market makers to 
execute multiple orders submitted through different trading systems, where those orders 
should be satisfied by the market maker's posted quoted size. It is believed that the 
subjection of market makers to unintended double liability for orders that reached their 
quotes at the same time through two trading systems (e.g. SOES and SelectNet) resulted 
in a decrease in incentives for market makers to commit capital. Consequently, quotation 
sizes and liquidity were lower than equilibria levels for single liability order systems. 
The NNMS eliminated the use of SelectNet to preference orders to market makers 
in NNM Securities unless the orders are at least 100 shares in excess of the receiving 
market makers' quoted size. This requirement is known as the over-sized order 
requirement and is also extended to orders directed to ECNs that register for automatic 
execution against their quotes in the NNMS. In addition to the size requirement of the 7 SelectNet will continue to perform this function for ECNs that choose not to take automatic execution against their quotes through the Nasdaq National Market Execution System (NNMS) after the implementation of SuperSOES. SuperSOES will be discussed later. 9 
over-sized order rule, the orders must also be designated as "All-or-None" (AON) or 
"Minimum Acceptable Quantity" (MAQ) orders. SelectNet orders that meet the over-size 
requirements can either be executed or negotiated by the recipient. 
The Nasdaq National Market Execution System substantially enhanced the 
trading of NNM securities through SOES. The enhancements include: ( 1) raising the 
maximum order size for NNM securities to 9900 shares; (2) enabling the entrance and 
automatic execution of agency and proprietary orders in NNM securities (including 
market makers) ; (3) reducing the minimum amount of time until the system will deliver 
another order to a given market maker to 5 seconds from the prior execution (previously 
17 seconds); (4) creating automatic interaction of NNM orders with market makers' 
displayed size and reserve size; and ( 5) eliminating the "No Decrementation" option and 
order preferencing in SOES. In general, these rule changes were expected to reduce the 
problem of dual liability, promote access of the entire quoted depth to all market 
participants, and increase the speed of executions. 
One of the features of NNMS is the reserve size. The reserve size is the new quote 
size to which a posted quote will be set once the quoted size is decremented to zero. 
Although the reserve size is not displayed in Nasdaq, it is automatically available once all 
displayed interest is exhausted. Furthermore, the system will execute all displayed quotes 
at the same price level before accessing the reserve size, thereby maintaining time 
priority. NNMS participants using the reserve size function must quote (display) a 
minimum of 1000 shares. 
The NNMS is also associated with new quote refresh rules and categories of 
ECNs. First, when a market maker's quote is refreshed to a different size or price level 
10 
than previously quoted, additional orders will not be directed to that market maker for 
five seconds following that refresh. Second, ECNs can choose to be either a Full­
Participant or Order-Entry ECNs (OE ECNs). Full-Participant ECNs provide automatic 
execution against their quotes for orders entered into NNMS, while Order-Entry ECNs do 
not. However, market participants can access Order-Entry ECN quotes through 
SelectNet, with preferenced messages up to 999,999 shares. Note that the oversized 
order requirement for preferenced SelectNet orders is not applicable to receiving Order­
Entry ECNs, but is applicable to sending Order-Entry ECNs. 
As of the approval date for NNMS, Nasdaq was working with Unlisted Trading 
Privileges (UTP) Exchanges to integrate them into the automatic execution functionality 
of NNMS. However, since the UTP exchanges were not integrated, SelectNet remained 
their primary linkage with Nasdaq allowing the receipt and delivery of preferenced 
SelectNet liability orders. Consequently, market makers still face the problem of dual 
liability for UTP eligible securities. 
Effective February 14, 2000, the lntermarket Trading System (ITS) plan was 
amended to expand the Computer Assisted Execution System (CAES)/ITS linkage to all 
exchange-listed securities, including non-Rule 19c-3 securities. 8 Expansion of the linkage 
was expected to "increase market efficiency and transparency, reduced trade-throughs, 
and level the playing field between Third Market firms and exchanges; decrease market 
fragmentation and produce long-term benefits to the National Market System (NMS); 
increase the liquidity and competitiveness of the securities markets; and increase the 
opportunity for investors to obtain the best price available in all markets for orders in 
8 See Nasdaq Head Trader Alert #2000-05. Detail of the ITS will be presented later. 1 1  
exchange-listed securities. " This was an important step in addressing Section 11A(a)(2) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Section 11A(a)(2) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Act") was 
adopted by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. Section 11A(a)(2) directs the SEC 
to use its authority to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for 
securities in accordance with the Congressional findings and objectives set forth in 
Section 1 lA(a)( l )  of the Act. SEC Release No. 34-42212, File No. 4-208 states that 
"among those findings and objectives is the linking of all markets for qualified securities 
through communication and data processing facilities. " 
Trading in UTP eligible securities was further altered on August 29, 2000 when 
the SEC Release No. 34-43217 amended Rule 12f-2 under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to permit national securities exchanges to begin trading in IPOs immediately 
after the first trade in the security is reported by the listing Exchange to the Consolidated 
tape. Previously, Unlisted Trading Privileges became available to an IPO security listed 
on another exchange after the first day of trading on the listing Exchange. The 
amendment became effective November 6, 2000. 
The introduction of the Nasdaq National Market Execution System did not change 
the trading rule for automatic execution of Nasdaq Small Cap securities. Consequently, 
the over-sized order requirement does not apply to Nasdaq SmallCap issues. Although 
participation in automatic execution for Nasdaq SmallCap securities remains voluntary, 
market makers that receive SelectNet orders that match the market maker's quoted price 
and size must honor those orders for Nasdaq SmallCap issues. 
1 2  
1A3. Nasdaq SuperMontage 
On January 19, 200 1, the SEC approved the establishment of the Nasdaq Order 
Display Facility (NODF) and Order Collector Facility (OCF). Modifications to the 
Nasdaq National Market System were also approved.9 Collectively, the changes are 
known as the SuperMontage proposal. The SuperMontage proposal was designed to alter 
Nasdaq's systems in three main areas: ( 1) quote/order collection; (2) quote/order display; 
and (3) execution services. Perhaps the most significant goal of the SuperMontage 
proposal is to increase the amount of trading interest displayed to the market, thereby 
increasing transparency and enhancing the price discovery process. 
The acceptance of the SuperMontage proposal by the SEC was conditioned on 
several stipulations. The SEC stated "The commission has considered the SuperMontage 
proposal in the context of increased demand for information about trading interest, 
increased competition among execution service providers, and changes in Nasdaq's 
ownership structure. The Exchange Act requires the commission to approve the 
proposed rule changes if it finds that the changes are consistent with the requirements of 
the Exchange Act applicable to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASO). 1 0  
In this context, including Nasdaq's demutualization, application for registration as an 
exchange, and impending full separation of the NASO and Nasdaq, and for the reasons 
discussed in this release, the Commission finds that the proposed rule changes are 
consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act applicable to the NASO and 
therefore approves the proposed rule changes." 1 1  This statement identifies the impending 9 See SEC Release No. 34-43863 
10 The National Association of Securities Dealers owns the Nasdaq. 1 1  See SEC Release No. 34-43863 13 
full separation of the NASD and Nasdaq as influencing the decision to accept the SuperMontage proposal. The Commission's belief that full separation is impending is understandable considering "the NASD board adopted a resolution stating its intent to divest itself of all remaining shares of Nasdaq not subject to outstanding warrants by June 30, 2002, subject to existing contractual and legal arrangements and to the reasonable judgment of NASD management that market conditions permit. "  While Nasdaq completed the repurchase of the 33,768,895 shares of common stock not subject to outstanding warrants on March 8, 2002, the NASD still owns 43,225,976 shares of common stock underlying the warrants issued by the NASD as part of its restructuring of the ownership in Nasdaq. 1 2  Furthermore, the NASD owns all of the outstanding shares of Series A and B Nasdaq preferred stock. While Series A shares do not have voting rights, Series B shares entitle the NASD to cast the number of votes that when combined with all other votes that the NASD is entitled to vote by virtue of ownership, proxies or voting trusts, enables the NASD to cast one vote more than one-half of all votes to be cast by stockholders. However, if Nasdaq obtains exchange registration, Series B preferred shares will automatically lose their voting rights and be redeemed by Nasdaq. Therefore, until the Nasdaq obtains exchange registration, the "impending full separation of the NASD and Nasdaq " will go unfulfilled even though the trading platform SuperMontage will be operable. Prior to approval of the SuperMontage proposal, commenting participants expressed concern about conflicts of interest with respect to the NASD's ownership of 
1 2  See Nasdaq March 2002 10-Q. 
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Nasdaq. For example, Archipelago LLC, one of the original four ECNs approved in January 1997 by the Commission comments, "Nasdaq's entry into the execution business presents severe conflicts of interest with respect to NASD's ownership of Nasdaq, its ownership of NASDR, and Nasdaq's role as the SIP (securities information processor). " 1 3  In particular, Archipelago was concerned that Nasdaq has a competitive advantage as the sole securities information processor by controlling and studying the Order Audit Trail System ("OATS") in which all NASD members are compelled to participate. 14 Market participants are responding to changes in Nasdaq's execution and reporting systems by creating alliances with regional exchanges seeking to establish themselves as national securities exchanges. For instance, on October 25, 2001, the SEC approved a proposal by the Pacific Exchange (PCX) to establish the Archipelago Exchange ("ArcaEx ".) ArcaEx is the first fully electronic National Securities Exchange for trading equity securities since 1976. On March 22, 2002, the Archipelago Exchange began trading 27 Pacific Exchange exclusively listed shares. Phase-in schedules for listed stocks occur between July 1st and July 19, 2002. Trading in certain Nasdaq stocks through ArcaEx began February 14, 2003. The SuperMontage trading platform should eliminate some drawbacks to Nasdaq's current quotation and trading system. Prior to SuperMontage, each Nasdaq quoting market participant and UTP Exchange was permitted to enter a single quotation into the system at any one time. The quotation may reflect customer limit orders, the .1 3 The National Association of Securities Dealers Regulation (NASDR) is a subsidiary of the NASD that regulates the activities of the Nasdaq market and brokers/dealers. 
14 See Archipelago comments in response to file number SR-NASD-99-53, September 1 5, 2000. 15 
Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant's or UTP Exchange's proprietary trading interest, or 
both. Market makers are subject to double liability exposure because SOES and 
SelectNet systems are not currently integrated. Although SelectNet is an order delivery 
service rather than an execution service, orders delivered to a market maker or ECN at its 
displayed quotation creates an obligation to execute the order at the quoted price and 
size." 1 5  Prior to Super Montage, Nasdaq quotation systems displayed the best bid and 
offer of a Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant or UTP Exchange. 16  However, market 
participants prefer to be able to observe trading interest outside of a Nasdaq Quoting 
Market Participant's or UTP exchanges' best bid and offer. Consequently, the 
SuperMontage is designed to modify Nasdaq systems in three principal areas: ( 1 ) 
quote/order collection; (2) quote/order display; and (3) execution services. 
Super Montage will increase the ability of UTP exchanges and Nasdaq Quoting 
Market Participants to present orders and quotes in the Nasdaq market. It will allow, but 
not force, Nasdaq Quoting Market Participants and UTP Exchanges to enter multiple 
quotes and/or orders at varying or the same prices. Although market makers will be 
required to maintain a two-sided attributable (i.e. not anonymous) quote/order complying 
with Commission and NASD rules, SuperMontage will enable Nasdaq Quoting Market 
Participants to submit non-attributable (i.e. anonymous) quotes/orders. UTP Exchanges 
can submit non-attributable agency quotes/orders, but principal orders must be 
attributable. 17  
1 5  See Firm Quote Role. 
16 Release No.34-43863 notes that the large majority of orders are executed outside Nasdaq's order delivery and execution systems via direct links, including dedicated line and telephone, among the ECNs, UTP exchanges, and market makers. 
17 Principal orders are orders by a broker/dealer when buying or selling for its ' own account. 1 6  
Additional information will be gathered from SuperMontage through the 
voluntary submission of additional quotes/orders from market participants in two ways. 
First, best-priced non-attributable quotes /orders from all participants will be aggregated 
into one buy and one sell price, both named "SIZE." Additionally, the best-priced 
attributable quotes/orders of each Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant and UTP Exchange 
will be displayed. The second display modification is the presentation of the three best­
priced quotes/orders through the Nasdaq Order Display Facility (NODF). The three best­
priced quotes/orders come from the aggregation of all quotes/orders, both attributable and 
non-attributable. Information from the second display modification will be provided to 
market data vendors for distribution. 
Changes to Nasdaq's execution services involve the replacement of SOES and 
SelectNet with two new processes: a non-directed order process and a directed order 
process. 
The non-directed order process will be the default execution process for 
marketable orders. Marketable non-directed orders will be matched and either executed 
against, or delivered to, the highest ranked opposite side quotes/orders of the Nasdaq 
Quoting Market Participants and UTP Exchanges on a liability basis. Market makers 
must auto execute these orders while UTP Exchanges and ECNs can choose automatic 
· execution or delivery. 
The non-directed order process will rank quotes /orders of Nasdaq Quoting 
Market Participants and UTP Exchanges according to one of three pre-specified 
algorithms: (1) price/time priority, which is the default algorithm, (2) price/size/time 
priority, or (3) price/time priority that accounts for ECN fees. Order preferencing by a 
17 
Nasdaq participant is allowed if the receiving Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant or UTP 
Exchange is at the best bid-offer. 
The directed order process allows Nasdaq participants to send orders to specific 
UTP Exchanges or Nasdaq Quoting Market Participants. An order is deemed a liability 
order only if it matches the posted quote/order of the recipient. The receipt of directed 
liability orders causes the risk of double liability. The receipt of directed liability orders 
through the Order Control Facility is voluntary for UTP Exchanges and Nasdaq Quoting 
Market Participants. 
Although the Commission notes that controversial issues still remain regarding 
SuperMontage, it concluded that the Nasdaq's agreement to disseminate the details of all 
attributable quotes/orders in the three best price levels on either side of the market 
resolves significant controversy. Furthermore, the Commission states "The result will be 
that all quote/order details will be generally available at the best price levels, except those 
quotes/orders that are submitted on an anonymous basis. The commission believes that 
this additional information will be valuable to competitors that may offer execution 
services complementary to, or in competition with, Nasdaq SuperMontage services . . .  " 
The implementation of SuperMontage is expected to enhance quoting/trading for 
Nasdaq Quoting Market Participants and UTP Exchanges. It will be left for researchers to 
determine if increases in liquidity result from the reduction in dual liability. Furthermore, 
it is unclear what effect the apparent increased ability to quote/trade anonymously will 
have on adverse selection costs and liquidity. 1 8  
1 8  For more details on SuperMontage , see Commission Release No.34-43863. 
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1A4. Changes to the lntermarket Trading System 
The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) arose from the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 197 5 and seeks to connect competing exchanges or markets, enabling 
investors to execute trades at the best prices across all markets. Section 11A(a)(2) of the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 directs the Commission to facilitate the 
establishment of a National Market System (NMS). In March 1978, several exchanges 
submitted a plan to the Commission to operate "an Intermarket Communications 
Linkage," which later became known as the ITS Plan. The American Stock Exchange, 
Boston Stock Exchange, Pacific Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange were 
involved in the creation of the plan. Currently, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
Chicago Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, and N ASD are also ITS 
participants. 
The NYSE sought to be excluded from the ITS. On April 26th 1979, the NYSE 
proposed Rule19c-3 to preclude "exchange off-board trading restriction from applying to 
securities listed after April 26th 1979." 1 9  During hearings for the rule, the NASD 
introduced plans to upgrade its order routing system enabling firms to obtain automatic 
executions against quotations of Third market makers in listed securities. 20 Rule 19c-3 
was adopted on June 11, 1980 with the ITS Plan permanently approved on January 27, 
1983. 19 See Exchange Act Release No. 15769. 20 The upgraded order routing system is known as the Computer Assisted Execution System (CAES). 
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Although the expansion of the ITS/CAES linkage to include non-Rule19c-3 
Securities was considered as early as November 12, 1991, because of disagreement 
among the ITS participants a supportable proposal was not introduced until the 
Commission proposed its own initiative in July 1998.21  
Effective February 14, 2000, the Commission implemented amendments to the 
Intermarket Trading System. The amendments expanded the ITS/Computer Assisted 
Execution System linkage to all listed securities, including non-Rule19c-3 securities. 
Although all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, and Nasdaq National Market are eligible for UTP trading by other exchanges 
or markets, there is a limit to the number of Nasdaq National Market issues that an 
exchange can trade at a single point in time.22 The limit is currently 1000 issues with the 
Chicago Stock Exchange being the only active UTP participant. 
In conclusion, the commission expanded the ITS to include non-Rule19c-3 
securities believing that the expansion would, "increase market efficiency and 
transparency, reduced trade-throughs, and level the playing field between the third 
market firms and exchanges; decrease market fragmentation and produce long-term 
benefits to the National Market System; increase the liquidity and competitiveness of the 
securities markets; and increase the opportunity for investors to obtain the best price 
available in all markets for orders in exchange-listed securities. "23 
21 Although the Commission solicited comment on the ITS/CAES expansion in the proposed release of the 
Order Handling Rules in 1 995, the expansion was not included in the adoption releaseed. 
22 See Chapter 2 of the revised January 2001 Nasdaq Trader Manual. 
23 Nasdaq memo dated January 28, 2000, Re: expansion of the Intermarket Trading System to include non­
Rulel 9c-3 Securities. See the Nasdaq Trader Manual, Chapter 1 1  to obtain information on registration as a 
Consolidated Quotation Service Market Maker and quotation and trading policies as of October 2000. 
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1 A5 .  SelectNet Modifications 
In July 200 1 ,  Nasdaq begin implementing further changes to SOES and 
· SelectNet. The changes are designed to reduce dual liability and reestablish SelectNet as 
an order delivery and negotiation system for NNM securities . The changes are also 
designed to allow market makers to use the automatic execution system for transactions 
for their own accounts. Additionally, the upgrades enable system interaction with a 
market makers reserve size. Overall ,  an increase in trading efficiency is expected. 24 
lB .  1 997 Order Handling Rules (OHR) 
Of f September 6th 1 996, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new 
rules designed to address increasing concerns about the handling of customer orders. The 
Order Handling Rules (OHR) were written to give all investors equal access to the best­
priced orders. It mandates that investor limit orders that improve the inside market must 
be displayed in the quote montage. In particular, the Commission adopted Rule Ac l -4, 
the Display Rule, and Rule 1 1  Ac 1 - 1 ,  the Quote Rule. The Commission expected these 
rules to help the development of an efficient, competitive and transparent National 
Market System in which all market participants could achieve best execution of their 
orders.25 
The Display Rule "requires OTC market makers and specialists to display the 
price and full-size of customer limit orders when these orders represent buying and 
24 See the SuperSoes/SelectNet Modifications Fact Sheet Revised June 19, 200 1 . 25 See 17  CFR part 40, Release No.34-37619A, File No. S7-30-95. 2 1  
selling interest that is at a better price than a specialist's or OTC market maker's public 
quote. OTC market makers and specialists also must increase the size of the quote for a 
particular security to reflect a limit order of greater than de minimus size when the limit 
order is priced equal to the specialist's or OTC market maker's disseminated quote, and 
that quote is equal to the national best bid or offer. " However, when a specialist or market 
maker sends a limit order to an exchange, registered national securities association 
system or Electronic Communications Network that complies with the Display Rule, they 
are exempted from the rule. Thus, market makers can avoid posting a customer's limit 
order in its own quotes by routing the limit order to an ECN. 
The Quote Rule requires the collection and public dissemination of the best bid, 
best offer, and size for each market quoting any security covered by the Quote Rule. In 
particular, market makers that elect to quote a Nasdaq National Market security must 
publish those quotes. Furthermore, the rule requires that quotations be firm with market 
makers and specialists generally obligated to execute orders at prices that are at least as 
favorable as their published bid or offer up to the size of their published bid or offer. 
The Order Handling Rules added three amendments to the Quote Rule. The first 
amendment requires an OTC market maker or specialist to make orders placed through 
an ECN publicly available if the orders price-improve the specialist's or market maker's 
public quotation. However, if the ECN orders are publicly disseminated and available to 
other brokers/dealers, then those market makers or specialists are deemed in compliance 
with the Quote Rule. Consequently, a market maker is not required to reflect a better­
priced order in its quotes when the market maker routes the order to an ECN. This 
display option is known as the ECN display alternative. 
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The second Quote Rule amendment extends the mandatory Quote Rule to OTC 
market makers and specialists whose volume exceeds 1 % of the aggregate volume over 
the most recent calendar quarter. 
The third Quote Rule amendment extends certain Quote Rule provisions to 
voluntarily quoted Nasdaq SmallCap securities. Specifically, the firmness obligations that 
formerly applied only to Nasdaq National Market securities are extended to SmallCap 
securities. 
1 C. Regulation for Alternative Trading Systems 
On December 2, 1 998, the SEC voted to publish two releases to modernize 
regulations for Alternative Trading Systems (ATS). The commission provided three 
primary concerns leading to the adoption of the two releases: ( 1 )  Alternative Trading 
Systems are regulated as traditional broker-dealers. Consequently, prior regulations failed 
to provide access to best prices, audit trail ,  adequate surveillance, or adequate prevention 
of system outages to investors; (2) regulatory requirements for registered exchanges and 
the NASO hinder their ability to compete with Alternative Trading Systems. Specifically, 
the NASO and registered exchanges must solicit public comment and receive SEC 
approval prior to changing their rules ; and (3) registered exchanges or exchanges 
considering registration may wish to operate as a for-profit organization rather than a not­
for-profit, member-owned corporation. 
The December 2, 1 998 releases address these issues by: ( 1 )  creating a new 
regulatory framework for Alternative Trading Systems that enhances investor protection 
and incorporates the systems into the national market system; (2) allowing registered 23 I • 
exchanges and the NASD to postpone seeking SEC approval of low-volume pilot trading systems for two years, and to trade new derivative securities products without prior commission approval if listing standards are in place; and (3) allowing registered exchanges to operate as for-profit businesses. The new regulatory framework for Alternative Trading Systems allows their registration as broker/dealers. Although registration as broker/dealers was allowed prior to Regulation ATS, additional requirements are imposed on those choosing to register as broker/dealers. First, when an Alternative Trading System is responsible for 5% or more of the trading volume on an exchange or Nasdaq listed security, the ATS must link with a registered exchange or the NASD and publicly display its best priced orders. Furthermore, those quotes must be executable by the registered exchanges and the NASD. However, only the orders that participants in an ATS choose to show to two or more participants must be publicly displayed (i.e. reserve sizes are excluded) . For exchange-listed securities, if a system for publicly displaying orders from an ATS to a national securities exchange or association does not exist, then an Alternative Trading System will not be violating Rule 301 (b )(3) for failing to post quotes. "Rule 301(b)(3) requires an alternative trading system to provide to a national securities exchange or national securities association, for inclusion in the public quotations system, prices and sizes of its best priced buy and sell orders, that are displayed to more than one person, in each covered security in which the alternative trading system represents 5% or more of the trading volume. " 26 Securities became subject to regulation A TS from 1999 26 See SEC Release No.34-4 1297. 
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through 2000. 27 The schedules were determined by ranking all covered securities on 
Nasdaq, according to their January 1 999 volume, into deciles taking an equal number of 
securities from each decile. Securities listed after January 1999 became subject to the 
requirements on June 20, 2000. 
The second additional requirement is the assurance of certain capacity, integrity, 
and security standards for an Alternative Trading System with 20% or more of the trading 
volume of a security. 
The last additional requirement is the prohibition of unfair discrimination among 
investors and brokers/dealers seeking access to an Alternative Trading System with 20% 
or more of the trading volume of a security.28 
1D. Decimal Pricing in the U.S. Securities Markets 
On January 28, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an order 
directing the exchanges and NASO to submit a decimalization implementation plan.29 
The commission recognized the potential benefits of decimal pricing over fraction-based 
pricing as early as January 2nd, 1994.30 In the order, the Commission stated that it 
believes decimal pricing could benefit investors by enhancing investor comprehension, 
facilitating globalization of U.S. markets, and potentially reducing transactions costs, 
27 The phase-in dates were August 23, 1 999 for Schedule A securities, September 28, 1999 for Schedule B 
securities, April 25, 2000 for Schedule C securities, and all other securities by June 20, 2000. 
28 SEC Release No.34-4 1297 also discusses a technical change to Rule of Practice 202.3(b)(2) regarding 
the process of applying for registration or exemption of registration as a national security exchange. 
29 Release No.34-42360, File No. 4-430. 
30 Division of Market Regulation, Commission, Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market 
Developments, January 1 994. 
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depending on the minimum price increment chosen. Consequently, the SEC issued the 
order pursuant to Section 11A(a)(2) and Section 11A(a)(3).3 1  
The implementation of decimalization occurred in a step-wise fashion which 
differed across exchanges. All stocks were not universally subjected to the new 
regulations at the same time because some exchanges made the transition to decimal 
pricing more easily than others. The first group of stocks began trading in decimals on 
August 28, 2000 and only included companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The second group of stocks began 
trading in decimals on September 25, 2000 and again only included companies listed on 
the NYSE and AMEX. The third pilot group was comprised only of NYSE stocks and 
subject to the new rules as of December 4, 2000. Finally, virtually all NYSE and AMEX 
listed companies began trading in decimals on January 29, 2001. 
Nasdaq listed companies were subjected to the new trading rules in three phases. 
The first group of stocks became subject to trading in decimals on March 12, 2001, the 
second on March 26, 2001, and all remaining issues on April 9, 2001. 32 31  The first section directs the Commission, having due regard for the public interest, the protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to use its authority under the Securities Act of 1934 to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities. The second section " gives the commission the ability to authorize or require by order the self-regulatory organizations to act �ointly*** in planning, developing, operating, or regulating a national market system." 
2 On July 1 8, 2001 ,  the Commission issued Release No. 34-44568, File No. S?- 14-0 1 ,  requesting comment on the effects of decimal trading in subpennies. 26 
lE. Other Developments On February 24, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the International Securities Exchange LLC (" ISE ") as a national securities exchange.33 According to the International Securities Exchange, it is "the first new registered U.S. Securities Exchange in 26 years, first fully electronic options exchange in the United States, and the world's first options marketplace combining electronic trading with auction market principles. "34 Trading began on May 26, 2000. As of July 17, 2002, the International Securities Exchange is the industry volume leader in the 509 issues that it trades and is now the primary market in volume terms for 276 of its issues.35 Furthermore, the International Security Exchange's market share has risen to 28% for all 509 issues, and to 25.1 % in all listed equity options. The 509 issues listed for trading account for more than 90 percent of all equity options volume across all five U.S. options exchanges. Since options trading is outside the scope of this work, a detailed discussion of ISE rules and trading systems is not warranted. However, it should be noted that the trading of options on equities has been shown to affect the quality of the underlying equity market. Consequently, the shift in order flow to the ISE from the other exchanges could impact trading in those underlying securities. In summary, changes to trading systems and regulations since the introduction of the 1997 Order Handling Rules may affect investors' choice of trading venue. These changes may ultimately impact market depth and the probability of informed trading. 33 See Release No.34-42455. 
34 ISE news release, "International Securities Exchange files for registration with the SEC." 35 ISE news release, "International Securities Exchange trades 150-million contract." 27 
Chapter 2 Changes in Depth 
2A. Introduction 
While researchers have documented evidence of smaller bid-ask spreads for 
stocks actively traded through ECNs, other important contributions of Alternative 
Trading Systems to market depth and liquidity are still to be documented.36 Similarly, the 
long-term effects of trading in decimals on market depth and liquidity are unknown. 
Therefore, the combined effects of increased trading through Alternative Trading 
Systems and trading in decimals on liquidity are unknown and may have significant 
implications for both market liquidity and the related trading costs. It is the goal of this 
chapter to investigate the joint impact of A TS and decimalization on market depth. 
Liquidity has been long discussed in the finance literature. Engle and Lange 
(2001) define liquidity as the ability to transact at low cost. In this context, liquidity is 
said to decrease as the cost to execute a transaction increases. Consequently, investors are 
concerned about liquidity because transactions costs reduce performance. 
The bid-ask spread is often considered a measure of liquidity since it represents 
the difference between the price at which an individual investor can buy (the ask price) 
and sell (the bid price) a given number of shares for a specific stock. However, the bid­
ask spread is not a complete measure of liquidity since the quoted inside spread is firm 
for only a limited, usually relatively small, number of shares. Engle and Lange (2001) 
refer to the bid-ask spread as a measure of tightness of the market price for low volume 
trades. Therefore, tightness, or the bid-ask spread, represents just one component of 
liquidity. 36 Strother et al. (2003) 
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The second component of liquidity is depth; the maximum number of shares that 
can be traded at a given price. Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical market reaction curve, 
which shows the expected transaction price per share given the desired number of shares 
to be traded for a specific stock. Tightness is represented as the vertical distance between 
the prices at which the buy and sell curves intersect the price line. The buy and sell 
curves look like staircases to reflect the lumpiness of quotation sizes. Depth is the 
horizontal distance between the price line and the number of shares to be traded. The 
steeper the market reaction curve, the larger the price impact for a given trade volume. 
Therefore, steeper market reaction curves reflect lower liquidity and higher transactions 
costs. 
Literature Review 
Early microstructure literature argued that individual stock volatility, price, and 
trading volume are important determinants of liquidity.37 Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) state that from an inventory perspective, individual-stock dollar 
volume should reduce spreads and increase depth; individual-stock volatility should have 
the opposite effect. When informed traders are the sole possessors of information, 
asymmetric information should increase both spreads and volatility. Furthermore, if 
informed traders earn higher profits than uninformed traders, spreads should increase as 
volatility increases. 
Harris ( 1997) suggests that smaller tick sizes may reduce liquidity. Recall that 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical Market Reaction Curve 
market makers' revenues are, at least partially, derived from the spread through buying at 
the bid price and selling at the ask price. Assuming that trading volume does not increase 
proportionally to the decrease in spreads, market makers expect to earn lower revenues in 
the presence of tighter spreads. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that lower 
returns (i.e. profits) by market makers will induce them to assume less risk. 
There are at least two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, ways in which market 
makers can reduce their risk to adjust for tighter bid-ask spreads. First market makers 
could reduce expected inventory holding costs by lowering the number of shares they 
hold. Alternatively, they could decrease their posted obligations to trade (quote size), 
thereby reducing the magnitude of possible changes in inventory holdings. If they choose 
to reduce the number of shares they hold, there should be a one-time adjustment in depth 
at the time of the move to decimalization. Market makers could then keep their quoted 
30 
size similar to pre-decimalization levels. If market makers choose to reduce their quote 
sizes, then there should be an unambiguous decrease in depth. 
Some foreign exchanges pre-empted the move by U.S. securities markets to quote 
in decimals . .  For example, the Toronto Stock Exchange began quoting in decimals in 
1995. In general, researchers have found that the change to decimals reduced spreads but 
did not adversely affect liquidity. 38 On the other hand, reduced spreads attracted more 
trading interest away from the upstairs market and onto the floor. After the move to 
decimals, market makers executed more trades less than 1,000 shares in Toronto, but the 
upstairs market executed fewer trades less than 10,000.39 
Prior to the move to decimalization, U.S. securities markets reduced tick-sizes 
from $ 1/8 to $ 1/16. Atkinson and Martin ( 1999) find that the reduction in tick sizes on 
the NYSE resulted in a smaller spreads and lower depth. However, they find no evidence 
of increased daily volatility. Furthermore, they find a reduction in trade-to-trade 
volatility. Bollen and Whaley (1998) show that spreads for low-priced stocks decreased 
the most on a percentage basis. Smith (1998) and Christie et al. (1999) find that benefits 
of smaller tick sizes on Nasdaq are similar to those on the NYSE, evidenced by smaller 
quoted and effective spreads, decreased depth, and insignificant changes in volatility. 
Preliminary research investigates the impact of trading in decimals on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Chakravarty and Wood (2000) show that trading in decimals has 
reduced quoted and effective spreads for the first few sets of pilot stocks.40 Additionally, 
they find a decline in depth. Bacidore, Battalio, and Jennings (2001) find reduced 38 See Bacidore ( 1 997), Porter and Weaver ( 1 997), and Mac Kinnon and Nimeroff ( 1 999). 39 See Griffiths, et al. ( 1998). 
40 See Chapter 1 for details on the transition to decimal trading. 
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liquidity in both the limit order book and displayed quotes. Furthermore, the supply of 
limit orders and the specialists' quote size both declined. They show that member firms 
provide more liquidity, but individuals provide less liquidity, after the move to decimals 
on the NYSE. 
Nasdaq Economic Research (2001) investigates the impact of Decimalization on 
the Nasdaq Stock Market in its final report to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Using data for all stocks that converted to decimal quoting on April 9, 2001, the paper 
investigates changes in Nasdaq characteristics occurring between the two weeks 
preceding and the two weeks following the conversion to quoting in decimals. 
Nasdaq Economic Research notes an important caveat concerning the Final 
Report to the SEC. The report states that " . . . it attempts to measure the initial impacts of 
decimals only. In light of the major changes it has induced, it is possible if not likely the 
ultimate impact of the decimals may take a number of months to reveal itself. Many 
markets participants, investors as well as market intermediaries, are in the process 
adapting to the new trading environment. It is also possible that some of the observed 
results are due to a novelty effect. What we measure in the first two weeks maybe 
substantially different a year from now. " Thus, although the Nasdaq Economic Research 
Final Report to the SEC is informative, it does not provide any long-term evidence of the 
impacts of moving trading to decimals. Consequently, this long-term investigation will 
help policy makers determine if the anticipated outcome of decimalization is reached. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to review the preliminary findings presented in the Final 




The Nasdaq Final Report to the SEC finds that after controlling for the day-to-day 
fluctuations in trading activity, the number of quote updates increased by 12 percent or 
more. However, there was little change in the number of trades or share volume. Quoted 
and effective spreads declined for most stocks, by an average of 50 percent. Although 
large institutional orders' transaction costs do not appear to have risen, small retail orders 
benefited the most from reduced spreads. The quoted size posted at the inside fell about 
two-thirds, but the cumulative displayed depth fell by a much smaller percentage. No 
increase in intra-day volatility was found. 
Informational-sensitive liquidity traders attempt to distinguish informed traders 
from uninformed traders. Several studies find evidence of liquidity traders' attempts to 
distinguish informed and uninformed traders using both the bid-ask spread and the price 
impact of a trade. Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Hasbrouck (1988) uncover a positive 
relationship between price impact and trade size. This suggests that informed agents trade 
more heavily in an attempt to profit from their depreciating informational advantages. 
Mclnish and Wood ( 1992) show that the bid-ask spread widens following large volume 
orders. 
Foster and Viswanathan ( 1995) suggest that the intensity of trading may be 
positively correlated with the proportion of informed agents because informed agents are 
often constrained by the time sensitivity of their information. Consequently, since the 
number of transactions or the number of shares per unit of time measure the intensity of 
trading activity, they should be a function of information asymmetry. 
Engle and Lange (2001) use NYSE transaction and quote data from November 1, 
1990 to January 31, 1991, and from August 1997 through December 1997, to identify, 33 .. . . 
measure and model intraday variations in the market depth of individual stocks. They 
propose a new intraday measure of market liquidity, VNET, which directly measures the 
depth of the market corresponding to a particular price deterioration. They find that 
market depth varies with volume, transactions, and volatility. They interpret changes in 
the market depth in terms of the varying proportion of informed traders in an asymmetric 
information model. 
Engle and Lange estimate their model for the length of a price-duration (PTIME) 
and the net directional volume traded within a price duration (VNET) over the two time 
periods and find similar parameter estimates. They conclude that the stability of the price 
estimates suggests that their price-duration approach captures some of the fundamental 
determinants of equity market liquidity. 
Using VNET, Engle and Lange estimate the shape of the market reaction curve. 
They find that the realized depth of the market varies according to trading conditions. 
Furthermore, the percentage imbalance between buys and sells sufficient to move prices 
declines with the total number of shares traded. The number of transactions per duration 
reduces the depth of the market. This supports the idea that informed traders flood the 
market after a semi-private news event. Additionally, movements in VNET are 
negatively correlated with movements in the bid-ask spread. The positive impact of the 
expected duration length on expected VNET suggests that when the market is volatile, it 
will offer less depth. Unanticipated shocks to the length of a price duration increase 
realized depth. The authors conclude that these results carry the implication that trading 
behavior may play a significant role in shaping and predicting the intraday liquidity of the 
stock market. 
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Easley, Engle, O'Hara, and Wu (2001) propose a dynamic model of trading and 
estimate the model on 16 actively traded stocks on the New York Stock Exchange over 
15 years of transactions data. They investigate the implications of trade dynamics on 
security price processes such as market liquidity, depth, and volatility. 
Easley, Engle, O'Hara, and Wu estimate the price impact of a sequence of trade 
orders, i.e. buy orders and sell orders, based on Bayes updating. Given arrival rate 
forecasts, they construct a measure of market depth, the half life of the price impacts for 
consecutive buys, analogous to Engle and Lange's market depth measure VNET. 
VNET and the half life measure of Easley et al. differ in at least two ways. First, 
VNET is defined by the excess trading volume while the half life is only concerned with 
the number of trades. Additionally, trade size is not considered in the half life. Second, 
VNET implicitly assumes that only the net trade imbalance matters on the price 
movement. That is, the sequence of trades is of no consequence. However, the half life 
assumes that the exact sequence of trading plays a role in the price movement. 
Consequently, the half life is based on the consecutive number of buys instead of net 
order flows. 
Easley et al. find that the half lives for most stocks are positively correlated with 
the total number of trades. Consequently, the market is deeper in the presence of more 
trades. Additionally, they show that the half lives for most stocks are negatively 
correlated with the ratio of trade imbalance over total trades, suggesting that market depth 
decreases with the proportion of informed trades. Finally, the authors show that 
differences in mean half life exist across stocks, demonstrating differences in market 
depth. 35 
Data 
The data for this study were retrieved from the Nastraq and TAQ databases. 
Nastraq and T AQ are publicly available trade and quote data offered by Nasdaq and the 
New York Stock Exchange, respectively. All trades, quotes, trade times, quote times, 
trade sizes, quote sizes, and market maker identifiers for each quote are obtained from 
Nastraq for a sample of 100 Nasdaq listed companies. All trades, quotes, trade times, 
quote times, trade sizes, and quote sizes are obtained from T AQ for a sample of 100 
NYSE listed companies. 
To investigate differences in market depth between the NYSE and Nasdaq, two 
matched portfolios are created. Firms are matched on the number of shares traded. First, 
all NYSE listed firms are ranked by the number of shares traded during December 1998 
and placed into share volume deciles. The ten firms with the highest volume from each 
decile are chosen, for a total of 100 firms. Next, all Nasdaq listed companies are sorted 
by number of shares traded during December 1998. Documented differences in trade 
reporting procedures between the NYSE and Nasdaq require Nasdaq trade volume to be 
adjusted to be comparable to NYSE trade volume.41 Therefore, the number of shares 
traded for Nasdaq companies is divided by 2. Lastly, the closest Nasdaq adjusted volume 
is identified for each NYSE company. Any duplicate matches are eliminated by keeping 
the closest match and re-matching the duplicate (i.e. The Nasdaq companies are sampled 
without replacement.) 
The high computational costs of trade and quote data cause researchers to limit 
both the number of companies and length of the period under investigation when 
41 See Daves, Wansley, and Zhang (2003) and Dyl and Anderson (2003). 
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investigating microstructure issues. For example, Engle and Lange (2001) use a sample 
of 17 NYSE listed, actively traded companies over 61 trading days to investigate market 
liquidity. Similarly, the sample employed here is limited to keep computational costs 
manageable. 
For both the NYSE and Nasdaq portfolios, data are obtained covering four two­
week periods; a two-week trading period one-year prior to the move to trading in 
decimals, the two-week period immediately preceding the move to trading in decimals, 
the two-week period immediately following decimalization, and a two-week period 
occurring one year after the beginning of trading in decimals. 
The portfolio of Nasdaq companies is created from those companies that were 
subject to trading in decimals on April 19, 2001. Consequently, the period before 
decimalization ranges from Thursday, April 5, 2001 through Wednesday, April 18, 2001. 
The related one-year prior period is from April 19, 1999 to April 30, 1999. The 
immediate post period is from April 19, 2001 to May 2, 2001. The one-year anniversary 
post period extends from Friday, April 19, 2002 to Thursday, May 2, 2002. 
The second portfolio includes only NYSE listed companies that were subject to 
trading in decimals on January 29, 2001. The companies in this portfolio are also selected 
by the ranking procedure detailed for Nasdaq listed companies. Therefore, the NYSE 
portfolio also includes 100 companies. 
The portfolio of NYSE companies is a subset of those companies that were 
subject to trading in decimals on January 15, 2001. Consequently, the one-year prior 
period is from January 29, 1999 to February 11, 1999. The sample period before 
decimalization ranges from Monday, January 15, 2001 through Friday, January 26, 2001. 
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The immediate post period is from January 29, 2001 to February 9, 2001. The one-year 
anniversary post period extends from Tuesday, January 29, 2002 to Monday, February 
11, 2002. The resulting portfolios of stocks for the NYSE and Nasdaq are presented in 
Table 1. 
2B. Methodology 
Several steps are required to measure or forecast the impact of Alternative 
Trading Systems on market depth. First, the VNET measure of Engle and Lange (2001) is 
computed. Next, the conditional expectation of the time between price changes is 
estimated. Lastly, a cross-sectional time series model of market depth is estimated. 
Engle and Lange (2001) propose a new intraday measure of market liquidity­
VNET. VNET defines market depth as the number of shares that can be bought or sold 
within a given price range. Given this definition of market depth, Engle and Lange argue 
that the measurement interval for a technique used to estimate market depth should be 
dictated by price levels, instead of calendar time. Consequently, VNET is created to 
directly measure the depth of the market corresponding to a particular price interval or 
duration. 
VNET defines the realized depth of the market as the imbalance between the 
number of shares bought and the number of shares sold within a pre-specified price 
duration. To compute VNET, a price threshold must first be specified for each individual 





Table 1 :  Study Sample 
A matched sample approach is used to select the companies included in the study. First, all NYSE firms are ranked by the 
number of shares traded in December 1998 and placed into share volume deciles. The ten firms with the highest volume 
are chosen from each decile for a total of 100 firms. The matched sample of Nasdaq listed firms is created by choosing 
for each NYSE firm, the Nasdaq listed company that traded the most similar share volume during December 1998. * 
Nasdaq NYSE 
Nasdaq Shares Nasdaq Shares I NYSE Shares NYSE Shares 
Firm Traded Firm Traded I Firm Traded Firm Traded 
SMXC 305300 MEDX 4347300 MUO 1 53 100 E 2 1 69300 
DUCK 3 12500 OSIP 4349000 VIM 1 53600 GVA 2 1 75800 
TACX 3 1 5300 WORK 4350400 PAI 156000 AC 2 1 76 1 00 
ASCA 3 16000 ALKS 4360200 SKP 1 57600 MHK 2180600 
PENX 3 16700 EXBT 4392900 MHO 1 58200 COE 21 97400 
LUFK 321200 VNWK 4400100 vcv 1 58600 HMX 2201 800 
HUBG 322800 ANAD 4406800 AK 160700 LDG 2202900 
THRD 324200 EMMS 4428 100 CBA 1 6 1400 BQT 2209300 DIAN 326100 REMC 4433400 AMN 1 62 100 WNC 2214800 
scsc 648700 TOPP 4434000 SCL 1 62800 WRC 22 15400 
ATGI 65 1900 DRTE 7252200 IQM 325500 PIM 3687000 
HRLY 653 100 PRST 7276600 STW 325500 TSO 3724400 
RCCC 653700 ASFC 734 1300 AMU 325800 BNO 3726200 
NEOG 659300 CAND 7365500 IMT 326400 MIL 3733500 
PCDI 660200 RGBK 7385 100 GAM 329600 DY 3735 100 
AVTR 660200 APAC 7406900 NGI 330100 EL 3742900 
MDEA 662500 HMSY 7424800 NUC 33 1 200 JP 3749300 
PLFE 665500 SCFS 7429400 ALZ 333200 coo 3754500 
BVAS 668300 DSTM 7481400 CNE 333900 FTS 3773700 
AULT 672400 DAVX 7528900 PPM 336200 PSA 3787200 
DRYR 1083200 NTAP 12293900 BKH 54 1 200 AGE 6177400 
RICK 1084500 SPLN 1 23 1 2800 EGP 542300 ucu 6210400 
MINI 1 089900 SOTR 1 2407600 PEI 545600 WPI 6217400 
BTRN 109 1500 MEDI 1 2422200 SBR 546300 PNM 6219200 
TECUA 1 1 10600 PTEN 1 2556600 . SEL 555 1 00 usu 6269000 
+:>,. 
0 
Table 1 Continued 
A matched S3.Jl1)le approach is used to select the COl11)anies included in the study. First, all NYSE firms are ranked by the 
nurmer of shares traded in December 1998 and placed into share vohnre deciles. 1be ten firms with the highest vohnre 
are chosen from each decile for a total of 100 firms. 1be matched sarq>le of Nasdaq listed firms is created by choosing 
for each NYSE firm, the Nasdaq listed company that traded the roost similar share volurre during December 1998.* 
Nasdaq NYSE 
Nasdaq Shares Nasdaq Shares NYSE Shares NYSE Shares 
Firm Traded Firm Traded Firm Traded Firm Traded 
TACT 1 1 13800 NEfM 1 2588400 WES 559200 PPL 6299000 
HOFF 1 1 1 7300 TRAC 127 12 100 DEL 559900 EfN 6350500 
LTRE 1 122900 TWMC 1 2728 100 FCF 560400 OOL 635 1 100 
BITS 1 1 23600 HLYW 1 275 1 600 BMT 560800 AHG 6375 100 
ODEfA 1 124400 PCCC 1 2827600 APX 561 100 TEO 6406100 
HGSI 1777700 CELL 23740000 FRT 89 1500 TOP 1 3387800 
NA1R 1780100 ADSK 23963900 MDA 894300 PCG 1 3420300 
OPTI 1 794500 INSP 24965 1 00 VLY 898 100 GLW 1 3434300 
ZIGO 1797800 BBBY 25509400 EfT 903300 APA 13655800 
CBUK 1 809100 SANM 25590200 BLX 904600 NR 1 38 14900 
LARS 1 809600 CHIR 261 1 1400 TLD 904800 PZL 1 3838 100 
QADI 1 826900 AMKR 27277900 PKE 905700 ZAP 13979000 
SNAP 1 834800 CENT 27566800 LFG 905800 BAX 1401 8200 
LNCB 1 835900 PEfM 28693500 ION 9 1 1 500 KSS 14172900 
FU1R 1 839300 VTSS 30414700 RYL 91 1900 TSM 1 4210900 
QDIN 2821900 BAMM 1 1 591 7300 GFF 1424500 BAC 97396500 
mo 2823500 PSFT 1 1 8707900 ESF 1426000 MU 104150000 
FSII 2824800 AMAT 139334500 FOE 1427700 DIS 1 1 1583800 
ALXN 2838400 YHOO 1 43294200 RI 1428200 SLB 1 1 3698300 
DTPI 2844000 COMS 17 1464600 WLT 1433000 MO 1 14796000 
APLX 2852100 ORCL 193926000 POS 1433 100 T 1 28630300 
GLFD 2856800 WCOM 283639400 ATS 1434800 LU 1 33647700 
ANSR 2885600 MSFT 308842100 GRB 1441 100 CD 1 38 146700 
BSTE 2893800 INTC 3 1 1089200 IPP 1445600 C 145404500 
BKUNA 291 1 500 csco 349695900 MM 1447400 BA 163745500 
* Reported share volurre count differences between the NYSE and Nasdaq are adjusted for by dividing Nasdaq reported share volurre by 2. 
When a price quote moves beyond the specified threshold, a price or information event is said to have occurred, signaling the end of a price duration.42 Alternatively, a return threshold can be used to identify an informational event. I choose to use return thresholds because share price differences across stocks cause a given price change to have different importance across those stocks. For example, a price move of $0.25 for a $ 1000 stock is small, but the same price move for a $ 1  stock is large. Identifying the level of return threshold that is consistent with being an informational event is somewhat arbitrary and has not been addressed by researchers. Consequently, I investigate the effects of different return thresholds on the number of informational events identified by each threshold. The pre-specified return thresholds are 0. 15%, 0.50%, 1 .00%, 2.00%, and 5.00%. Once the price or return threshold is specified, all signed trades that occurred since the last information event, not including the current informational event, are summed. Therefore, VNET determines the net directional volume that was traded before a price quote moves beyond a specified price threshold. Formally, VNETj = log LdijvoliJ , 
j 
( 1 )  where d is the direction of the trade indicator (sell = - 1  and buy = 1 )  and vol is the number of shares traded on the j1h transaction during the l duration for a given company. The summation is over all transactions within a given price-duration. VNET is computed in log levels . 
4 2  Engle and Lange (2001) include the additional constraint that at  least two consecutive data points must exceed the chosen price threshold to signal the end of a price duration. 
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If the variability in the amount of one-sided volume that can be sustained before prices 
adjust contains information about the degree of information asymmetry in the market, 
then the time between price events should be considered when attempting to explain 
variation in market depth. For instance, Engle and Lange show that the amount of one­
sided volume (VNET) that can be sustained before prices adjust is not constant over time 
for a given stock. Perhaps the failure of prior models to consider the irregular arrival rates 
of trades and quotes contributes to the lack of clarity about the role that liquidity proxies, 
such as the bid-ask spread and bid-ask quote sizes, play in explaining time variation in 
trade impacts. For example, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) choose a common time interval 
of 15 minutes to specify the data they use in a principal components analysis of common 
factors in order flows and returns. They find that although both returns and order flows 
are characterized by common factors, common factors in bid-ask spreads and bid-ask 
quote sizes are relatively small. 
Engle and Russell (1998) introduce the autoregressive conditional duration 
(ACD) model that allows data to arrive in unequal time intervals. Instead of requiring 
researchers to aggregate information within a given time interval, the ACD model allows 
researchers to treat the arrival times of the data as a point process with an intensity 
defined conditional on past activity. Thus, the ACD model can be used to predict how 
long it will be until prices change. While it is not the goal of this research to forecast the 
time between price changes, it is important to include the conditional expectation of the 
time between price changes to forecast market depth. 





the ACD model of Engle and Russell ( 1998). 43 Let PTIME be the elapsed clock time 
between two events identified in computing VNET. Additionally, let EPTIME be the 
conditional expectation of PTIME. 
A two-step procedure is used to estimate the expected duration, EPTIME. First, 
PTIME is fitted on 8 knot-points using a spline. The knot-points are chosen to reflect the 
U-shaped pattern of trading activity reflected in the literature; 9: 30, 1 0:00, 1 1 :00, 1 2 :00, 
1 :00, 2:00, 3 :00, 3 :30.44 Next, each observation of PTIME is divided by the estimated 
coefficient for the time-of-day interval during which the price change occurred. The 
result is the expected time between price changes or duration, EPTIME. 45 
Finally, a model to estimate ATS' impacts on market depth over a price-duration 
is developed. This model borrows from the specification of Engle and Lange (200 1 ). 
The first model tests for differences in VNET between the NYSE and Nasdaq in a 
multivariate framework. The specification employs the explanatory variables from Engle 
and Lange as control variables. The model is presented in equation 1 A. 
The first model is extended to include binary variables to test for differences in 
market depth by volume deciles . Equation l B  presents this formulation. 
To measure the impact of Alternative Trading Systems on market depth, three 
new variables are introduced to the model . The variable %ECNQ is the proportion of all 
quotes posted to Nasdaq that are submitted through an ECN. The variable %SNET is the 
43 Engle and Lange (2001) employ the following ACD model to forecast the time between price changes ; 
EPTIME, = w + a1PTIME,.1 + fi1EPTIME,.1 + <p1SPR_NOM,.1, where, EPTIME is the conditional expectation of the elapsed clock time, PTIME is the elapsed clock time, and SPR_NOM is the nominal bid­ask spread. 
44 For example, see Barclay et al. ( 1999). 45 EPTIME is the same as Engle and Russell's ( 1997) 'seasonally adjusted' set of durations. 
45 
proportion of all trades executed through SelectNet and %SOBS is the proportion of all 
trades executed through SOES.46 The model specification is presented in equation 2A. 
Lastly, the A TS specification is extended to include binary variables to test for 
differences in market depth by volume deciles and is offered in equation 2B. 
The explanatory variables in the models are: 
TW ASpread = the time-weighted average bid-ask spread during the price-duration, 












= the number of trades during the price-duration, 
= the elapsed clock time between price-durations, 
= the conditional expectation of Ptime, 
= the log of (Ptime I Eptime ), 
= the proportion of all quotes posted by ECN s over the duration, 
= the proportion of all trades executed through SelectNet over the 
duration, 
= the proportion of all trades executed through SOES over the duration, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company is NYSE listed, otherwise equal to 
0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if observation occurred during the pre­
decimalization 2001 period, 0 otherwise, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if observation occurred during the post­
decimalization 2001 period, 0 otherwise, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if observation occurred during the 2002 
period, 0 otherwise, 
Pre2001NYSE= NYSE times Pre2001, 
Post200 1NYSE= NYSE times Post200 1 ,  
Post2002NYSE= NYSE times Post2001, 





otherwise equal to 0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 2, 
otherwise equal to 0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 3, 
otherwise equal to 0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 4, 
otherwise equal to 0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 5, 
otherwise equal to 0, 







= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 6, 
otherwise equal to 0, = binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 7, 
otherwise equal to 0, = binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 8, 
otherwise equal to 0, 
= binary variable equal to 1 if company's share volume is in decile 9, 
otherwise equal to 0. 
VNETit = a + P1 TWASpread;1-1 + P2 Volif.J + fi3Tradesif.J + 
P10Post2001NYSEi + P11Post2002NYSE; + P12Decilel i + 
fi13Decile2i + fi14Decile3; + fi15Decile4i + P1dJecile5i + 
PwDecile9; + t:;1 
PsSOESit + eif 
VNETit = a +  P1TWASpreadif.J + P2Tradesif.J + fi3Eptimeit+ 
47 
( I A) ( l B) 
(2A) 
VNET;, =a+ P1TWASpread;1•1 + /hTrades;1.1 + p3Eptime;, + 
/J4Ptime_erril + p5NYSE; + PsNYSEi + P6Pre2001; + 
/J7Post20011 + PJ'ost2002; + fi9Pre2001 NYSE1 + 
VNET;, = o. + /J1TWASpreadit-J + /J2Vol;1.1 + /J3Trades;,.1 + 
fJ4Eptimeir + (35Ptime_erru + /J6ECNit + /37S electNet;, + 
B8Decilel; + /39Decile2; + /J10Decile3; + /311Decile4; + 
f312Decile5; + f313Decile6; + /314Decile7; + /J15Decile8; + /3uJ)ecile9; + e;1 (2B) 
Engle and Lange estimate a number of different specifications of the model to 
forecast market depth over a price-duration. Using a pooled regression, the following 
relationships are established. 
Spreads of the final trade for the previous price-duration are negatively related to 
VNET. Therefore, as spreads widen, depth decreases. 
Engle and Lange find the log of the total volume traded during the previous price­
duration (Volj- t) is positively related to VNET. Therefore, higher trading volume and 
share prices result in a smaller percentage imbalance in orders. The log of the number of 
trades during the previous price-duration (Tradesj- t )  is negatively related to VNET, 
supporting the idea that periods of high trading reflect an influx of informed traders. 
Additionally, the log of the conditional expectation of the time between price 
changes, the log of Eptime, and the log of the error of the forecast of the time between 
price changes, Ptime_err are estimated to be positively related to VNET. The positive 
relationship between the expected time for prices to move and market depth reflects the 
expectation that lower volatility is associated with less informed trading. Consequently, 
higher expected times between price changes reflect lower information asymmetry. The 
positive relationship between the error in forecasting the time length of a price.,.duration 
and market depth demonstrates traders' attempts to execute transactions before the next 
expected price change. 
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Assuming that the benefits of the posting of limit orders to ECN s are dominated 
by the negative effects of greater trader anonymity, then as the proportion of the total 
number of trades executed through an ECN increases for a given company, market depth 
should decrease. 
SelectNet allows market participants to reveal their identity when electronically 
negotiating the terms of a trade. When an investor chooses to reveal his identity, it is less 
likely that he is attempting to exploit the counterparty by taking advantage of private 
information. Consequently, counterparties should be more willing to negotiate favorable 
trade terms through SelectNet. As a result, SelectNet should increase market depth. 
The effects of Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System are less clear. Orders 
executed through SOES tend to be small, individual investor orders. However, the orders 
are anonymous. Assuming that the small share sizes of SOES trades minimizes 
anonymous traders ' ability to take advantage of perishable private information, higher 
proportions of trades executed through the SOES should increase market depth. 
Hypotheses for the Effects of Decimalization on Depth 
Preliminary research finds that smaller bid-ask spreads result following the 
introduction of trading in decimals.47 Consequently, price-quote size curves created for 
the bid side of the market and the ask side of the market must move closer together. 
There are at least four possible movements along or by bid-curves and ask-curves that 
result in smaller spreads. The theoretical equilibrium market price in a world with no 
frictions is represented by the intersection of the bid curve with the ask curve. 
47 See Chakravarty and Wood (2000) and Nasdaq Economic Research (200 1 ). 
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Market participants can change their quotation behavior in four ways that are 
consistent with the expectation of smaller bid-ask spreads. First, market participants can 
quote such that the bid and ask curves stay the same. However, traders move down the 
ask curve and up the bid curve, thereby narrowing the bid-ask spread. Second, both the 
bid curve and ask curve may pivot simultaneously, causing quoted spreads to narrow. In 
this case, both quoted volume on the bid side of the market and the ask side of the market 
will increase. However, equilibrium market prices will remain the same. 
When the bid curve shifts downward and pivots and there is no movement by the 
ask curve, then quoted volume will decrease on the bid side of the market and 
equilibrium market prices will decrease. Similarly, when the ask curve shifts upward and 
pivots, quoted volume on the ask side of the market decreases with an increase in the 
equilibrium price. 
In summary, the move to trade in decimals can affect bid curves and ask curves, 
causing changes in equilibrium prices and quoted volumes. Movement along the bid 
curve and ask curve will cause a drop in quoted volume. Similarly, when either the bid 
curve or ask curve pivots and shifts, quoted volume will decrease. However, a 
simultaneous pivot in the bid curve and ask curve will cause higher quoted volume with 





Market participants change their quotation behavior causing a simultaneous 
pivot in the bid curve and the ask curve. The movement in the curves causes 
quoted volume to increase. Consequently, VNET increases. 
Hypothesis 2 :  
Market participants change their quotation behavior causing a drop in quoted 
volume. The drop results from a pivot and shift in the bid curve or the ask curve, 
or a simultaneous shift down the ask curve and up the bid curve. Consequently, 
VNET decreases. 
Hypotheses for the Effects of Alternative Trading Systems on Depth 
Hypothesis 3: 
The benefits of posting customer limit orders through ECNs outweighs the costs of 
trader anonymity. In the Admati and Pfleiderer ( 1988) framework where liquidity 
traders and informed traders prefer to trade during active periods, informed 
traders are less likely to be recognized because of the high number of active 
traders. Consequently, companies with more ECN trade and quote activity should 
have increased depth. 
5 1  
Hypothesis 4: 
The higher adverse selection costs arising from trader anonymity dominate all 
possible benefits arising from ECN participation. Consequently, companies with 
more ECN trade and quote activity should have decreased depth. 
Hypothesis 5: 
SelectNet users can reveal their identities, thereby reducing adverse selection 
costs. As a result, higher proportions of non-anonymous SelectNet trades should 
result in increased trading and depth. 
Hypothesis 6: 
SelectNet users can directly negotiate individual trade parameters. Direct 
negotiations require more time and effort to complete. Therefore, fewer trades 
will be executed. If average trade size does not increase enough to offset the 
decrease in the number of trades, then total trading volume should drop. 
Consequently, depth should decrease. 
Hypothesis 7: 
SOES trades are small anonymous trades. Mandated small order sizes minimize 
traders ' ability to use perishable information. Therefore, higher proportions of 
SOES trading should result in increased trading and depth. 
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Chapter 3 Changes in Depth Results 3A. Unconditional Results Table 2 presents VNET summary statistics by trading volume ranked deciles for the NYSE during the 1999, pre-decimalization 200 1 ,  post-decimalization 200 1 ,  and 2002 periods. The averages show that VNET tends to almost always increase as the pre­specified threshold increases for each of the four two..:week trading periods. For instance, average VNET increases from 6.98 for the 0. 1 5% threshold to 10.39 for the 5 .00% threshold for the low volume (0) decile in 1999. Similarly, VNET generally increases as trading volume increases, regardless of the time period. For example, VNET increases from 8.02 for the low volume (0) decile to 9.9 1 for the high volume (9) decile for the 0.50% threshold in 1999. Therefore, higher net numbers of shares are required to induce pre-specified returns in the presence of increased volume. Also, higher net numbers of shares are required to induce larger returns. VNET summary statistics by trading volume ranked deciles for the Nasdaq sample of firms are provided in Table 3. Consistently, the frequency of informational events decreases as the return threshold increases. For example, consider the high volume (9) decile during the 200 1 pre-decimalization period. The number of events drops from 1 1 ,950 for the 0. 1 5% threshold to 27 for the 5 .00% threshold. Therefore, this suggests 2.7 informational events per company over the 10  day period, or 0.27 informational events per company per day at the 5 .00% return threshold. In general, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that VNET or depth is higher on the NYSE compared to Nasdaq during 1999 and 200 1 .  However, it appears that VNET is higher on the Nasdaq during the 2002 period. This will be further investigated later. 53 
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Table 2: VNET Summ� Statistics bl Tradin� Volume Ranked Deciles for NYSE Summary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 1 5%,0.5%, 1  %,2%,5%). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in December 1998 for NYSE listed companies. VN EI;,k = lo�L(d;�J X vo(.; 1 where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I , sell= - I )  and vol is the number of shares i traded. VNET is computed for each-j th duration for company k . 1999 Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 15% Mean 6.98 7.27 7. 14 7. 1 6  7. 13  7.43 7.42 7.63 7.43 8.35 0.50% Mean 8.02 7.98 8.3 1 8.2 1 8.40 8. 16  8.26 8.87 8.36 9.9 1 1 .00% Mean 8.4 1  7.9 1 8.7 1 8.72 8.98 8.80 8.55 9.72 9.02 1 0.74 2.00% Mean 8.95 7.98 8.65 8.89 9.56 9.21 9. 1 0  1 0.02 9.56 1 1 .41 5.00% Mean 10.39 7.95 9.2 1 9.04 9.63 9.90 9.54 1 0.43 10.70 1 2.25 0. 15% Frequency 1528 1 336 2870 4956 7265 7847 9 1 84 15335 25732 57049 0.50% Frequency 338 334 757 142 1  20 1 1  259 1 2746 3739 8957 8975 1 .00% Frequency 1 34 150 284 552 682 1 0 1 0  1 3 1 1 1 244 3937 2769 2.00% Frequency 57 84 1 12 140 249 320 449 427 1758 69 1 5.00% Frequency 9 4 20 1 7  35 33 63 58 260 1 1 3 0. 15% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1  4.61 4.61  4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 0.50% Minimum 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1  4.61 4.61  4.61 4.6 1  4.61  1 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1  4.6 1 4.6 1  4.61  4.61 4.6 1  4.61  2.00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.61  4.61 4.61  4.6 1 4.6 1  4.61 5.00% Minimum 8.29 6.9 1 5 .30 4.6 1  5 .30 5 .70 4.6 1 5 .99 5.70 4.6 1  0. 1 5% Maximum 1 1 .95 1 0.7 1 1 1 .67 1 5 . 1 5  1 2.45 14.47 1 3.52 1 5 .30 1 5 .83 15 .07 0.50% Maximum 1 2.30 1 1 .00 1 1 . 86 15 . 1 5  1 3 .7 1 14.64 1 3 .51  15 .29 1 5.83 15 .48 1 .00% Maximum 1 1 .92 1 1 .08 1 2. 1 3  1 5 . 1 5  1 3.21  14.44 1 3 .45 14. 1 3  1 5 .83 15 .50 2.00% Maximum 1 1 .76 1 0.84 1 1 .58 1 3 . 1 1 1 3 . 1 1 13 . 1 0  1 3.3 1 1 3.92 15 .84 15 .5 1  5.00% Maximum 1 1 .64 9.65 1 1 .3 1  1 2.74 1 1 .76 13 .2 1  1 3 .09 1 3.35 16.23 15 .42 0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 1 .27 1 .29 1 .37 1 .40 1 .53 1 .58 1 .52 1 .61  1 .70 1 .80 0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .38 1 .48 1 . 5 1  1 .52 1 .66 1 .78 1 .67 1 .69 1 .89 1 .79 1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .45 1 .53 1 .59 1 .64 1 .77 1 .80 1 .9 1  1 .78 1 .92 1 .79 2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .34 1 .3 1  1 .69 1 .90 1 .84 1 .76 1 .98 1 .87 1 .98 1 .8 1  5.00% Standard Deviation 1 . 14 1 . 1 8  1 .53 2.43 1 .67 1 .93 2.0 1 2.2 1 1 .55 1 .94 
Vl 
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Table 2 Continued Summary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 15%,0.5%,1  %,2%,5% ). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in December 1 998 for NYSE listed companies. 
VN EI; ,k = lo�L(dtj xvo/J'.j 1 where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I , sell= - 1 ) and vol is the number of shares i traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  2001 Pre-Decimalization Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 15% Mean 6.53 6.92 6.57 6.69 6.97 6.72 6.99 7.0 1 7.05 7.45 0.50% Mean 7.02 7.32 7. 1 3  7.39 7.37 7.23 7.9 1 7.66 7.82 8.60 1 .00% Mean 7.69 7.6 1 7.7 1 8.32 7.75 7.75 8.53 8.6 1 8.2 1 9.53 2.00% Mean 8.67 7.99 8.44 8.56 8.3 1 8.09 9. 1 3  9.48 9.00 10.43 5.00% Mean 9.63 8.42 9. 1 1  8.44 9.02 8.26 9.40 10.47 10.22 1 1 .54 0. 15% Frequency 42 1 8  2434 6245 1 4620 1 3 1 64 1 3027 29308 40404 95336 158040 0.50% Frequency 2753 1452 3664 6522 8795 668 1 104 19  1 88 12  41292 53724 1 .00% Frequency 1247 857 1694 1 934 4769 2996 3986 6530 25921 2038 1 2.00% Frequency 264 306 54 1 565 1 762 1280 1 497 2038 1 0609 6935 5.00% Frequency 3 1  45 1 1 7 129 328 394 428 432 2099 1549 0. 15% Minimum 4.61 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 0.50% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 1 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61  2.00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 5.00% Minimum 5.99 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.61 0. 15% Maximum 1 1 .24 1 1 .7 1 1 1 .74 1 4.55 14.75 1 3 .30 14. 1 3  14.39 15 .09 15 . 10  0.50% Maximum 1 1 .93 1 1 .69 1 1 .88 14.56 15 . 15 13 .60 14. 14 14.96 15 .09 15 . 16  1 .00% Maximum 1 1 .3 1  1 1 .99 1 2.33 14.56 15 . 15  13 .68 14. 1 3  14.95 15 .09 15 . 19  2.00% Maximum 1 1 . 8 1  1 1 .99 12.30 1 3 .75 15 . 1 5  1 3 .82 1 4.28 1 4.96 1 5 .09 1 5 .22 5 .00% Maximum 1 1 .68 1 2.64 1 2. 1 1 12.93 15 . 1 1  1 3 .91  14. 1 7  14.89 15 .39 15 .20 0. 15% Standard Deviation 1 .35 1 .30 1 .29 1 .4 1  1 .52 1 .41  1 .54 1 .48 1 .62 1 .79 0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .45 1 .42 1 .4 1  1 .56 1 .64 1 .54 1 .72 1 .64 1 .77 1 .93 1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .47 1 .49 1 .53 1 .67 1 .78 1 .67 1 . 83 1 .77 1 .83 1 .93 2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .57 1 .67 1 .6 1  2.02 1 .99 1 .68 1 .92 1 .89 1 .84 1 .97 5 .00% Standard Deviation 1 . 34 1 .77 1 .93 2. 1 7  2. 1 1  1 .87 2.29 1 .78 1 .94 1 .96 
Vl °' 
Table 2 Continued Surrnnary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 1 5%,0.5%, 1 %,2%,5%). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading vo� in December 1998 for NYSE listed companies. 
VN EI;,k = lo�L(dt xvo(.; 1 where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy,: I ,  sell= - 1 ) and vol is the nuni,er of shares ' traded. VNEr is computed for eachj th duration for company k . 200 1 Post-Decimalization Low Voll.lll£ Decile High Vo� Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 15% Mean 7.70 7.42 6.92 7.38 7 .32 7 . 1 2  7 .67 7 .35 7.53 8 .00 0.50% Mean 8.5 1 7 .73 7 .39 7.73 7.90 7.70 7 .98 8.00 8 . 17  8.96 1 .00% Mean 9.05 7.88 7 .50 7.92 8 . 1 2  7 .97 7.93 8 .46 8 .28 9.32 2.00% Mean 9. 1 1  7 .84 7.5 1 7.86 8 .75 8 .30 8 .42 8 .70 8 .23 9.47 5 .00% Mean 9.58 8.72 8 .37 8 . 14 9.2 1 8 .79 8 .62 9.44 8 .91  10. 1 6  0. 15% Frequency 2270 1 179 4204 63 1 3  7023 8236 10842 2 1 683 49793 8 1 547 0.50% Frequency 1 126 5 1 2  2032 2734 3675 3068 4384 9658 2068 1 243 1 5  1 .00% Frequency 798 289 1 323 1522 2268 1723 28 1 2  4333 1 3258 1 1 753 2.00% Frequency 373 1 56 9 1 9  99 1 904 879 1 142 228 1 9449 6 1 1 1  5 .00% Frequency 85 46 2 1 9  305 220 2 1 7  458 73 1 3394 2 1 44 0. 15% Minimmn 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1 0.50% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 1 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 2.00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 5.00% Minimum 5.30 5 .30 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 0. 15% Maxirrum 1 3 .74 1 1 .85 1 2. 1 1  1 3 .53 1 3 .30 12 .42 14.30 1 3 .61  14.54 1 6. 17  0.50% Maxim.nn 1 3.85 12 .03 1 2.68 1 3 .66 1 3 . 1 2  12 .99 1 3 .60 14. 1 2  14 .57 1 6. 1 8  1 .00% Maxitnlm 14.2 1 1 2.04 12 .64 1 3 .8 1 1 3 .29 1 3 .0 1 1 4.00 1 4.30 14.55 1 6. 1 8 2 .00% Maxirrum 14.7 1 1 2 .04 12 .65 1 3 .94 1 3 . 1 3  12 .66 14.00 14.23 14.6 1 1 6.22 5.00% Maxirrum 14.95 12 . 1 2  1 2.69 1 3 . 1 3  1 3 . 1 6  1 2. 1 3 14.20 14.7 1 14.63 15 .56 0. 15% Standard Deviation 1 .85 1 .39 1 .48 1 .54 1 .54 1 .59 1 .67 1 .64 1 .76 1 .88 0.50% Standard Deviation 2.25 1 .50 1 .62 1 .7 1  1 .63 1 .75 1 .85 1 .74 1 .9 1  2.02 1 .00% Standard Deviation 2.39 1 .54 1 .68 1 .8 1  1 .66 1 .85 1 .9 1  1 .79 1 .99 2. 1 8  2.00% Standard Deviation 2.4 1 1 .67 1 .7 1  1 .82 1 .7 1  1 .85 1 .98 1 .84 2.04 2.35 5 .00% Standard Deviation 2.33 1 .73 1 .59 1 .83 1 .83 1 .78 2 . 15  1 .76 2. 1 2  2.39 
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Table 2 Continued Summary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 15%,0.5%,  1 %,2%,5% ). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in December 1 998 for NYSE listed companies. VNEij.k = Io�L(dtj X vot 1 where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares i traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k .  2002 Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 15% Mean 6.64 7. 1 0  6.79 6.61 6.95 6.59 7.09 7.0 1 7.22 7.67 0.50% Mean 7.09 7.37 7.32 6.85 7.48 6.8 1  7.53 7.83 7.82 8.73 1 .00% Mean 7.38 7.24 7.48 6.99 7.83 7.0 1 7.64 8.3 1 8. 1 7  9.48 2.00% Mean 7.60 7.30 7.90 7.36 7.96 7.35 8.07 8.62 8.45 10. 1 8  5.00% Mean 8. 1 1  7.64 9.0 1 8.33 7.72 7.66 8.79 9.28 10.40 1 1 .20 0. 15% Frequency 9747 1554 6408 15772 1 58 1 1 22535 1 8404 4083 1 76280 153895 0.50% Frequency 7265 645 34 10  10893 7665 1 5648 8683 1 4322 36333 52555 1 .00% Frequency 4638 409 2558 7983 4783 1 1 1 73 5859 7468 23345 23583 2.00% Frequency 2484 244 1 384 4 1 89 2832 5961 2965 4474 14894 10553 5.00% Frequency 704 95 360 1 030 1 639 2385 1069 1606 2737 3 144 0. 1 5% Minimum 4.61 4.6 1 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 0.50% Minimum 4.6 1 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.61 4.61 1 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 2.00% Minimum 4.61 4.6 1 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1 4.61 4.61 5 .00% Minimum 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 4.6 1 · 4.6 1 4.61 4.61 4.6 1 0. 1 5% Maximum 1 3 .46 1 2. 1 9  1 2.41 1 3.32 14.35 1 3 .06 14. 1 2  14.54 15 . 10  15 .04 0.50% Maximum 1 3 .46 1 2.48 1 2.9 1 1 3 .55 14.35 1 3 .29 14.35 14.55 15 .07 15 .09 1 .00% Maximum 1 3 .74 1 2.56 1 2.83 1 3 .35 14.94 1 3 .25 1 4.77 1 4.60 15 .07 1 5 .09 2.00% Maximum 14.25 1 2.58 1 3 . 1 0  1 3 ,39 15 .05 1 3 . 8 1  14.77 14.56 15 .05 15 .06 5.00% Maximum 14.76 1 1 .40 1 3 . 1 3 1 3 .40 14.32 14.03 14.78 14.85 14.99 15 .30 0. 15% Standard Deviation 1 .49 1 .5 1  1 .53 1 .49 1 .66 1 .5 1  1 .66 1 .58 1 .70 1 . 83 0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .63 1 .77 1 .60 1 .56 1 . 87 1 .58 1 .68 1 .73 1 . 83 1 .94 1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .69 1 .77 1 .63 1 .60 1 .95 1 .62 1 .72 1 .83 1 .88 1 .93 2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .87 1 .7 1  1 .64 1 .65 2.07 1 .68 1 .73 1 .98 1 .93 1 .92 5 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .97 1 .55 1 .68 1 .67 1 .93 1 .79 1 .74 2. 10  1 .72 1 .80 
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Table 3 :  VNET Summary Statistics by Tradin� Volume Ranked Deciles for Nasdag Summary statistics are computed for VNET across four two -week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 15%,0.5%, 1 %,2%,5%). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in March 1 999 for Nasdaq listed companies. 
VNET k = Io�L(dk • x vo/f'. · i 
J .  1,J ,] where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number o f  shares traded . VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  1 999 Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 1 5% Mean 6.60 6.80 6 .82 6 .92 7.06 7 .21  7 .28 7 . 1 5  7 .42 8 .72 0.50% Mean 6.94 7 . 12  7 .20 7 .37 7 .38 7 .7 1 7 .77 7 .99 8 .50 9.83 1 .00% Mean 7 .50 7 .40 7.44 7 .90 7.9 1 8 .25 8 .26 8 .66 9 .26 10.46 2.00% Mean 8 .00 7 .7 1 7 .86 8 .3 1 8 .48 8 .83 8 .95 9.33 9 .82 1 1 .03 5.00% Mean 8 . 1 2  8 .28 8 .67 9.32 9.41 9.59 9 .94 10.43 10.50 1 1 .79 0. 1 5 %  Frequency 941 1 233 2 1 30 2044 3 1 70 6 1 65 4570 1 2403 1 4427 1 2441 0.50% Frequency 608 753 1 205 1074 1 878 3049 2036 3882 3375 2094 1 .00% Frequency 294 433 697 486 834 1 298 9 1 0  1 524 1 1 39 700 2.00% Frequency 1 28 1 62 3 1 4  205 299 455 336 52 1 352 208 5.00% Frequency 25 42 72 37 64 85 74 98 55 23 0. 1 5% Minimum 4.6 1 3.40 3.00 2.64 2.30 2.89 1 .79 0.69 1 .39 1 . 10 0.50% Minimum 3 .22 3.40 4.32 1 .95 1 .6 1  0.69 2.64 1 .6 1  0.69 1 .6 1  1 .00% Minimum 3 .22 3 .22 3 .91  2 .64 2.30 2.40 3 .91  2.77 3 .22 3 .00 2.00% Minimum 4.43 3 .58 3.91 4.34 3 .91  2. 83 4.6 1  3 .22 3 .33 5 .50 5 .00% Minimum 5 . 1 6  6.40 4.62 6.40 5 .86 4.6 1  5 .86 7 .54 6 .54 6.55 0. 1 5% Maximum 1 1 .56 1 1 .43 1 1 . 1 9 1 2.29 1 1 .56 1 2.79 1 3 .40 12.66 12.59 1 4.98 0.50% Maximum 1 1 .56 1 1 .43 1 1 .02 1 2.30 1 1 .45 1 3 .22 1 3 .88  1 2.72 1 3.03 14.30 1 .00% Maximum 1 1 .72 1 1 .36 1 1 . 34 1 2. 37 1 1 .64 1 3.80 1 4. 1 3  1 2.65 1 3 .26 14 .82 2.00% Maximum 1 1 .57 10.76 10.97 1 1 .2 1  1 1 .73 1 3.8 1 1 3 . 1 2  1 2.68 1 3.27 1 4. 62 5 .00% Maximum 9.5 1 10.29 10. 73 1 1 .38 1 1 .75 1 2.74 1 3 .08 1 2.57 1 3.29 1 5 . 1 3  0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 1 .43 1 .34 1 .35 1 .49 1 .48 1 .47 1 .5 1  1 .52 1 .55 1 .83 0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .54 1 .36 1 .34 1 .53 1 .52 1 .5 1  1 .55 1 .54 1 .56 1 .88 1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .60 1 .40 1 .38  1 .48 1 .52 1 .48 1 .5 1  1 .44 1 .46 1 . 8 1  2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .59 1 .40 1 .33 1 .52 1 .40 1 .6 1  1 .40 1 .43 1 .53 1 .77 5.00% Standard Deviation 1 .2 1  0.93 1 .20 1 .2 1  1 .27 1 .5 1  1 .36 1 . 1 5  1 .64 2. 1 8  00 
Table 3 Continued S ummary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 1 5%,0.5%, 1 %,2%,5%). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in March 1 999 for Nasdaq listed companies. 
VNET k = lo�L(dk . xvo(': . � J. i.J .J where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k .  2001 Pre-Decimalization Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 1 5% Mean 6 . 1 2  6.42 6 .67 7.05 6 .58  7 .08 6 .8 1 7 .54 7 .66 9.45 0.50% Mean 6 .5 1 6.92 7 .22 7 .58 7 .32 7 .94 7 .38 8 .06 8 .83  1 0.70 1 .00% Mean 6.89 7.49 7 .59 7 .94 7 .75 8 .45 7 . 82 8 .49 9 .66 1 1 .27 2.00% Mean 7 .23 7 .97 8.05 8 .26 8 .32 9.09 8 .47 8 .99 1 0.3 1 1 1 .65 5 .00% Mean 7 .69 8 .56 8 .52 8.48 8 . 87 9.9 1  9.20 9 .64 1 1 .03 1 2. 1 6 0. 1 5% Frequency 1 556 3407 4470 8237 8379 1 3 1 02 5706 1 1 1 94 2 1 487 1 1 950 0.50% Frequency 850 1 529 1 678  2204 2976 3 890 1 934 3249 4807 2 1 1 9  1 .00% Frequency 47 1 7 1 1 8 1 9  932 1 336 1 759 843 1 339 1 685 706 2.00% Frequency 203 300 369 330 5 1 3  607 330 5 1 2  529 2 1 5 5 .00% Frequency 53 62 101  73  1 1 1  1 1 6 58  108  89  27 0. 1 5% Minimum 2.30 2.7 1  1 . 1 0  1 .6 1  2 .56 2.30 1 .6 1  1 .79 1 .39  0.69 0.50% Minimum 3.9 1 3.00 3.00 1 .6 1  2.40 2.08 1 .6 1  1 .6 1  1 .39 3 .6 1 1 .00% Minimum 3.00 4.6 1 2.30 3 .91  2.77 2.30 2.64 4.09 3 .74 4.6 1  2 .00% Minimum 3.00 4.6 1  3 .7 1  4.6 1  2.7 1  4.6 1  3 .30 4.22 3 .8 1 4.6 1  5 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1  3 .9 1 4.6 1 4.36 5 . 70 3 .9 1 6 . 1 5  8 .30 0. 1 5% Maximum 1 0.82 1 2.73 1 2. 72 1 2.38  1 3 .32 1 3 .35 1 2.65 14. 1 0  1 3 . 84 1 5.82  0.50% Maximum 1 1 .24 1 2. 85 1 2.96 1 2.49 1 3 .34 1 3 .3 1 1 1 .93 1 4.2 1 14.06 1 5 .55 1 .00% Maximum 1 1 .22 1 2.25 1 2.95 1 3 .29 1 3 .30 1 3 .58  1 2.06 1 4.88  1 4.24 1 5 .87  2.00% Maximum 1 0.85 1 2. 2 1  1 2.96 1 3 . 80 1 3 .68 1 3 .36 1 2.33 1 4.9 1 1 4.27 1 6.32 5.00% Maximum 1 0.88 1 2.64 1 2.98 1 2. 82 1 2.76 1 3 .52 1 1 .75  14.6 1 14.50 1 5 .9 1 0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 1 .35 1 .54 1 .64 1 .58  1 . 55 1 .6 1  1 .63 1 .80 1 .73  2. 1 4  0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .43 1 .55 1 .75 1 .75 1 .69 1 .69 1 .66 1 .97 1 .75  2.02 1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .50 1 .73 1 . 8 1  1 .75 1 .72 1 .70 1 .69 2.02 1 .70 2. 1 0  2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .5 1  1 .56 1 .83 1 . 75 1 .73 1 .68 1 .58  2.00 1 .85  2. 1 5  5 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .4 1  1 . 5 1  1 .76 1 .63 1 .7 1  1 .43 1 .4 1  2. 1 6  1 .74 2. 1 1  
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Table 3 Continued Summary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading periods using five different threshold returns (0. 1 5 %,0.5%, 1 %,2%,5%). Firms are placed into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in March 1 999 for Nasdaq listed companies. 
VNET k = lo�L(dk - xvo(: - 1 ] ,  l ,J ,] where. d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k . 2001 Post-Decimalization Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 1 5% Mean 6.30 6 .06 6 .65 7. 1 6  6.9 1 7. 1 3  6.93 7 .63 7 .97 9 .44 0.50% Mean 6.75 6 .67 7.24 7.9 1 7.68 8.05 7.44 8. 1 7  9 .20 1 0.68 1 .00% Mean 7. 1 7  7.07 7.52 8.25 8 .30 8 .68 7.84 8.57 9 .89 . 1 1 .27 2.00% Mean 7.38 7.80 7.80 8 .60 8 .68 9 . 34 8 .30 9.05 10 .63 1 1 .75 5 .00% Mean 7.64 8.38 8. 1 5  8.93 9 .6 1 1 0. 1 5  8 .9 1  9 .64 1 1 .78 1 2.52  0. 1 5% Frequency 2293 3833  4025 7883 7856 1 1 346 5280 1 1 996 1 8585 1 0052 0.50% Frequency 1055 1 589 1 42 1  1 9 1 7 2539 3 1 59 1 896 3 345 3732 1 527 1 .00% Frequency 576 824 736 768 1 109 1 205 829 1 358 1 1 8 1  453 2.00% Frequency 249 346 3 20 276 4 1 3  434 328 446 3 23 1 27 5 .00% Frequency 65 58 73 5 1  82 76 63 96 37 1 3  0. 1 5% Minimum 3 .9 1 2.30 0.69 1 .79 2.7 1 3 .00 1 . 10 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.50% Minimum 3 .33  2.48 3 . 53  1 .6 1  1 .6 1  2.77 4.25 2.83 0.69 4.6 1  1 .00% Minimum 3 .9 1 2.30 3 . 9 1  3 .00 3 . 3 3  4.6 1  3 . 9 1  1 .6 1  1 .3 9  4.3 8  2.00% Minimum 3 .91  1 .6 1  3 .9 1 4.6 1  4.32 4.6 1  3 .58 4.6 1  4.60 4.6 1  5 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 4.6 1  4.6 1  5 . 30 4.6 1  6 .68 4.6 1  5 .92 8 . 1 2  1 0.55 0. 1 5% Maximum 1 1 .92 1 2.36  1 3 .03 1 2.97 1 3 .82 1 3 .80 1 2.44 1 3 . 38  14.22 1 5 .01  0.50% Maximum 1 2.25 1 2. 36 1 2.98 1 2.95 1 3 .86 1 3 . 95 1 2.49 1 3 .77 1 4.28 1 5 .50 1 .00% Maximum 1 2.26 1 2. 36 1 3 . 1 1 1 3 . 1 6  1 3 .85 1 4.05 1 3 .07 1 3 .78 1 4. 4 1  1 5 .66 2.00% Maximum 1 2.23 1 2.35  1 2. 94 1 3 .58 1 3 .87 14.04 1 2.57 1 4. 1 2  1 4.42 1 5 . 25 5 .00% Maximum 1 1 .89 1 2. 1 9 1 1 . 1 4 1 1 .76 1 3 .89 1 4.01 1 2.0 1 1 3 .80 1 5. 30 14 .33  0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 1 .47 1 .37 1 .58 1 .55  1 .6 1  1 .6 1  1 .60 1 .70 1 .68 1 .95 0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .60 1 .47 1 .68 1 .74 1 .69 1 .68 1 .66 1 . 84 1 .72 1 .9 1  1 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .74 1 .56  1 .7 1  1 .82 1 .68 1 .68 1 .68 1 .89 1 .78 1 .97 2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .83 1 .64 1 .7 1  1 .83 1 .75 1 .58 1 .63 1 .87 1 .72 2.05 5 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .82 1 .62 1 .62 1 .62 1 .57 1 . 3 1  1 .76 1 .66 1 .90 1 . 1 4 0 
Table 3 Continued S ummary statistics are computed for VNET across four two-week trading perio ds u sing five different threshold returns (0. 1 5 %,0.5%, 1 %,2%,5%). Firms are placed .into deciles by ranking according to total monthly trading volume in March 1 999 for Nasdaq listed companies. 
VNET k = lo��(dk . xvo(: . � ], l,J ,J where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k .  2002 Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0. 1 5% Mean 6.98 6.96 6.96 7.23 6.9 1 7. 1 8  7.06 7 .96 8 . 1 7  9.83 0.50% Mean 7 .58 7.59 7 .64 7.72 7 .63 8.03 7 .74 8.43 9.01 1 1 . 1 8  1 .00% Mean 7.68 7.83 8.01 8.03 8.24 8 .80 8 .29 8.78 9.65 1 1 .85  2.00% Mean 8.23 7.99 8.5 1  8 .40 8 .74 9.22 9.02 9. 10  10.21  1 2.62 5 .00% Mean 8 . 1 3  8.42 9.43 8 .65 8.95 1 0.36 9.83 9.72 10.63 1 3. 1 5  0. 1 5% Frequency 3656 4075 5348 5646 7872 1 4237 690 1 970 1 1 5504 14898 0.50% Frequency 1053 1 377 1 595 1 532 2 176 3898 22 1 3  2025 3 1 7 1  2034 1 .00% Frequency 483 556 665 634 853 1 544 862 697 1004 606 2.00% Frequency 203 220 234 239 3 1 9 467 235 198 301 1 76 5 .00% Frequency 5 1  4 1  29 47 4 1  8 6  29 40 48 21 0. 1 5% Minimum 1 .39 2.77 1 .39 0.69 1 .6 1  0.69 2.08 1 .6 1  0.69 2.40 0.50% Minimum 2.30 0.69 1 . 1 0 2.83 0.69 2.08 3.9 1 3 .22 2.08 3. 1 4  1 .00% Minimum 2.64 0.69 4.32 3.93 2.40 3.40 0.69 3.00 3.9 1 4.6 1 2.00% Minimum 4.6 1 0.69 3 .8 1 4.50 4.6 1  3.40 4.6 1  4.22 4.6 1 5 . 8 1  5 .00% Minimum 4.6 1 5 .30 4.6 1  4.6 1  5 .30 6.49 7 .70 5 .42 7.00 7 .74 0. 1 5% Maximum 1 2.77 1 1 .98 1 3 .72 1 2.58 1 3 . 1 6  1 5 .36 1 2.66 1 4.5 1 · 1 3 .41  1 4:90 0.50% Maximum 1 3.33 1 1 .98 1 3 .7 1 1 2.53 1 3 . 1 7  1 5 .36 1 3 .07 1 4.5 1 1 3 .45 1 5·. 37 1 .00% Maximum 1 2.38 1 2.07 1 3 .28 1 2.76 1 3.20 1 5.36 1 2.86 1 4.36 1 3.98 1 6.09 2.00% Maximum 1 2.52 1 2. 1 0 1 3 .48 1 2.05 1 3.41 1 5 .36 1 2.50 1 4.27 1 3.93 1 6. 1 7  5 .00% Maximum 10.99 1 1 .56 1 3. 84 1 1 .83 1 2.22 1 5 .37 1 2.06 1 2.8 1 1 3 .89 1 6.73 0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 1 .56 1 .53 1 .64 1 .58  1 .66 1 .57 1 . 6 1  1 .70 1 .59 2. 1 1  0.50% Standard Deviation 1 .74 1 .66 1 . 7 1  1 .76 1 .64 1 .72 1 .68 1 .98 1 .75 2. 1 5  1 .00% Standard Deviatio n  1 .74 1 .72 1 .82 1 .75 1 .69 1 .69 1 .66 2.0 1 1 .76 2.26 2.00% Standard Deviation 1 .64 1 .80 1 .82 1 . 80 1 .53 1 .75 1 .45 1 .83 1 .68 2.08 5 .00% Standard Deviation 1 .45 1 .65 2. 14  1 .80 1 .63 1 .54 1 .06 1 .43 1 .64 2.50 
Tables 4 and 5 convert the VNET statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3 into 
number of shares. VNET is converted into shares by computing the antilogarithm of the 
reported VNET statistic. For instance, in Table 2, VNET is 6.98 for the low volume (0) 
decile in 1999 at the 0. 15% threshold. Computing e6·98, we obtain 1 ,076 shares, which is 
reported in Table 4 for the low volume (0) decile at the 0. 15% threshold in 1999. During 
the 1999 trading period, the share volume necessary to induce a price change is higher for 
the NYSE compared to Nasdaq for most return thresholds across all possible deciles. 
However, during the 200 1 pre-decimalization period, the volume necessary to induce a 
price change is higher on Nasdaq than on the NYSE for high volume stocks, deciles 8 
and 9. During the 2002 period, the share volume necessary to induce a price change is 
higher on the Nasdaq than on the NYSE for all volume deciles. Therefore, it appears that 
while the NYSE had more depth in 1999, improvements in depth between 1999 and 2002 
result in the Nasdaq sample of firms having higher depth in 2002. Unconditional t-tests of 
VNET investigate these possible differences in Table 6. 
Panel A of Table 6 provides differences in mean VNET values by time period for 
the NYSE and Nasdaq at the 1 % and 2% return thresholds. T-test results for the 1 % and 
2% thresholds are consistent for both the NYSE and Nasdaq for the time periods 
presented. Average VNET values increase from 8.4207 to 8.7 134 for the Nasdaq 1 % 
from 1999 to 2002 and are statistically different at the 1 % level. Therefore, depth 
62 
Table 4: Tradins Volume Necessarl to Induce Price Chanses bl Tradins Volume Ranked Deciles for NYSE 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 2 for NYSE firms. 
VNEE k = Io�L(dk . xvo( - 1 
J, l,J ,} 
1 999 
Threshold 
0. 15% Mean 
0.50% Mean 
1 .00% Mean 
2.00% Mean 
5.00% Mean 
0. 1 5% Minimum 
0.50% Minimum 
1 .00% Minimum 
2.00% Minimum 
5.00% Minimum 
0. 1 5% Maximum 
0.50% Maximum 
1 .00% Maximum 
2.00% Maximum 
5.00% Maximum 
0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 
0.50% Standard Deviation 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 
2.00% Standard Deviation 
5.00% Standard Deviation 
where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  
Low Volume Decile 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1076 1438 1262 1287 1245 1 690 1668 2055 1689 
3032 2922 4077 3683 4430 3482 3859 708 1 4268 
4509 27 1 2  6092 6 1 1 7  7948 6606 5 148 16593 829 1 
7674 2922 5696 7240 14237 9959 8990 22434 14 174 
3265 1 2841 10008 84 14 15286 1 9985 1 392 1 34003 4456 1 
100 100 100 100 100 100 1 00 1 00 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 00 
100 100 100 100 1 00 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 1 00 100 100 100 100 100 
4000 1000 200 100 200 300 100 400 300 
155200 45000 1 17000 3805700 254000 1 927200 744400 4396200 7502600 
2 19000 60000 14 1400 3805700 898800 2278900 737600 436 1000 ' 7498800 
150200 64700 1 84500 3806600 547900 1 873700 690400 1365400 7524900 
127700 5 1200 i 06700 495700 494800 490500 606000 1 1 10700 7555600 
1 1 3300 1 5500 8 1400 340300 127400 548000 483200 626600 1 1 1 98800 
3.56 3 .63 3 .93 4.04 4.60 4.87 4.57 5.03 5 .49 
3 .99 4.4 1 4.55 4.56 5.24 5 .93 5 .34 5.4 1 6.59 
4.24 4.6 1 4.92 5 . 1 3  5 .87 6.08 6.75 5.94 6.83 
3 . 8 1  3.72 5.43 6.70 6.27 5 .79 7.27 6.49 7.23 
3 . 12 3.26 4.60 1 1 .4 1 5.30 6.92 7.45 9.08 4.7 1 
High Volume 
9 
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Table 4 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 2 for NYSE firms. 
VNEE k = lo�L(d
k . xvo{- 1 
], l,J ,] 
2001 Pre-Decimalization 
Threshold 















0. 15% Standard Deviation 
0.50% Standard Deviation 
1.00% Standard Deviation 
2.00% Standard Deviation 
5.00% Standard Deviation 
where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1, sell= - 1) and vo 1 is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  
Low Volume Decile 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
687 1010 7 1 1  802 1062 833 1084 1 1 1 1  1 148 
1 1 16 1505 1244 1625 1592 1376 2722 213 1  2501 
2187 2024 2234 4120 232 1 23 14 5076 5503 3669 
5810 2939 4617 5232 4061 3273 9215 13 1 20 8066 
15259 4534 9085 4629 8280 3878 12 101 35386 273 14 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 00 
100 100 100 100 1 00 100 100 100 1 00 
100 100 100 1 00 1 00 1 00 100 100 100 
100 100 1 00 100 100 100 100 100 100 
400 100 100 100 100 100 1 00  100 100 
76000 12 1400 125200 2092000 2538000 600000 1362800 1774200 3572000 
152200 1 19400 144000 2095300 3806000 803000 1383 100 3 141700 3572000 
82000 16 1 200 225500 2097300 3806000 870400 1 372800 3 105200 3572000 
135200 161200 220600 937600 3805500 1008900 1598500 3 153800 3572000 
118500 309500 1 8 1300 414100 363 1 100 1099000 1421600 292 1 600 4806300 
3.85 3.67 3.62 4. 10 4.56 4. 10 4.66 4.38 5.05 
4.26 4. 12 4.09 4.77 5. 14 4.68 5.59 5. 1 4  5.89 
4.36 4.44 4.60 5.3 1 5.95 5.30 6.21  5.88 6.20 
4.80 5.29 4.99 7.58 7.32 5.38 6.83 6.59 6.27 

























Table 4 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 2 for NYSE firms. 
VNET, k = lo�L(d
k . x vor j 
}, l,) ,} 
2001 Post-Decimalization 
Threshold 
0. 15% Mean 
0.50% Mean 
1 .00% Mean 
2.00% Mean 
5.00% Mean 
0. 15% Minimum 
0.50% Minimum 
1 .00% Minimum 
2.00% Minimum 
5.00% Minimum 
0. 15% Maximum 
0.50% Maximum 
1 .00% Maximum 
2.00% Maximum 
5.00% Maximum 
0. 15% Standard Deviation 
0.50% Standard Deviation 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 
2.00% Standard Deviation 
5.00% Standard Deviation 
where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I ,  sell= - 1 ) and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  
Low Volume Decile 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2209 1670 1017 1600 1 5 1 3  1 234 2 141 1552 1 865 
4954 2272 1617 2269 2706 2210 29 16 2988 35 1 8  
8487 2654 1 8 1 3  2757 3375 2905 2774 4735 3945 
9085 2546 1 83 1  258 1 63 15 4004 4546 6007 3766 
145 12  6 15 1  4322 3422 10009 6587 5556 12637 7392 
100 1 00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 1 00 100 100 1 00  100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 00 1 00 
100 1 00 100 1 00 100 100 100 100 100 
200 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
924000 1 39500 18 1700 748400 599400 246600 1624900 8 1 3500 2057700 
1039500 167600 321700 857700 499400 436900 806600 1 353900 2 1 22900 
1478300 1 70200 308200 992800 59 1600 445 100 1200900 1623600 2078500 
2448600 168900 3 12600 1 1 37 100 505300 3 1 5000 1200900 1 507400 22 1 1500 
3 1 1 8500 1 82600 323600 503900 5 17200 1 85 100 1 470800 2448400 2267400 
6.35 4.00 4.4 1 4.65 4.66 4.89 5.29 5. 17 5.82 
9.45 4.49 5.07 5.54 5. 1 1  5.78 6.35 5.7 1 6.74 
10.92 4.67 5.37 6.08 5.27 6.35 6.74 6.00 7.32 
1 1 . 1 7 5.33 5.55 6. 17 5.5 1 6.37 7.25 6.3 1  7.71 
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Table 4 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 2 for NYSE firms. 
VNEJ: k = lo�L(d
k xvor j 
J, l,J ,} 
2002 
Threshold 
0. 15% Mean 
0.50% Mean 
1 .00% Mean 
2.00% Mean 
5.00% Mean 
0. 15% Minimum 
0.50% Minimum 
1 .00% Minimum 
2.00% Minimum 
5.00% Minimum 
0. 15% Maximum 
0.50% Maximum 
1 .00% Maximum 
2.00% Maximum 
5.00% Maximum 
0. 15% Standard Deviation 
0.50% Standard Deviation 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 
2.00% Standard Deviation 
5.00% Standard Deviation 
where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= I ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  
Low Volume Decile 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
762 12 13  888 744 1045 726 1205 1 105 1 363 
1 1 99 1596 1 5 1 1 945 1778 907 1 862 25 12  2492 
1600 1400 1769 1085 25 1 1  1 109 2086 4056 3544 
2007 1478 2708 1566 2852 1562 3 193 5558 4668 
3332 2088 821 8  4 149 2258 2 1 12 6542 10744 32894 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
697900 197400 245400 609900 1700000 470400 1 361900 2061400 3601400 
699400 262900 403000 7 65 100 1700000 594000 1708600 2080300 35 1 5700 
928800 285600 37 1400 626300 3073400 567000 2601600 2 196500 35 1 1 300 
1537900 290200 489400 654000 3422000 997800 2601600 2107200 3436400 
2565400 89 100 502900 66 1200 1648 100 1244600 2627700 2808 100 322 1200 · 
4.43 4.50 4.6 1 4.42 5.28 4.54 5.24 4.83 5.46 
5. 13  5.84 4.95 4.75 6.47 4.86 5.36 5.62 6.24 
5.44 5.88 5.09 4.96 7.0 1 5.06 5.60 6.26 6.59 
6.46 5.5 1 5. 14 5.22 7.94 5.34 5.62 7.23 6.87 























Table 5: Tradin� Volume Necessari to Induce Price Chan�es bl Tradin� Volume Ranked Deciles for Nasdag 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 3 for Nasdaq firms. 
VNE£ k = Io�L(dk - xvo( - i 
}, l ,J ,J where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for eachj th duration for company k .  
1999 Low Volume Decile High Volume 
Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0. 1 5% Mean 733 90 1 9 12  10 10  1 165 1 358 1450 1272 1675 6 12 1  
0.50% Mean 1036 1239 1 335 1585 1 599 2237 2379 2965 4935 1 8625 
1 .00% Mean 1 803 1 629 1 705 2688 273 1 38 14  388 1 5770 105 1 3  34954 
2.00% Mean 2987 2239 2589 4045 4794 6855 7699 1 1 2 1 6  1 83 1 5  61 754 
5 .00% Mean 3346 3956 5809 1 1 2 1 3  1 22 15  14588 20801 34030 36459 1 32533 
0. 15% Minimum 100 30 20 14 10  1 8  6 2 4 3 
0.50% Minimum 25 30 75 7 5 2 14  5 2 5 
1 .00% Minimum 25 25 50 14 10  1 1  50 16  25 20 
2.00% Minimum 84 36 50 77 50 1 7  1 00 25 28 244 
5 .00% Minimum 1 75 600 1 0 1 600 350 100 35 1 1 875 692 701 
0. 15% Maximum 105000 91600 72500 2 1 7 1 1 4  104800 357400 660400 3 15228 2928 1 0  3 19 1 196 
0.50% Maximum 105000 91600 6 1 140 2201 89 93800 554000 1063450 3339 1 3  455 101  16226 1 3  
1 .00% Maximum 123300 85780 84084 2361 89 1 1 3200 9887 1 3  1 369250 3 10750 572975 2742322 
2.00% Maximum 105561 47 100 57845 73689 124628 9896 1 3 499600 321075 5780 1 1 2228322 
5 .00% Maximum 1 3440 29366 45700 87289 126432 34207 1 480600 287655 590925 3732607 
0. 15% Standard Deviation 4. 1 9  3 . 8 1  3 .86 4.44 4.40 4.34 4.54 4.57 4.7 1 6.24 
0.50% Standard Deviation 4.65 3 .88 3 .83 4.63 4.57 4.52 4.7 1 4.65 4.77 6.54 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 4.96 4.04 3 .99 4.38 4.55 4.39 4.52 4.23 4.3 1  6. 1 2  
2.00% Standard Deviation 4.92 4.05 3 .80 4.58 4.06 5 .00 4.06 4. 1 7  4.61 5 .89 
5 .00% Standard Deviation 3 .37 2.52 3 .33 3.35 3.56 4.52 3 .90 3 . 1 6  5 . 1 3  8 .88 
O'I 
00 
Table 5 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 3 for Nasdaq firms. 
VNE£ k = lo��(d
k . xvo{- 1 J, l,J ,J where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k .  
2001 Pre-Decimalization Low Volume Decile High Volume 
Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0. 1 5% Mean 456 6 1 1 787 1 1 54 7 1 8  1 1 88 909 1 888  2 127 127 16  
0.50% Mean 67 1 1 0 1 3  1 360 1 965 1503 2803 1600 3 1 70 68 1 8  44450 
1 .00% Mean 981 1 793 1 982 28 1 6  2333 4678 2500 4879 1 5704 78 146 
2.00% Mean 1 380 2884 3 1 34 3871  4 1 1 2  8906 478 1  801 9 29944 1 14223 
5 .00% Mean 2190 5219  5014 4820 7085 201 55 9882 15362 61428 1 91467 
0. 15% Minimum 10 15 3 5 1 3  1 0  5 6 4 2 
0.50% Minimum 50 20 20 5 1 1  8 5 5 4 37 
1 .00% Minimum 20 1 00 1 0  50 16  10  14  60 42 1 00 
2.00% Minimum 20 100 41  100 1 5  100 27 68 45 1 00 
5 .00% Minimum 100 100 100 50 100 78 300 50 469 4009 
0. 15% Maximum 49900 336800 335200 237800 609200 625000 3 1 1497 1 333609 1 026058 7403672 
0.50% Maximum 75800 38 1 830 425475 266239 61 8700 604742 15 1 848 148 1 1 32 1272725 5659405 
1 .00% Maximum 74900 208000 421475 591083 597700 7893 1 1 1 72350 2895253 1 532 129 784 1 348 
2.00% Maximum 5 1 300 20 1000 424075 979933 87 1649 636365 226734 2987537 1 570094 1 2224647 
5 .00% Maximum 53266 308049 433875 371 1 89 347388 743 1 1 9 126 1 37 2207815  1 980995 8 1 20165 
0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 3.85 4.68 5 . 1 7  4.85 4.72 5.01 5 . 1 0  6.07 5.65 8.52 
0.50% Standard Deviation 4. 16  4.73 5 .77 5 .75 5 .43 5 .40 5.24 7.20 · 5 .76 7.5 1 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 4.46 5 .65 6.09 5.78 5 .58 5 .45 5.43 7.5 1 5 .47 8 . 1 7  
2.00% Standard Deviation 4.54 4.78 6.26 5.75 5.65 5 .35 4.87 7.36 6.38 8.56 
5 .00% Standard Deviation 4. 1 1  4.54 5 . 8 1  5.08 5 .53 4. 1 7  4.09 8 .7 1 5 .68 8 .22 
Table 5 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 3 for Nasdaq firms. VNEL k = lo�L(dk . xvo( . i J, l ,J ,J where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vol is the number of shares 
traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k .  
2001 Post-Decimalization Low Volume Decile High Volume 
Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0. 1 5% Mean 544 428 769 1282 1002 1250 1021  2060 2902 12628 
0.50% Mean 85 1 789 1 390 2727 2175 3 1 26 1 704 3542 9859 43393 
1 .00% Mean 1 302 1 179 1 839 3834 4025 5876 2545 5246 1973 1  78 1 10 
2.00% Mean 1605 2448 2436 5453 5858 1 1 384 4040 8548 4 1524 126767 
5.00% Mean 2072 4352 3475 7582 14885 25649 74 18  1 53 10 1 3 1 2 1 8  273424 
0. 1 5% Minimum 50 10  2 6 1 5  20 3 2 2 2 
0.50% Minimum 28 12  34 5 5 1 6  70 1 7  2 100 
1 .00% Minimum 50 1 0  50 20 28 100 50 5 4 80 
2.00% Minimum 50 5 50 1 00 75 100 36 1 00 99 100 
5 .00% Minimum 100 100 100 200 1 00 800 1 00 372 3360 38226 
0. 15% Maximum 1 50300 2330 17  456000 429000 1 004350 983600 25 1475 649200 1 50 1 650 3299876 
0.50% Maximum 209200 233017  4338 10  4 19744 1040530 1 145875 265909 959900 1 595306 5387289 
1 .00% Maximum 21 1500 233017  492600 5 19469 1039630 1269412  472 1 86 965200 1 8 19 1 01 63 10533 
2.00% Maximum 204000 232017  4 16 120 793945 1054735 1250807 288423 1 35 8 1 28 1 832803 4 1 79532 
5.00% Maximum 145200 195850 69200 1 28214 1 078895 12 18353 163965 988700 4423834 1678 138  
0. 1 5% Standard Deviation 4.34 3 .95 4.87 4.72 4.98 4.99 4.94 5.46 5.36 7.04 
0.50% Standard Deviation 4.97 4.37 5.36 5 .72 5 .40 5 .35 5 .25 6.32 5 .57 6.73 
1 .00% Standard Deviation 5.7 1 4.75 5 .50 6. 1 8  5 .38 5 .34 5 .35 6.63 5 .9 1  7. 14  
2.00% Standard Deviation 6.26 5 . 1 6  5 .5 1 6.23 5.78 4.84 5 . 10  6.52 5 .6 1  7.74 
5 .00% Standard Deviation 6. 1 7  5 .08 5 .04 5.07 4.79 3.69 5.83 5.28 6.66 3 . 1 2  
-..J 
0 
Table 5 Continued 
Trading Volume is calculated as: EXPONENTIAL (VNET). VNET is computed and reported in Table 3 for Nasdaq firms. 
VNEE k = lo�L(d
k . xvo( - 1 
}, l ,J ,} where, d is the trade direction indicator (buy= 1 ,  sell= - 1 )  and vo 1 is the number of shares 
i traded. VNET is computed for each j th duration for company k . 
2002 Low Volume Decile High Volume Threshold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0. 15% Mean 1078 1 052 1058 1 379 1001  1 3 1 6  1 166 2860 3526 1 8501 
0.50% Mean 195 1  1 979 2070 2254 2052 307 1 2303 4565 8 1 87 7 1 338 
1 .00% Mean 2165 25 1 7  3016  3062 3800 6607 3986 6507 1 5565 140727 
2.00% Mean 3760 2942 498 1 4455 622 1 10053 8308 8984 27 1 38 303637 
5 .00% Mean 3388 4527 124 1 1 5737 77 14  3 1637 1 8505 1 6658 41 502 5 1 3439 
0. 15% Minimum 4 1 6  4 2 5 2 8 5 2 1 1  
0.50% Minimum 10  2 3 1 7  2 8 50 25 8 23 
1 .00% Minimum 14 2 75 5 1  1 1  30 2 20 50 1 00 
2.00% - Minimum 100 2 45 90 100 30 100 68 1 00 334 
5 .00% Minimum 100 200 100 100 200 660 2200 227 1 100 2300 
0. 15% Maximum 350 100 159300 908500 29098 1 5 19000 4701010  3 15855 1 995599 669600 2968227 
0.50% Maximum 6152 19 158878 896979 276927 523000 4701410  472980 201 0036 691 362 475 1 168 
1 .00% Maximum 237598 1 74594 584420 348764 541 384 470701 0  382933 1 723400 1 1 77307 96827 19  
2.00% Maximum 274641 1 80000 7 14520 1 7 1 1 3 1  667642 469452 1  268527 1 575804 1 120783 1 05538 1 4  
5 .00% Maximum 59500 1047 15  1028548 1 37732 202969 4750386 1 73282 364896 1080056 1 8463080 
0. 15% Standard Deviation 4.77 4.61 5 . 1 8  4.88 5.24 4.8 1 5.02 5 .47 4.90 8.25 
0.50% Standard Deviation 5 .69 5.28 5 .5 1 5 .80 5 . 1 8  5.57 5 .39 7.28 5 .76 8 .57  
1 .00% Standard Deviation 5.70 5.58 6. 15  5 .74 5.44 5 .45 5.27 7.43 5 .80 9.58 
2.00% Standard Deviation 5. 14  6.02 6. 15  6.06 4.64 5 .77 4.28 6.20 5 .37 7.99 
5 .00% Standard Deviation 4.28 5 . 19  8.5 1 6.07 5 . 10  4.64 2.90 4.20 5 . 1 7  12. 19 
Table 6 :  Unconditional Tests of VNET 
Panel A 
Unconditional t-tests are employed to test for differences of mean VNET values between samples. 
Differences in mean VNET values are tested by comparing 1999 values with 2002 values, 
Pre-Decimalization 200 1 with Post-Decimalization values, and Pre-Decimalization 200 1 
with 2002 values for two return thresholds ( 1 .00% and 2.00% ). 
1999 2002 
Threshold Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 1 .00% 8.4207 8.7134 10. 12 0 .000 1 17697 
Nasdaq 2.00% 8.8685 9.0785 4.5 1 0.000 1 78 19  NYSE 1 .00% 9.3369 8. 1468 -6 1 .99 0.000 1 15934 1 NYSE 2.00% 9.6826 8.477 1 -37.34 0.000 1 83147 
...J Pre-200 1 Post-200 1 
Threshold Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 1.00% 8.4144 8.4 1 12  -0.02 0.9822 29079 
Nasdaq 2.00% 8.8 144 8.7386 - 1 .45 0. 146 1  - 102 13 NYSE 1.00% 8.5558 8.5 10 1  -3.2 1 0.00 13 167033 NYSE 2.00% 9.2746 8.5760 -36.83 0.000 1 74826 
Pre-200 1 2002 
Threshold Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 1.00% 8.4 144 8.7134 9.92 0.000 1 23236 
Nasdaq 2.00% 8.8 144 9.0785 5.36 0.000 1 975 1 NYSE 1.00% 8.5558 8. 1468 -4 1 .2 1  0.000 1 25 1 120 NYSE 2.00% 9.2746 8.4771 -50.44 0.000 1 1 1732 1 
Table 6 Continued 
Panel B 
Unconditional t-tests are employed to test for differences of mean VNET values between samples. 
Differences in mean VNET values are tested by comparing mean VNET values for Low 
Threshold returns and High Threshold returns ( 1 .00% and 2.00%). T-tests are computed 
separately for 1999, Pre-Decimalization 200 1, Post-Decimalization 200 1, and 2002 for both 
the NYSE and Nasdaq. 
Low Threshold High Threshold 
( 1 .00%) (2.00%) 
1999 Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 8.4207 8 .8685 - 1 2.95 0.000 1 13304 
...J 
NYSE 9.3369 9.6826 - 10.37 0.000 1 19994 
N 
Low Threshold High Threshold 
Pre-200 1 Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 8.4 144 8.8 144 - 1 1 .0 1  0.000 1 20775 
NYSE 8.5558 9.2746 -5 1 .05 0 .000 1 1 45947 
Low Threshold High Threshold 
Post-200 1 Mean Mean t-Value E-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 8.4 1 12 8.7386 -8.57 0.000 1 185 17 
NYSE 8.5 10 1  8 .5760 -4.24 0 .000 1 959 12 
Low Threshold High Threshold 
2002 Mean Mean t-Value e-Value Observations 
Nasdaq 8.7134 9.0785 -8.48 0.000 1 122 12 
NYSE 8. 1468 8.4771 -29.42 0.000 1 222494 
Table 6 Continued 
Panel C 
Unconditional t-tests are employed to test for differences of mean VNET values between samples. 
Differences in mean VNET values are tested by comparing mean VNET values for Nasdaq 
and NYSE firms. VNET is determined using Low Threshold returns and High Threshold returns 
( 1 .00% and 2.00%). T-tests are computed separately for 1999, Pre-Decimalization 200 1 ,  
Post-Decimalization 200 1 ,  and 2002 time periods. 
NYSE Nasdaq 
Threshold Mean Mean t-Value e-Value Observations 
1999 1 .00% 9.3369 8.4207 -34.03 0.000 1 24642 
Pre-200 1 1 .00% 8.5558 8.4 144 -5.72 0.000 1 12 1960 
Post-200 1 1 .00% 8.5 10 1  8.41 12  -3.22 0.00 13 74 152 
2002 1.00% 8. 1468 8.7 134 25.22 0.000 1 152396 
NYSE Nasdaq 
Threshold Mean Mean t-Value e-Value Observations 
1999 2.00% 9.6826 8.8685 - 17.75 0.000 1 8656 
Pre-200 1 2.00% 9.2746 8.8 144 - 12.06 0.000 1 44762 
Post-200 1 2.00% 8.5760 8.7386 5.12  0.000 1 40277 
2002 2.00% 8.4771 9.0785 15.63 0.000 1 82310 
increased on Nasdaq from 1999 to 2002. Comparatively, average VNET values decrease 
from 9.3369 to 8.1468 for the NYSE 1 % threshold, showing a drop in depth on the 
NYSE from 1999 to 2002. 
A t-test of average VNET values using the pre-decimalization 2001 and post­
decimalization 2001 samples shows the impact of decimalization on depth. Mean VNET 
values drop from 9.2746 to 8.5760 for the NYSE 2% threshold upon the move to trading 
in decimals and are statistically different at the 0.01 level of significance. Converting 
these VNET values to share amounts demonstrates the economic significance of the 
changes from pre-decimalization to post-decimalization; 10,664 shares were needed to 
induce a 2% return during the pre-decimalization 2001 period, but only 5,303 shares were 
needed during the post-decimalization 2001 period. Similar tests for the Nasdaq result in 
insignificant decreases in VNET. Consequently, decimalization was associated with a 
significant decrease in depth on the NYSE, but did not significantly affect depth on the 
Nasdaq. 
Unconditional t-tests for the differences in mean VNET values between the 1 % 
threshold and the 2% threshold are presented in panel B of Table 6. The volume 
necessary to induce a price change is higher for the 2 % return threshold than the 1 % 
return threshold for all time periods for both the NYSE and Nasdaq. Consistently, greater 
share volumes are needed to induce larger price changes or returns. 
Unconditional t-tests for differences in mean VNET values between the NYSE 
and Nasdaq are reported in panel C of Table 6. Average VNET values are statistically 
different between the NYSE and Nasdaq at the 0.01 level for all time periods and 
thresholds. The differences in mean values confirm earlier evidence, showing that while 
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Table 7: Regression Results for VNET on the NYSE and Nasdaq using 1 % Price Threshold 
The following regression model is estimated in which the dependent variable is VNET, and the independent variables are the 
lagged time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the 
number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptime, and a binary variable 
set to one if the company is NYSE listed. The results are reported in Panel A. The regression model is: 
VNETit = a +  P 1TWASpreadit-I + P2Volit-I + P3Tradesit-I + P4Eptimeit + P5Ptime_errit + P6NYSEi + Ejt ( 1 )  
The results i n  Panel B are from equation (2), where binary variables have been added for  the time period from which the 
observation originated and interaction terms between the time period binaries and NYSE listing binary. Binary variables for the 
decile rankings of the number of shares traded are also included. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volumes. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. 
VNETit = a +  P1 TWASpreadit-I + P2 Tradesit-I + P3EPtimeit + P4Ptime_errit + 
P5NYSEi + P6Pre2001i + P7Post200 1 i + P8Post2002i + P9Pre2001NYSEi + P10Post2001NYSEi + 
P 1 1Post2002NYSEi + P1 2Decilel i + P 1 3Decile2i + P14Decile3i + P15Decile4i + P 16Decile5i + 
P17Decile6i + P 18Decile7i + P19Decile8i + P20Decile9i + Ejt 
Panel A: VNET on the NYSE and Nasd� (N=38724) 
Intercept TWASpread Vol Trades Eptime Ptime_err NYSE 
4. 16584 -0.00966 0.27767 0.2 1 946 0. 18447 0.28208 0.826 14 
( 0.0001) (0.0014) (0.000 1 )  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Panel B: VNET on the NYSE and Nasdag with Volume Deciles (N=38724) 
Intercept TWASpread Trades Eptime Ptime_err NYSE Pre2001 Post2001 
4.8738 -0.01 17 0.3398 0.3047 0.3245 1 .4258 0.2793 0.3639 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000 1 )  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pre2001NYSE Post2001NYSE Post2002NYSE Decilel Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 
-0.453 1  -0.5441 -0.6820 -0.2736 0. 1039 0.0629 0.2 13 1 0.0013 
(0.0180) (0. 1444) (0.3292) (0.0069) (0.2400) (0.4035) (0.0050) (0.9857) 
Decile? Decile8 Decile9 
0.7090 1 .0349 1 .7538 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000 1 )  
(2) 








Adj. R 2 
0.3 150 
increases to 0.3755. The interaction variables between time period and NYSE exchange 
listing all have negative coefficients. However, only the coefficient of -0.4531 for the 
pre-decimalization interaction variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. Thus, while depth increased on the Nasdaq from 1999 to 2002, it decreased 
by an insignificant amount on the NYSE over the same time period. 
The binary variables for volume rank by decile further show that depth increases 
as trading volume increases. In particular, the increase in VNET is the largest for the 
highest volume (9) decile with an increase of 1.7538. Note that the inclusion of the 
· volume decile binaries results in an increase in the coefficient of the NYSE binary to 
1.2458. This result suggests it takes about 3.5 more shares of stocks to induce a 1 % return 
for NYSE listed firms compared to Nasdaq listed firms after controlling for all other 
factors included in this model of depth. 
Table 8 provides the regression results for VNET on the NYSE and Nasdaq using 
the 2 % threshold. The explanatory variables are the same as those specified in Table 7, 
but the threshold for computing VNET is increased from 1 % to 2 % as a robustness check. 
A change in the threshold value results in different values for the dependent and 
independent variables. Some of the signs and statistical significances change from Table 
7 to Table 8. In panel A, time-weighted average bid-ask spreads are no longer 
significantly associated with VNET. In panel B, time-weighted average bid-ask spreads, 
the time binaries pre-decimalization 2001, post-decimalization 2001, and the volume 
decile binaries Decile4 and Decile6 become statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level. 




Table 8: Regression Results for VNET on the NYSE and Nasdaq using 2% Price Threshold The following regression model is estimated in which the dependent variable is VNET, and the independent variables are the lagged time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptime, and a binary variable set to  one if the company is NYSE listed. The results are reported in Panel A. The regression model is: VNETit = a +  � 1TWASpreadit-I + �2Volit-I + �3Tradesit-I + �4Eptimeit + �5Ptime_errit + 
�6NYSEi + Eit ( 1 ) The results in Panel B are from equation (2), where binary variables have been added for the time period from which the observation originated and interaction terms between the time period binaries and NYSE listing binary. Binary variables for the decile rankings of the number of shares traded are also included. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volumes. P-values are reported in parentheses. VNETit = a + � 1 TW ASpreadit-I + �2 Tradesit-I + �3EPtimeit + �4Ptime_errit + �5NYSEi + �6Pre2001 i + �7Post200l i + �8Post2002i + �9Pre2001NYSEi + � 1 J>ost2001NYSEi + �1 1Post2002NYSEi + �1 2Decilel i + � 1 3Decile2i + � 14Decile3i + � 1 5Decile4i + �1 6Decile5i + �1 7Decile6i + � 1 8Decile7i + � 1 9Decile8i + �20Decile9i + Eit (2) 
Panel A: VNET on the NYSE and Nasda9 (N=16669) Intercept TWASpread Vol Trades Eptime Ptime_err NYSE Adj. R 2 4.47239 0.00217  0.34302 0. 1 2 1 56 0.25 1 78 0.25597 0.40856 0.3 1 1 1  (0.0001)  (0.2341 )  (0.0001 ) (0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Panel B:  VNET on  the NYSE and Nasdaq with Volume Deciles (N=16669) Intercept TWASpread Trades Eptime Ptime_err NYSE Pre2001 Post200 1 Post2002 5.7387 0.002 1 0.3336 0.3 105 0.29 1 5  1 .5 10 1  0. 1369 0.0866 0.4668 (0.0001 )  (0.2436) (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0001 )  (0. 1 846) (0.4242) (0.000 1 )  Pre2001NYSE Post2001NYSE Post2002NYSE Decile l Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 -0.3478 -0.4948 -0.9562 -0.8265 -0.3486 -0.5782 -0.2 149 -0.5509 0.0926 (0.0252) (0.0024) (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0061 )  (0.0001)  (0.0459) (0.0001 )  (0.3776) Decile? Decile8 Decile9 Adj. R 2 0.3 125 0.60 1 1 1 .4588 0.3245 (0.0023) (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  
and Decile5 turn negative. However, the post-decimalization 2001 and 2002 NYSE 
interaction variables become statistically significant. Consequently, depth is a dynamic 
process with factor importance changing as the definition of an informational event, i.e. 
the return threshold, changes. Therefore, varying the return threshold specification results 
in the measurement of different types of information. Here, the 1 % threshold for the 
NYSE sample in 1999 computes 2769 events or about 28 events per company each day. 
However, the 2 % threshold over the same period estimates 691 events or 7 events per 
company every day. 
These contradictions and changes in significance levels lead me to conclude that 
the 1 % threshold is identifying noise trading as informational trading. It does not seem 
reasonable for there to be an average of 28 informational events per day for a company. 
As a result, the 2% and 1 % thresholds are capturing different types or quantities of 
information. 
Table 9 presents regression results for VNET on the Nasdaq, including 
Alternative Trading System effects, using the 1 % threshold. Panel B includes the 
explanatory variables given in panel A and adds binary variables for 9 of the 10 deciles to 
capture differences in volume across deciles. Panel A estimates show that time-weighted 
average spreads are negatively related to depth. Trade volume, the number of trades, the 
conditional forecast of the time between price changes, and the error in the conditional 
forecast of time between price changes are positively related to VNET. The variables for 
the proportion of quotes posted on Nasdaq through ECNs and the proportion of trades 




Table 9: Regression Results for VNET on Nasdaq with A TS using 1 % Price Threshold The following regression model is estimated in which the dependent variable is VNET, and the independent variables are the lagged time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptime, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The results are reported in Panel A. The regression model is: VNETit = a +  P 1TWASpreadit- I  + P2Volit-I + P3Tradesit-I + P4Eptimeit + P5Ptime_errit + P6ECNit + P7SelectNetit + P8SOESit + £it ( 1 )  The results in Panel B are from equation (2), where binary variables have been added for decile rankings of the number of shares traded. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volumes. P-values are reported in parentheses. VNETit = a + P 1 TW ASpreadit- i + P2 Tradesit- I  + P3EPtimeit + P4Ptime_errit + P5ECNit + P6SelectNetit + P7SOESit + P8Decilel i + P9Decile2i + P10Decile3 i + PnDecile4i + P 1 2Decile5i + P 1 3Decile6i + P 1 4Decile7i + P 1 5Decile8i + P 1 6Decile9i + Eit 
Panel A: VNET on Nasda9 (N=45 1 8) Intercept TWASpread Vol Trades Eptime Ptime_err ECN SelectNet 5.043 1 1  - 1 .07 1 2  0. 14738 0.3863 0.32473 0.24993 0. 1 9 1 1 3  0.0044 1 (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0367) (0.9770) 
Panel B: VNET on Nasda9 with Volume Deciles (N=45 1 8) Intercept TWASpread Trades Eptime Ptime_err ECN SelectNet SOES 5.69766 -0.94997 0.26503 0.30849 0.24733 0.22 1 54 -0. 1 7306 0.88355 (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.01 34) (0.2446) (0.09 10) Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 Decile7 Decile8 Decile9 0.405 1 3  0.59606 0.49699 0.27287 0.45762 1 .09456 1 .39209 1 .99532 (0.01 54) (0.0001 )  (0.0007) (0.0507) (0.00 1 3) (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0001 )  (2) SOES 2.3969 1 (0.000 1 )  Adj. R 2 0.3441 Decile! 0.092 1 2  (0.5425) Adj. R 2 0.3909 
When binary variables for volume deciles are included in panel B, the coefficient for 
SelectNet becomes negative, but remains insignificant. The variable SOES becomes 
insignificant at the 0.05 level. The volume decile binaries demonstrate a general increase 
in depth as volume ranking increases. 
Table 10 provides regression results for VNET on Nasdaq, including Alternative 
Trading System effects, using the 2% threshold. The variables are the same as those 
given in Table 9 and are provided for a robustness check. VNET estimates using the 2% 
threshold instead of the 1 % threshold to compute the dependent and independent 
variables are shown in panel A. The estimates present the coefficients to remain relatively 
stable. In panel B, the coefficient for SOES becomes significant at the 0.01 level, but the 
coefficient for ECNs becomes insignificant. Additionally, the sign for the SelectNet 
coefficient turns positive, but remains insignificant. Again, the return threshold 
specification can affect modeling of VNET. 
3C. Conclusions 
Unconditional t-tests show that VNET decreased on the NYSE from pre­
decimalization 2001 to post-decimalization 2001. This is consistent with the findings that 
smaller tick sizes reduce liquidity; Harris ( 1997), Atkinson and Martin ( 1999), Smith 
(1998), Christie et al. ( 1999), and Bacidore, Battalio, and Jennings (200 1 ). 
Decimalization however, caused no immediate impact on depth on the Nasdaq. 
The impacts of decimalization on depth over the year following decimalization are 
strikingly different for the Nasdaq compared to the NYSE; VNET increased on the 
Nasdaq, but decreased on the NYSE. While the unconditional tests suggest depth 




Table 10: Regression Results for VNET on Nasdaq with ATS using 2% Price Threshold The following regression model is estimated in which the dependent variable is VNET, and the independent variables are the lagged time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptime, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The results are reported in Panel A. The regression model is: VNETit = a + � 1 TW ASpreadit-I + �2 V olit-I + �3 Tradesit-I + �4Eptimeit + �5Ptime_errit + �6ECNit + �7SelectNetit + �8SOESit + Eit The results in Panel B are from equation (2), where binary variables have been added for decile rankings of the number of shares traded. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volumes. P-values are reported in parentheses. VNETit = a +  � 1TWASpreadit-I + �2Tradesit- I  + �3EPtimeit + �4Ptime_errit + �5ECNit + �6SelectNetit + �7SOES it + �8Decile l i + �9Decile2i + � 10Decile3 i + � 1 1Decile4i + � 12Decile5i + �1 3Decile6i + � 14Decile7i + � 15Decile8 i + �16Decile9i + Eit 
Panel A :  VNET on Nasdaq ( 1 763) Intercept TWASpread Vol Trades Eptime Ptime_err ECN SelectNet 4.7745 - 1 .06335 0. 15621 0.4 1 278 0.26468 0.23985 0.27208 0.36622 (0.000 1 )  (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0450) (0. 1 333) 
Panel B:  VNET on Nasdaq with Volume Deciles ( 1 763) Intercept TWASpread Trades Eptime Ptime_err ECN SelectNet SOES 5 .4943 1 -0.79216  0.33075 0.25907 0.2406 1 0. 16866 0.07227 1 .30697 (0.0001 )  (0.0008) (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 )  (0.2 143) (0.7653) (0.0046) Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 Decile? Decile8 Decile9 0.56654 0.70178 0.50978 0.4 1793 0.66579 0.820 1 8  1 .45847 1 .70902 (0.01 23) (0.0010) (0.0 1 55)  (0.()349) (0.00 1 1 )  (0.0001 )  (0.0001 ) (0.0001 )  ( 1 )  (2) SOES 1 .59493 (0.0006) Adj. R 2 0.3260 Decilel -0. 1 6572 (0.44 1 7) Adj. R 2 0.3561 
on the Nasdaq turns significantly greater than depth on the NYSE in the post­decimalization period, the regression analysis shows that after controlling the other factors in the model, NYSE listing is still associated with increased depth. The increase in depth on the Nasdaq supports Hypothesis 1 ,  suggesting that bid curves and ask curves simultaneously pivoted, or flattened, upon the introduction of trading in decimals. The drop in depth on the NYSE is consistent with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that either investors changed their quotation behavior such that there was movement along the bid and ask curves, or there was a simultaneous pivot and shift in bid and ask curves. Multivariate analysis shows that there was an insignificant increase in depth on the Nasdaq upon the implementation of trading in decimals. However, NYSE listed companies experienced an insignificant decrease in depth following the move to decimalization. Structural differences between the NYSE and Nasdaq, such as the aggregate use of limit orders, may explain the observed differences in depth. Consistent with the findings of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001 ), generally, depth increases in volume. The impact of Alternative Trading Systems on depth for the Nasdaq has been significant. In general, higher proportions of quote activity through ECNs are associated with increased depth, supporting Hypothesis 3 ;  the benefit of posting customer limit orders outweighs the possible increase in adverse selection costs arising from trader anonymity. Higher proportions of trading through SOES are associated with increased depth, supporting Hypothesis 7; small trades minimize traders' ability to use perishable information. 
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• I 
Comparative analysis of the effect of the selection of the threshold value suggests 
that different thresholds capture different information. For example, regression results for 
VNET on the NYSE and Nasdaq using the 1 % return threshold suggest a significant 
negative relationship between depth and time-weighted average bid-ask spreads. 
However, regression results for VNET on the NYSE and Nasdaq using the 2% return 
threshold suggest an insignificant positive relationship between depth and time-weighted 
average bid-ask spreads. Consequently, researchers should be careful in specifying the 
threshold price or return used to identify informational events. 
84 
Chapter 4 Informed Trading 
4A. Introduction 
The amount of informed trading in financial markets can significantly affect both 
their ongoing development, and cost of capital for listing firms. For example, managerial 
trading in company stock prior to informational events has resulted in significant stock 
price decreases for some violating firms. 48 If the degree of informed trading is 
significantly different for alternative types of trading systems, then the growth of specific 
types of trading systems can have significant impacts on the overall amount of informed 
trading in those respective markets. Consequently, it is important for policy makers to 
understand that their implicit support of specific types of trading systems can affect the 
overall cost of capital for an economy. Ultimately, policy makers will need to known how 
informed trading differs across trading systems. It is the goal of this work to show how 
adverse selection costs from informed trading differ across Alternative Trading Systems. 
Literature Review 
Markets differ in a variety of ways. One difference, which can affect market 
quality, is the extent to which market participants can trade anonymously. Using data 
from the German stock market where non-anonymous traditional floor based exchanges 
co-exist with an anonymous computerized trading system, Grammig et al. (2001) show 
that the probability of informed trading is significantly lower in the floor based trading 
system. Economides and Schwartz ( 1995) and Schwartz and Steil ( 1996) note that 
48 A highly publicized case is that of ImClone Corporation. In 2001 ,  three days before an announcement by the Food and Drug Administration of refusal to accept clinical trials submitted in support of a key drug approval application, several family members and friends of the CEO Waksal sold stock holdings in ImClone. When this information was disseminated to the market, ImClone' s stock dropped precipitously. 85 
institutional traders say they prefer an anonymous trading environment because they do 
not want to disclose their trading needs. Benveniste et al. (1992) suggest that anonymity 
allows informed traders to stay unidentified and consequently aggravate the adverse 
selection problem. Specifically, they show that brokers are motivated to share 
information with specialists about the trading motives of their customers because of the 
potential of specialists to price discriminate as retribution for having been exploited by 
broker informational advantages. Seppi ( 1990) models the coexistence of a non­
anonymous upstairs market for block transactions and an anonymous trading floor. He 
shows informed market participants will not trade in the upstairs market because 
behavioral constraints they do not want to comply with can be enforced in the non­
anonymous setting. Rhodes-Kropf ( 1998) investigates the coexistence of an anonymous 
and a non-anonymous dealer market. Since traders' identities are known in the non­
anonymous market, dealers will negotiate prices inside the quoted spread. However, 
dealers will not negotiate in anonymous markets. 
Prior research supports the idea that anonymity is related to higher adverse 
selection costs. De Jong et al. ( 1996) find that non-anonymously negotiated trades 
executed on the Paris Bourse's CAC systems have lower price impacts than regular 
CAC trades. Madhavan and Cheng (1997) show that traders who can credibly signal that 
liquidity needs motivate their trades, use the upstairs market. Garfinkel and Nimalendram 
(1998) show that Nasdaq stocks exhibit smaller increases in the bid-ask spread on 
insider-trading days than NYSE stocks. Consequently, they conclude that the Nasdaq is 
more conducive to anonymous trading than the NYSE. Heidie and Huang (2002) find the 
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probability of informed trading to be lower on the NYSE for a sample of firms that 
switched listing from the Nasdaq to the NYSE. 
Grammig et al. (2001) note that markets often differ with respect to the degree of 
anonymity they offer. Specifically, they state that most electronic crossing networks are 
completely anonymous whereas the New York Stock Exchange is not. However, trading 
on the NYSE is more anonymous than trading in the upstairs market for block trades. 
Similarly, under certain conditions, quotations placed through Electronic Communication 
Networks (ECNs) may be anonymous while dealer quotations on Nasdaq are not 
anonymous.49 
Data 
The data for this study were retrieved from the Nastraq and TAQ databases. 
Nastraq and TAQ are publicly available trade and quote data offered by Nasdaq and the 
New York Stock Exchange, respectively. All trades, quotes, trade times, quote times, 
trade sizes, quote sizes, and market maker identifiers for each quote are obtained from 
Nastraq for a sample of 100 Nasdaq listed companies. All trades, quotes, trade times, 
quote times, trade sizes, and quote sizes are obtained from T AQ for a sample of 100 
NYSE listed companies. 
To investigate differences in the probability of informed trading between the 
NYSE and Nasdaq, two matched portfolios are created. Firms are matched on the number 
of shares traded. First, all NYSE listed firms are ranked by the number of shares traded 
during December 1998 and placed into share volume deciles. The ten firms with the 
49 That is, the identity of the market maker quoting directly on Nasdaq is revealed. 87 
highest volume from each decile are chosen, for a total of 100 firms. Next, all Nasdaq 
listed companies are sorted by number of shares traded during December 1998. 
Documented differences in trade reporting procedures between the NYSE and Nasdaq 
require Nasdaq trade volume to be adjusted to be comparable to NYSE trade volume.50 
Therefore, the number of shares traded for Nasdaq companies is divided by 2. Lastly, the 
closest Nasdaq adjusted volume is identified for each NYSE company. Any duplicate 
matches are eliminated by keeping the closest match and re-matching the duplicate (i.e. 
The Nasdaq companies are sampled without replacement.) 
The high computational costs of trade and quote data cause researchers to limit 
both the number of companies and length of the period under investigation when 
investigating microstructure issues. For example, Engle and Lange (2001) use a sample 
of 17 NYSE listed, actively traded companies over 61 trading days to investigate market 
liquidity. Similarly, the sample employed here is limited to keep computational costs 
manageable. 
For both the NYSE and Nasdaq portfolios, data are obtained covering four two­
week periods; a two-week trading period one-year prior to the move to trading in 
decimals, the two-week period immediately preceding the move to trading in decimals, 
the two-week period immediately following decimalization, and a two-week period 
occurring one year after the beginning of trading in decimals. 
The portfolio of Nasdaq companies is created from those companies that were 
subject to trading in decimals on April 19, 2001. Consequent! y, the period before 
decimalization ranges from Thursday, April 5, 2001 through Wednesday, April 18, 2001. 
50 See Daves, Wansley, and Zhang (2003) and Dyl and Anderson (2003). 
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The related one-year prior period is from April 19, 1999 to April 30, 1999. The 
immediate post period is from April 19, 2001 to May 2, 2001. The one-year anniversary 
post period extends from Friday, April 19, 2002 to Thursday, May 2, 2002. 
The second portfolio includes only NYSE listed companies that were subject to 
trading in decimals on January 29, 2001. The companies in this portfolio are also selected 
by the ranking procedure detailed for Nasdaq listed companies. Therefore, the NYSE 
portfolio also includes 100 companies. 
The portfolio of NYSE companies is a subset of those companies that were 
subject to trading in decimals on January 15, 2001. Consequently, the one-year prior 
period is from January 29, 1999 to February 11, 1999. The sample period before 
decimalization ranges from Monday, January 15, 2001 through Friday, January 26, 2001. 
The immediate post period is from January 29, 2001 to February 9, 2001. The one-year 
anniversary post period extends from Tuesday, January 29, 2002 to Monday, February 
11, 2002. 
4B. Methodology 
Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) specify a model to estimate the risk 
of information-based trading on a single market.5 1  During a period T, a trading day, a 
risky asset is traded in a dealer market and an alternative trading system. In both markets, 
a risk neutral competitive dealer quotes bid and ask prices for one unit of a risky asset. 
51 Grammig et al. (2001 ) develop and estimate a structural model that builds on Easley et al. ( 1 996) and Easley and O'Hara ( 1987, 1992). The extension by Grammig et al. accounts for parallel trading in two markets, which is the market framework for securities that simultaneously trade on a listing market or exchange and an ECN. However, since the data used in this study do not identify ECN trades, the Grammig 
et al. model cannot be employed. 89 
Trading results from market buy and sell orders submitted by a large number of traders. 
Some of these trades are potentially informed trades. 
Time is indexed by t e [O, T] . Trading days are indexed by i e [1, / ] .  Nature 
determines whether an informational event occurs prior to the start of the trading day. 
Informational occurrences are assumed to be independent across trading days and occur 
with probability o.. In the absence of an informational event, the asset value is V; * • When 
an informational event occurs, the asset value is V; < V; * with probability � and V ; > V; * 
with probability 1-�. That is, � is the probability of a bad or negative informational event 
and ( 1 - �) is the probability of a good or positive informational event. The asset value is 
revealed at the close of the trading day. Informational events are assumed to be 
independent across trading days. 
Two groups of traders exist; informed traders and uninformed traders. 
Uninformed traders trade for liquidity purposes without knowing the underlying asset' s  
value or if an informational event has taken place. However, informed traders know the 
true asset value and when informational events occur. Consequently, informed traders 
only trade when informational events take place. 
The order arrival processes are modeled as independent Poisson processes. The 
arrival rate of uninformed buy and sell orders is denoted by £. The arrival rate of 
informed traders on days with information events is µ. The arrival rate of informed 
traders is zero on days without informational events. 
Traders know the unconditional probabilities of an informational event, and they 
know the order arrival rates, but they do not observe whether an informational event 
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occurred. Traders use Bayes' rule to update their beliefs during the trading day. All order 
arrival rates are assumed to be independent. 
At the beginning of the trading day, i.e. time zero, a market participant's beliefs 
about the probabilities for no news, bad news, and good news informational events are 
equivalent to unconditional probabilities. Formally, "no news" (n), "bad news" (b), and 
"good news" (g) correspond to P(O) = ( l -a, a&, a( l-o)). Using Bayes' rule, these 
probabilities are updated after each trade; the vector of subjective probabilities 
conditional on the trade history in the market prior to time t are denoted by P(t) = (Pn(t), 
Pb(t), Pg(t)). Therefore, the expected asset value conditioned on the trade history, is 
E (V; I t) =  Pn (t)V/ + Pb (t)V ; + Pg (t)V ; . ( 1 )  
The market maker establishes bid prices b(t) and ask prices a(t) equal to the 
conditional expectation of the asset value, given that the next trade is a seller-initiated 
and buyer-initiated, respectively. The resulting bid-ask spread is 
s(t) = a(t) - b(t) 
= Pl Bu/t)(V i - E[Y; I !  b + Pl Sell (t)(E[Vi I !] - V i ), (2) 
where Pl Buy(!) and Plsen(t) are the conditional probabilities that the next buyer-initiated 
and seller-initiated trades are motivated by information. Consequently, the spread at time 
t equals the probability that a buy is information-based multiplied by the expected loss to 
an informed buyer, including an asymmetric term for sells. The probability that any trade 
that occurs at time t is information-based is the average of the probability of an 
information-based sell and the probability of an information based buy, weighted by the 
probability that the next transaction is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. Formally, 
9 1  
PI (t) = Prob(buy)PI Buy (t) + Prob(sell)PI seu (t) 
µ(P
g (t) + Pb (t)) = --------
2£ + µ(P
g (t) + Pb (t)) 
The probability of an informed trade at the opening is based on the unconditional 
probabilities, 
PI = PI(O) = aµ 
aµ + 2£ 
(3) 
(4) 
Easley et al. ( 1996) estimate the parameters; a, '5, £, and µ for a single market. 
The unconditional probability of encountering an informed trader P I(O) can be 
determined using these parameters. 52 
The resulting likelihood of observing Si sells and Bi buys by a market maker on a 
day no news day i is 
I . = exp[-2(£I') (£Tli (£T)5i ] n,l B. ,s . , , .  , ·  (6) 
Equation (6) is the product of the densities of two independent Poisson processes that 
determine the rival of uninformed buyers and sel lers in the two trading systems. 
Respectively, the likelihoods for a "bad news day" and a "good news day" are 
(£I')B; [(£ + µ)T] s; 
I . = exp(-(2£ + µ)T) ------b,, B- 'S - '  , · , .  
(£I') S; [(£ + µ)T] B; 
I . = exp(-(2£ + µ)T) ------g,, B- 'S - ' , .  , .  (7) (8) 
52 Grammig et al. (2001)  extend this model to estimate the parameters for two markets and test the hypothesis that the probability of encountering an informed trader in an anonymous screen-based trading system is higher than the corresponding probability on an exchange floor. 
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The likelihood of observing fl; = { Si, Bi, } on a day which the occurrence of an 
informational event is not known is the weighted average of equations (6)-(8): 
I; = (1 - a)I n,i + a& b,i + a(I - .i)I g ,i • (9) 
Since news events are assumed to be independent across days, the likelihood of observing 
the data M = {Q; } {=1 over a /  days is 
L(M 1 0) = I1I; - ( 10) 
;=t 
Equation 10 is maximized with respect to the parameter vector 0 to obtain maximum 
likel ihood estimates of the parameters. The probabilities a and .i range are bound 
between O and 1 .  Approximate standard errors are estimated from the covariance matrix .  
To . investigate the impact of  Alternative Trading Systems on the probabil ity of 
informed trading (PIN), the following time-series cross sectional equation is estimated ( 1 1) 
where trades i s  the average number of trades, ECN i s  the proportion of al l quotes posted 
to Nasdaq that were submitted by ECNs, SelectNet is the proportion of all trades executed 
through SelectNet, and SOES is the proportion of all trades executed through SOES . 
In the framework of Admati and Pfleiderer ( 1 988), informed traders prefer to 
trade_ during periods when they are less likely to be discovered. Consequently, informed 
traders desire to trade when trading activity is high. Therefore, a negative relationship is 
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P/Ni =a+ fiJLOG(Trades) + fi3ECNi + B4SelectNet; + fi5SOES;+ c:i 
expected between the probability of informed trading and the average number of 
transactions for a given company. 
Orders executed through ECNs can be submitted anonymously. As a result, the 
likelihood of encountering an informed trader should increase as the proportion of quotes 
submitted by ECNs increase. 
SOES executed trades are also anonymous. However, SOES orders are small 
individual investor orders. Since SOES order sizes are limited to small numbers of 
shares, the ability of informed traders to take advantage of perishable information is 
minimized. Consequently, higher proportions of SOES trading should decrease the 
probability of informed trading. 
Lastly, SelectNet allows participants to electronically negotiate trade terms. The 
identities of the counterparties to the trade are revealed during the negotiation process. If 
a trader is concerned about her reputation and future ability to obtain favorable trade 
terms, then she is less likely to attempt to take advantage of informational advantages 
when her identity is known. Thus, increased trading through SelectNet should decrease 
the probability of informed trading. 
Hypotheses for the Effects of Alternative Trading Systems of the Probability of Informed 
Trading 
Hypothesis 1: 
The benefits of posting customer limit orders through ECNs outweighs the costs of 
trader anonymity. In the Admati and Pfleiderer ( 1988) framework where liquidity 
94 
traders and informed traders prefer to trade during active periods, informed 
traders are less likely to be recognized because of the high number of active 
traders. Consequently, companies with more ECN trade and quote activity should 
have lower probabilities of informed trading. 
Hypothesis 2 :  
The higher adverse selection costs arising from trader anonymity dominate all 
possible benefits arising from ECN participation. Consequently, companies with 
more ECN trade and quote activity should have higher probabilities of informed 
trading. 
Hypothesis 3: 
SelectNet users can reveal their identities, thereby reducing adverse selection 
costs. As a result, higher proportions of non-anonymous SelectNet trades should 
result in lower probabilities of informed trading. 
Hypothesis 4: 
SOES trades are small anonymous trades. Mandated small order sizes minimize 
traders ' ability to use perishable information. Therefore, higher proportions of 
SOES trading should lower the probability of informed trading. 
Assuming that the benefits of the posting of limit orders to ECNs is dominated by 
the negative effects of greater trader anonymity, then as the proportion of the total 
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number of trades executed through an ECN increases for a given company, market depth 
should decrease. 53 
SelectNet allows market participants to reveal their identity when electronically 
negotiating the terms of a trade. When an investor chooses to reveal his identity, it is less 
likely that he is attempting to exploit the counterparty by taking advantage of private 
information. Consequently, counterparties should be more willing to negotiate favorable 
trade terms through SelectNet. As a result, SelectNet should increase market depth. 
The effects of Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System are less clear. Orders 
executed through SOES tend to be small, individual investor orders. However, the orders 
are anonymous. If information asymmetry costs dominate the benefits of reduced order 
execution times, the SOES orders reduce market depth. 
53 Neither Nastraq nor TAQ data identify the party responsible for a given trade. Consequently, the proportion of the total number of trades executed through an ECN is proxied by the proportional of all quotations submitted through an ECN. 
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Chapter 5 Informed Trading Results 
5A. Unconditional Results 
Table 1 1  presents the average probability of informed trading by decile for both 
the NYSE and Nasdaq. In general , lower volume stocks have higher probabilities of 
informed trading. The average probabil ity of informed trading for the NYSE sample 
decreases from 14.42% in 1 999 to 1 2.67% in 2002. While the average probabil ity of 
informed trading on the Nasdaq is more variable from one period to the next, it appears 
stable over the long-term with estimates of 2 1 .32% in 1999 and 2 1 . 1 7% in 2002. Overall ,  
the probability of informed trading appears higher for the matched sample of Nasdaq 
firms than for the NYSE firms. These differences are tested further in later tables. 
Next, the effects of Alternative Trading Systems on the probability of informed 
trading are investigated for the Nasdaq. Table 1 2  lists the recognized Electronic 
Communication Networks that are included in this study. For the 1 999 to 2002 period, 
there are 10 qualified ECNs. 
Table 1 3  offers summary statistics for quote activity of ECNs and trade activity of 
SOES and SelectNet. The mean values of the proportion of all quotes posted through 
Nasdaq by ECN s are presented for share volume ranked deciles. Mean values for SOES 
and SelectNet are the proportions of trades executed through the respective trading 
systems. From 1 999 to 200 1 ,  the highest volume deciles have the highest proportions of 
ECN quotation activity. In 2002, the highest volume deciles actually have the lowest 
proportions of ECN quote activity. However, the highest volume deciles do have the 
greatest number of quotations by ECN s. 
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Table 1 1 : The Probability of Informed Trading 
The Probability of Informed Trading is computed across four two-week trading periods for matched samples of NYSE and 
Nasdaq listed companies. Firms are placed into deciles by ranking total monthly share trading volume in December 1998. 
Low Volume Decile High Volume 
1999 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Avera�e 
NYSE (N=lO00) 27.00% 14.24% 17.77% 13.93% 12.98% 13.69% 13. 15% 9.05% 10. 14% 12.28% 14.42% 
Nasdaq (N=l000) 33.86% 21 .63% 29.82% 29.66% 18.62% 16.36% 18.36% 15.63% 16.37% 12.88% 21 .32% 
Decile 
200 1 Pre-Decimalization 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Avera�e 
NYSE (N=lO00) 19.64% 16.92% 19. 19% 14.73% 12.65% 12.54% 1 4.55% 13.93% 12.56% 9.03% 14.57% 
� Nasdaq (N=l000) 23.88% 20.72% 20.40% 19.83% 1 3. 1 1% 15.83% 17.44% 19.25% 15. 17% 24.67% 1 9.03% 
Decile 
200 1 Post-Decimalization 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Avera�e 
NYSE (N=lO00) 23.04% 16.31% 16.60% 16.82% 12.09% 12.8 1% 13. 10% 9.22% 12.08% 1 1 .69% 14.38% 
Nasdaq (N=l000) 36.37% 28. 17% 20.63% 24.59% 18.60% 20.67% 16.94% 20.36% 22.99% 32.90% 24.22% 
Decile 
2002 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Avera�e 
NYSE (N=lO00) 16.5 1% 17.78% 12.37% 12. 12% 14.79% 12. 14% 1 1 .31% 8.23% 13. 12% 8.27% 12.67% 
Nasda9. (N=l000) 23.34% 20.79% 24. 19% 30.68% 24.0 1 % 1 1 .6 1 % 18. 15% 22.02% 15.64% 2 1 .29% 21 . 17% 
Table 12: Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) 
The following trading systems are considered linked-ECNs 
and are appropriately identified in the study. 
Archipelago ECN ARCA 
Attain ECN A TIN 
Brass Utility ECN 




Spear Leeds & Kellogg ECN 
Strike Technologies ECN 










Table 13: Alternative Trading System Statistics 
Summary statistics are presented for quote activity of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and trade 
activity of the Small Order Execution System (SOES) and SelectNet. The mean values of the proportion of all quotes 
posted through Nasdaq by ECNs are presented for share volume ranked deciles of 100 Nasdaq listed companies. 
Firms are placed into deciles by ranking December 1998 total monthly share trading volume from lowest to highest. 
Mean values for SOES and SelectNet are the proportion of all trades executed by the respective systems. 
Panel A: ECNs 
Lowest Volume Decile Highest Volume 
1999 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mean 25% 24% 27% 23% 24% 32% 34% 35% 38% 58% 
Frequency 2791 4314 8274 8678 14529 33267 29706 9786 1 207224 1533796 - Standard Deviation 0.432 1 0.4299 0.4432 0.4220 0.4244 0.4673 0.4742 0.4779 0.4852 0.4933 0 
0 
200 1 Pre-Decimalization 
Mean 57% 67% 75% 75% 67% 67% 73% 70% 74% 70% 
Frequency 6043 17585 55884 308988 8 1775 2305 16 102726 605364 10509 17 478 1472 
Standard Deviation 0.4957 0.47 18 0.4305 0.4322 0.4704 0.4688 0.4462 0.4602 0.44 1 1 0.4598 
200 1 Post-Decimalization Mean 60% 65% 75% 72% 64% 67% 68% 67% 70% 70% 
Frequency 15962 22756 58083 348678 1 19 1 12 242 196 105386 734659 1254864 5240970 
Standard Deviation 0.4893 0.4759 0.4312  0.4483 0.4802 0.4719  0.4650 0.4710  0.457 1 0.4589 
2002 
Mean 78% 75% 79% 81% 8 1% 79% 79% 77% 77% 70% 
Frequency 77555 54550 92887 28 1293 104349 333057 1 64700 1 1 17649 1394252 6 1 68733 
Standard Deviation 0.4 1 18 0.4355 0.4079 0.3900 0.3957 0.4038 0.4040 0.4233 0.4 188 0.4599 
Table 1 3 :  Continued 
Panel B :  SOES Lowest Volume Decile Highest Volume 1999 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean 4% 4% 2% 3% 4% 6% 3% 6% 8% 7% Frequency 1 855 3002 6004 67 1 2  10709 2 1 740 2429 1 68083 1 39605 1584 127 Standard Deviation 0. 1 9 19  0. 1904 0. 1 530 0. 1 650 0. 1 883 0.238 1 0. 1 620 0.2367 0.2744 0.25 17  200 1 Pre-Decimalization Mean 2% 3% 2% 7% 5% 8% 2% 7% 6% 6% Frequency 2575 6939 17786 1 39359 27357 89498 34655 342352 549722 4467907 Standard Deviation 0. 1 380 0. 1 628 0. 1 526 0.2498 0.2 1 29 0.2782 0. 1 229 0.2553 0.2448 0.246 1 2001 Post-Decimalization -
0 Mean 5% 2% 3% 7% 8% 7% 2% 7% 6% 6% - Frequency 5592 7505 1 5 1 2 1  103678 35 1 88 78340 28865 338056 539033 384424 1 Standard Deviation 0.2 174 0. 1 505 0. 1 593 0.26 1 2  0.2703 0.2584 0. 1 2 1 6  0.2630 0.2407 0.2463 2002 Mean 23% 26% 25% 20% 24% 23% 23% 23% 24% 23% Frequency 20798 17640 207 1 2  55733 30330 92723 45 1 84 280386 37459 1 35 19392 Standard Deviation 0.4239 0.4408 0.4306 0.4005 0.4296 0.4 1 80 0.42 14 0.4 177 0.4245 0.4227 
Table 13: Continued 
Panel C: SelectNet 
Lowest Volume Decile Highest Volume 
1999 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mean 30% 28% 28% 33% 34% 36% · 29% 27% 28% 19% 
Frequency 1855 3002 6004 6712  10709 2 1740 2429 1 68083 139605 1584 127 
Standard Deviation 0.4604 0.45 1 1 0.4484 0 .4698 0.4736 0.4798 0.4532 0.4463 0.4475 0.394 1 
200 1 Pre-Decimalization 
Mean 53% 52% 52% 28% 49% 50% 48% 34% 34% 23% 
Frequency 2575 6939 17786 139359 27357 89498 34655 342352 549722 4467907 - Standard Deviation 0.4992 0.4997 0.4994 0.4469 0.4999 0.5000 0.4997 0.472 1 0.4743 0.42 12 
200 1 Post-Decimalization 
Mean 48% 50% 50% 29% 49% 5 1% 48% 32% 33% 24% 
Frequency 5592 7505 15 12 1 103678 35 188 78340 28865 338056 539033 384424 1 
Standard Deviation 0.4997 0.5000 0.5000 0.4557 0.4999 0.4998 0.4998 0.4673 0.4698 0.4254 
2002 
Mean 10% 1 2% 14% 1 1% 12% 15% 1 1% 9% 10% 6% 
Frequency 20798 17640 20712 55733 30330 92723 45 184 280386 37459 1 35 19392 
Standard Deviation 0.3048 0.3264 0.3499 0.3074 0.3276 0.3577 0.3 150 0.2862 0.2936 0.2404 
0 
Iv 
Summary statistics for SOES trading activity show that from 1999 through 2001, 
the proportion of trading through SOES if higher for higher volume securities. SOES 
trading activity jumps from 2001 to 2002 as a result of trading system changes to SOES 
and SelectNet. 
In general, summary statistics for SelectNet show higher proportions of trading 
for lower volume stocks. SelectNet trading activity decreases from 200 1 to 2002 as a 
result of trading system changes to SOES and SelectNet. 
Table 14, panel A offers unconditional t-tests for time period differences in the 
mean proportions of all quotes submitted to Nasdaq through ECNs, and all trades 
executed through SOES and SelectNet. From 1999 to 2002, there are significant increases 
in ECN quote activity and SOES trading activity at the 0.01 level of significance. 
SelectNet shows a substantial decline in trading activity at the same level of significance. 
Mean quote and trade proportions do not change for any system as a result of 
decimalization during the two-week periods prior to and following the move to decimals. 
However, from pre-decimalization 200 1 to 2002, there are significant decreases in ECN 
and SelectNet activity, but a significant increase in SOES activity. 
Table 14, panel B presents unconditional t-tests for volume rank differences in the 
mean proportions of all quotes submitted to Nasdaq through ECNs and all trades 
executed by SOES and SelectNet. The proportions of quotes originating from ECNs and 
trades executed by SOES typically are higher for the high volume decile (9) than the low 
volume (0) decile. However, the proportion of trades executed by SelectNet drops as 
volume increases. 
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Table 14: Unconditional Alternative Trading Systems T-tests 
Panel A 
Unconditional t-tests are employed to test for differences in the mean 
proportions of all quotes or trades posted to Nasdaq and 
submitted through Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), 
the Small Order Execution System (SOES), or SelectNet, 
respectively. Differences in mean proportions are tested by 
comparing 1999 values with 2002 values, Pre-Decimalization 200 1 
with Post-Decimalization values, and Pre-Decimalization 200 1 with 
2002 values. 
1999 2002 
Mean Mean t-Value E-Value 
ECN 0.2445 0.75 17 1 2.88 0.000 1 
SelectNet 0.2599 0.0920 - 10.93 0.000 1 
SOES 0.0319  0.2222 23.05 0.000 1 
Pre-200 1 Post-200 1 
Mean Mean t-Value E-Value 
ECN 0.6535 0.648 1 -0.65 0.52 15 
SelectNet 0.34 1 2  0.3388 -0. 19  0.854 1 
SOES 0.0305 0.0368 0.52 0.6 1 26 
Pre-200 1 2002 
Mean Mean t-Value E-Value 
ECN 0.75 17 0.6535 4.00 0.0008 
SelectNet 0.34 12  0.0920 -8.42 0.000 1 
SOES 0.0305 0.2222 1 9.64 0.000 1 
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Table 14: Continued 
Panel B 
Differences in the mean proportions of all quotes and trades from 
Low Volume and High Volume share deciles are tested for ECNs, 
SOES, and SelectNet . Differences in means are computed 
separately for 1 999, Pre-Decimalization 200 1 ,  Post-Decimalization 
200 1 ,  and 2002. 
Low Volume (0) High Volume (9) 
1 999 Mean Mean t-Value e-Value 
ECN 0.2323 0.58 1 0  -35 .69 0.0001 
SelectNet 0.2836 0. 1 9 1 6  12.27 0.000 1 
SOES 0.0295 0.0676 -5.08 0.0001 
Low Volume (0) High Volume (9) 
Pre-2001 Mean Mean t-Value e-Value 
ECN 0.553 1 0.6959 -22 .08 0.0001 
SelectNet 0.5 108 0.2302 36.07 0.000 1 
SOES 0.0 14 1  0 .0645 -9.35 0.0001 
Low Volume (0) High Volume (9) 
Post-200 1 Mean Mean t-Value e-Value 
ECN 0.5952 0.698 1 -26.29 0.0001 
SelectNet 0.4678 0.2368 42.80 0.000 1 
SOES 0.0440 0.0646 -4.60 0.000 1 
Low Volume (0) High Volume (9) 
2002 Mean Mean t-Value e-Value 
ECN 0.7807 0.6959 52.64 0.000 1 
SelectNet 0.0995 0.06 1 3  25 . 10 0.0001 
SOES 0.2290 0.2325 0.64 0.52 1 2 
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5B. Multivariate Results 
Table 15 presents regression results for the probability of informed trading (PIN) 
on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Panel A shows an inverse relationship between the probability 
of informed trading and the number of trades for a given firm. The probability of 
informed trading is significant lower on the NYSE than on Nasdaq for the matched 
sample of firms. 
Table 15, panel B includes the same explanatory variables as panel A, but adds 
binary variables to capture the effects of higher volume on the probability of informed 
trading. The effects of exchange listing and the number of trades do not change when the 
binaries are included. The estimates show that probability of informed trading varies by 
volume rank, but does not monotonically decrease as volume increases. In fact, volume 
deciles 1, 2, 4 and 5 h�ve the lowest probabilities of informed trading. 
Table 1 6  presents regression results for the probability of informed trading on the 
Nasdaq, including Alternative Trading System effects. Panel A shows that PIN decreases 
as the proportion of ECN quotations increases and the number of trades increases. 
However, the proportions of trading through SOES and SelectNet do not significantly 
affect the probability of informed trading. PIN is slightly higher in 2001 than the other 
periods. 
Table 16, panel B includes includes the same explanatory variables as panel A, 
but adds binary variables to capture the effects of higher volume on the probability of 
informed trading. Generally, volume ranking does not impact the probability of informed 
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Table 1 5 :  Regression Results for the Probability of Informed Trading on the NYSE and Nasdaq 
The following regression 100del is estimated in which the dependent variable is the probability 
of infonred trading, and the independent variables are the natural logarithm of the number of trades 
and a binary variable set to one if the company is NYSE listed. The results are reported in Panel A. 
The regression ITX)del is : 
PINi = a + P 1LnTradesi + P2NYSg + ti ( 1 )  
The results in Panel B are from equation (2), where binary variables have been added for decile 
rankings of the number of shares traded. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volwnes. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. 
PINi = a +  P 1LnTradesi + P2NYSg + P3Decile l i  + P4Decile2i + P5Decile3 i + 
P6Decile4i + P7 Decile5 i + P8Decile6i + p9Decile 7 i + P 1 0Decile8i + 
P 1 1  Decile9i + Ei 
Panel A: The Probability oflnfonred Trading on NYSE and Nasdaq 
Intercept LnTrades NYSE 
0.40465 -0.0263 -0.0799 
(0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0001 )  
(2) 
Adj . R 2 
0.3465 
Panel B: The Probability of lnfonred Trading on NYSE and Nasdaq with Voh.ure Deciles 
Intercept LnTrades NYSE Decile 1 Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 
0.4564 -0.0298 -0.0828 -0.04 17  -0.0424 -0.01 16 -0.0540 -0.0425 -0 .0290 
(0.000 1 )  (0.000 1) (0.000 1 )  (0.0020) (0.001 9) "  (0.3984) (0.000 1 )  (0.0036) (0.0467) 
Decile 7 Decile8 Decile9 
-0.0264 -0.0078 0.0 104 
(0.0864) (0.63 1 1 ) (0.5957) 
Adj . R 2 
0.3704 
Table 16 :  Regression Results for the Probability of Informed Trading and the Alternative Trading System Effect The following regression model is estimated in which the dependent variable is the probability of informed trading, and the independent variables are the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by Electronic Communication Networks, the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, the natural logarithm of the number of trades, a binary variable set to one if the data are from the time period Jan. 2 1 ,  2001 -Feb. 7, 2001 , a binary variable set to one if the data are from the time period May. 14, 2001 -May 28, 200 1 ,  and a binary variable set to one if the data are from the time period May. 14, 2002-May 28, 2002. The regression model is : PINi = a +  P 1ECNi + P2SOES i + P3SelectNeti + P4LnTradesi + P5Pre2001 i + P6Post200 l i  + P7Post2002i + ei (3) The results in Panel B are from equation ( 4 ), where binary variables have been added for decile rankings of the number of shares traded. Deciles are ranked from lowest (0) to highest (9) volumes. P-values are reported in parentheses. PINi = a +  P 1ECNi + P2SOESi + P3SelectNeti + P4LnTradesi + P5Pre2001 i + P6Post2001 i + P7Post2002i + P8Decile l i + P9Decile2i + P 10Decile3i + P 1 1Decile4i + P 1 2Decile5i + P 13Decile6i + P 14Decile7i + P 1 5Decile8i + P 1 6Decile9i + P 1 7Decilel0i + Ei 
Panel A: The Probability q_f lnformed Trading and the Alternatiye_ Trading System Effect Intercept ECN SelectNet SOES LnTrades Pre2001 Post2001 Post2002 0.4402 -0. 1 1 89 0.0046 0.0365 -0.0268 0.0339 0.0330 0.0398 (0.0001 )  (0.0002) (0.9365) (0.6342) (0.0001 )  (0.0448) (0.0466) (0. 1 337) (4) Adj. R 2 0.4335 
Panel B: The Probability of Informed Trading and the Alternative Trading System Effect with Volume Decile Intercept ECN SelectNet SOES LnTrades Pre2001 Post2001 Post2002 Decilel 0.4424 -0. 1 092 0.0334 0.0475 -0.025 1 0.0257 · 0.025 1 0.0386 -0.02704 (0.0001 )  (0.0007) (0.5788) (0.5379) (0.0001 )  (0. 1 360) (0. 1 38 1 )  (0. 1432) (0. 1 665) Decile2 -0.0387 (0.0530) Decile3 0.0058 (0.7689) Decile4 -0.06 16 (0.0026) Decile5 -0.0391 (0.0779) Decile6 -0.0407 (0.0493) Decile? -0.01 30 (0.556 1 )  Decile8 -0.0 105 (0.6597} Decile9 -0.0403 (0. 1 592) Adj. R 2 0.4499 -0 00 
trading. Time effects become insignificant when volume rankings are included. ECNs 
remain negatively related to the probability of informed trading. 
5C. Conclusions 
Unconditional t-tests find the probability of informed trading to be lower for the 
. NYSE sample firms than for the Nasdaq sample of firms. This result is supported by the 
finding of Heidie and Huang (2002) that the probability of informed trading is lower on 
the NYSE for a sample of firms switching listing from the Nasdaq to the NYSE . 
. Furthermore, it is consistent with the conjecture of Garfinkel and Nimalendram ( 1998) 
that the Nasdaq is more anonymous than the NYSE. 
Quotation activity through ECNs extends from primarily high volume stocks in 
1999 to all stocks by 2002. SOES trading is slightly higher for high volume stocks, while 
SelectNet trading is higher for lower volume stocks. Quote and trade activity for ECNs, 
SOES, and SelectNet do not significantly change upon the move to decimal trading. 
Additionally, the probability of informed trading is shown to vary by volume decile 
ranking. 
Similar to the unconditional evidence, multivariate regressions show the 
probability of informed trading is lower on the NYSE than on Nasdaq. Brockman and 
Chung ( 1999) suggest that limit order trading results in lower adverse selection costs. 
Consequently, the lower probability of informed trading on the NYSE may come from 
higher levels of limit order trading. 
Estimates of the impact of the proportion of quotations placed through ECNs 
show that the probability of informed trading decreases as the proportion of ECN 
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quotations increases. However, the proportion of trades executed through SOES and 
SelectNet do not significantly affect the probability of informed trading. Generally, 
volume ranking does not impact the probability of informed trading on Nasdaq. Thus, 
only Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
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Chapter 6 Simultaneous Equations 
6A. Methodology 
This chapter investigates the possibility that traders simultaneously establish and 
react to depth and spreads whi le also considering adverse selection costs. Easley et al. 
( 1 996) only consider the effects of volume and the probability of informed trading on 
spreads. Engle and Lange (200 1 )  do not consider adverse selection costs in their 
specification of depth. However, when market participants quote a certain size and price 
for a security, they consider many factors. Important factors a trader might consider 
include; current spreads and the quoted volume associated with those spreads, current 
inventory levels and desired inventory levels, order flow, proprietary information, and 
adverse selection. Consequently, spreads, depth, and the probability of informed trading 
appear to be determined contemporaneous} y. 
Green (2000) offers two stage least squares as a technique to model simultaneous 
equations when endogenous variables exist. Therefore, a two stage least squares model is 
employed to measure the simultaneous impact of Alternative Trading Systems on depth, 
the probability of informed trading, and time-weighted average spreads. The following 
two stage least squares model is estimated in equations 1 -3 
VNET_Meani = o. + P1TWA_Meani + P2 Vol_Mean; + fi3Trades_Mean; + 
P 4Eptime_Mean; + PsPtime_err _Mean; + P6ECN_Mean; + 
fi7SelectNet_Meani + PsSOES_Mean; + c; 
B4SelectNet_Meani + PsSOES_Mean; + ti 
1 1 1  
( 1) (2) PIN;= a.+ fi1Trades_Mean; + fi2VNET_Mean; + f·iJECN_Mean; + 
TWA_Mean; = a + fiJ(Price_Mean x PIN); + P2Trades_Mean; + P6ECN_Mean; + P1SelectNet_Mean; + PsSOES_Mean; + e; (3) 
where VNET_Mean is the average VNET computed separately for each two-week 
trading period, TW A_Mean is the average time-weighted average bid-ask spread, 
Vol_Mean is the average the average share volume, Trades_Mean the average number of 
trades, Eptime_Mean is the average conditional forecast of time between price durations, 
Ptime_err_Mean is the average error of the conditional forecast of time between price 
durations, ECN_Mean is the average proportion of quotes posted to Nasdaq originating 
from ECNs, SelectNet_Mean is the average proportion of trades executed through 
SelectNet, SOES_Mean is the average proportion of trades executed through SOES, PIN 
is the probability of informed trading, and Price_Mean is the average trade price. 
6B. Two Stage Least Squares Results 
Table 17 presents two-stage least squares regression results for the Nasdaq, 
including Alternative Trading System effects, using the 1 % price threshold to compute 
VNET. Equation 1 estimates show depth decreases as time-weighted bid-ask spreads 
increase. However, depth increases in trading volume, the number of trades, and the 
conditional time between trades. Higher proportions of quotations placed through ECNs 
and proportions of trades executed through SOES are related to increased depth. 
Comparatively, higher proportions of trading through SelectNet are related to lower 




Table 17: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results on Nasdaq with ATS using 1 % Price Threshold 
The following two stage least squares regression model is estimated using three simultaneous equations. In equation ( 1 ), the dependent variable is the 
average VNET computed for each of the following two-week trading periods: Apr 19, 1 999 - Apr 30, 1999, Apr 5, 200 1 - Apr 1 8, 200 1 ,  
Apr 19, 200 1 - May 2, 2001 ,  and Apr 19, 2002 - May 2, 2002. The independent variables are the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged 
natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the 
forecast of eptime, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), the proportion of trades executed 
with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The independent variables are averaged over the 
same time periods as VNET. 
The probability of informed trading (PIN) is the independent variable in equation (2). PIN is estimated over the detailed two-week trading periods. The 
independent variables are the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, VNET, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECN s, the 
proportion of trades executed with SelectNet; and the proportion of trades executed with the SOES. The independent variables are averaged over the 
specified time periods. 
In equation (3), the time-weighted average bid-ask spread is the independent variable and is averaged over the described two-week trading periods. The 
independent variables are (the stock price x PIN), the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed through 
SelectNet, the proportion of trades executed with the SOES, and the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades. The independent variables are 
averaged over the specified time periods. The model is: 
VNET_Meani = a +  P 1TWA_Meani + P2VoLMeani + P3Trades_Meani + P4Eptime_Meani + 
P5Ptime_err_Meani + P6ECN_Meani + P7SelectNet_Meani + P8SOES_Meani + Ei 
PINi = a + P 1 Trades_Meani + P2 VNET _Meani + P3ECN_Meani + P4SelectNet_Meani + P5SOES_Meani + Ej 
TW A_Meani = a + P1 (Price_Mean x PIN)i + P2 Trades_Meani + P3ECN_Meani + 
P4SOES_Meani + P5SelectNet_Meani + Ej 
Eguation 1: VNET Mean on Nasda9 (N=260) 
Intercept TWA_Mean Vol_Mean Trades_Mean Eptime_Mean Ptime_err_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean 
0.5978 - 1 .8385 0.8345 1 .0082 0.3897 0.0560 1 .8772 -2.9599 
(0.5290) (0.0073i (0.0001 )  (0.0001 ) (0.0001)  (0. 1 1 10) (0.000 1 )  (0.000 li 
Eguation 2: PIN on Nasda9 (N=260) 
Intercept Trades_Mean VNET_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean SOES_Mean 
0.4834 -0.0240 -0.0 1 83 -0. 1 6 10  0.0894 - 1 . 1 522 
(0.0001)  (0.0833) (0.0333) (0.0001 )  (0. 1 886) (0.0 107) 
Eguation 3: Time-Wei�hted Average S12reads (TWA) on Nasdag (N=260) 
Intercept Price_Mean x PIN Trades_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean SOES_Mean 
0.2509 0.0342 -0.0705 -0.097 0. 1582 0.4777 




( 1 )  
(2) 
(3) 
Adj. R 2 
0.6990 
Adj. R 2 
0.4 1 1 5  
Adj. R 2 
0.4660 
Trading Systems on depth are more pronounced with the sign of the SelectNet coefficient 
turning negative. 
Estimates for equation 2 show a negative relationship between VNET and the 
probability of informed trading (PIN). Increased quote activity by ECNs and increased 
trade activity through SOES are associated with lower probabilities of informed trading. 
However, trading through SelectNet does not significantly affect informed trading. 
Equation 3 results demonstrate higher numbers of trades are associated with 
narrower bid-ask spreads. However, higher adverse selection costs, represented as 
average stock price multiplied by PIN, are related to increased spreads. Although higher 
proportions of ECN quote activity on are associated with decreases in bid-asked spreads, 
higher proportions of trading through SelectNet are associated with increases in spreads. 
Table 18 presents two stage least squares results for the Nasdaq, including 
alternative trading system effects, using the 2% threshold. Two notable differences exist 
between the results presented in Table 17 and those presented in Table 18 . First, in 
equation 1, the effect of a SOES trading on depth becomes negative and insignificant. 
Second, the relationship between SOES trading and the probability of informed trading 
turns positive and significant. 
Consistently in Tables 17 and 18, ECN quotation activity is associated with 
increased dep�h, lower probabilities of informed trading, and smaller bid-ask spreads. 
Comparatively, higher proportions of trading through SelectNet are related to decreased 
depth and increased spreads. 
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-Table 18: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results on Nasdaq with ATS using 2% Price Threshold 
The following two stage least squares regression model is estimated using three simultaneous equations. In equation ( I ), the dependent variable is the 
average VNET computed for each of the following two-week trading periods: Apr 1 9, 1 999 - Apr 30, 1999, Apr 5, 200 1 - Apr 1 8, 200 1 ,  
Apr 1 9, 2001 - May 2 ,  2001 ,  and Apr 19, 2002 - May 2 ,  2002. The independent variables are the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged 
natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the 
forecast of eptime, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), the proportion of trades executed 
with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The independent variables are averaged over the 
same time periods as VNET. 
The probability of informed trading (PIN) is the independent variable in equation (2). PIN is estimated over the detailed two-week trading periods. The 
independent variables are the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, VNET, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the 
proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the SOES. The independent variables are averaged over the 
specified time periods. 
In equation (3), the time-weighted average bid-ask spread is the independent variable and is averaged over the described two-week trading periods. The 
independent variables are (the stock price x PIN), the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed through 
SelectNet, the proportion of trades executed with the SOES, and the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades. The independent variables are 
averaged over the specified time periods. The model is: 
VNET _Meani = u + P 1 TW A_Meani + P2 Vol_Meani + P3 Trades_Meani + P4Eptime_Meani + 
PINi 
P5Ptime_err_Meani + P6ECN_Meani + f3?SelectNet_Meani + P8SOES_Meani + Ej 
= u + p1 Trades_Meani + Pi VNET _Meani + P3ECN_Meani + P4SelectNet_Meani + P5SOES_Meani + Ej 
TW A_Meani = u + P1 (Price_Mean x PIN)i + P2 Trades_Meani + P3ECN_Meani + 
P4SOES_Meani + P5SelectNet_Meani + Ej Equation 1 :  VNET Mean on Nasdaq (N=3 1 9) ( 1 )  (2) (3) 
Intercept TWA_Mean Vol_Mean Trades_Mean Eptime_Mean Ptime_err_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean SOES_Mean Adj. R 2 
1 .8566 -0.57 1 4  0.6296 0.9905 0.0153  -0.01 27 2.4596 -3. 1 292 - 1 .2668 0.4756 
(0.066 1 )  (0.5 1 37) (0.0001 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.7030) (0.6 1 1 3) (0.0001 )  (0.0001)  (0.4 1_64) Eguation 2: PIN on Nasdaq (N=3 1 9) 
Intercept Trades_Mean VNET_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean SOES_Mean Adj. R 2 
0.4680 -0.0204 -0.0190 -0. 1 108 0.0006 0. 3470 0.2743 
(0.0001 ) (0. 1 4 1 4) (0. 1 375) (0.0023) (0.9928) (0.0Q2_ID Equation 3: Time-Weishted Avera�e SEreads (TWA) on Nasdaq (N=3 19) 
Intercept Price_Mean x PIN Trades_Mean ECN_Mean SelectNet_Mean SOES_Mean Adj. R 2 
0.2333 0.03 1 4  -0.0482 -0. 1 220 0.2696 -0. 1 390 0.4 1 86 
(0.0001 )  (0.0001)  (0.0001 )  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.3368) 
Table 1 9  provides two stage least squares regression estimates for the NYSE and 
Nasdaq using the 1 % threshold. Results for equation 1 suggest NYSE listing is positively, 
but insignificantly related to VNET relative to Nasdaq listing. NYSE listing is  associated 
with an increase in the probability of informed trading in equation 2. Lastly, NYSE 
listing is weakly associated with higher time-weighted average spreads in equation 3. 
Two-stage least squares regression results for the NYSE and Nasdaq using the 2% 
threshold are given in Table 20. At the 2% threshold, NYSE listing is associated with 
lower probabilities of informed trading and larger bid-ask spreads. However, the 
coefficients for volume and the conditional time between trades in equation 1 have 
different signs in Table 1 9  than in Table 20. Additionally, NYSE listing no related to 
VNET. 
In general, Tables 1 9  and 20 showed that NYSE listing is only consistently 
associated with increased time-weighted average bid-ask spreads. 
6C. Conclusions 
Two-stage least squares regression estimates find a positive relationship between 
the number of trades and VNET. Although this is consistent with the half-life model of 
Easley et al. , it contradicts evidence offered by Engle and Lange (2001). 
Increased ECN quotation activity is  associated with increased depth, lower 
probabilities of informed trading, and smaller bid-ask spreads . These relationships are 
consistent with the expectation that the benefit of the posting of customer limit orders 
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Table 19: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results on the NYSE and Nasdaq using 1 % Price Threshold The follo�ing two stage least squares regression model is estimated using three simultaneous equations. In equation ( 1 ), the dependent variable is the average VNET computed for each of the following two-week trading periods for Nasdaq listed companies: Apr 19, 1999 - Apr 30, 1999, Apr 5, 2001 - Apr 18, 2001 ,  Apr 1 9, 2001 - May 2, 200 1,  and Apr 19, 2002 - May 2, 2002. VNET is averaged over the following two-week trading periods for NYSE listed companies: Jan 29, 1999 - Feb 1 1 ,  1999, Jan 15, 2001 - Jan 26, 2001 ,  Jan 29, 2001 - Feb 9, 2001 ,  and Jan 29, 2002 - Feb 1 1 , 2002. The independent variables are the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptirne, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The independent variables are averaged over the same time periods as VNET. The probability of informed trading (PIN) is the independent variable in equation (2). PIN is estimated over the detailed two-week trading periods. The independent variables are the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, VNET, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the SOES. The independent variables are averaged over the specified time periods. In equation (3), the time-weighted average bid-ask spread is the independent variable and is averaged over the described two-week trading periods. The independent variables are (the stock price x PIN), the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, the proportion of trades executed with the SOES, and the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades. The independent variables are averaged over the specified time periods. The model is: VNET_Meani = a +  J3 1TWA_Meani + J32Vol_Meani + J33Trades_Meani + J34Eptirne_Meani + J35Ptime_err_Meani + J36NYSEi + Ei PINi = a + J31 Trades_Meani + J32 VNET _Meani + J33NYSEi + Ej TW A_Meani = a + J31 (Price_Mean x PIN)i + J32 Trades_Meani + J33NYSEi + Ei Equation 1 :  VNET Mean on the NYSE and Nasdaq (N=668) Intercept TWA_Mean Vol_Mean Trades_Mean 6.3468 -0. 1 93 1  -0.2277 1 .3 1 17 {0.OOOJ_)_ (0.4240) (0.2463) (0.0008) Equation 2: PIN on the NYSE and Nasdaq (N=668) Intercept Trades_Mean VNET _Mean NYSE 1 .59 12 0. 1619 -0. 2093 0.0763 {0.OOO_ ! l  _ (0.0001 )  (0.0001) (0.01 30) Eptime_Mean Ptime_err_Mean 0.2457 0. 1 168 (Q_.3955) _ _____JQ._503 1 )  Equation 3 :  Time-Weighted Average Spreads (TWA) o n  the NYSE and Nasdaq (N=668) Intercept Price_Mean x PIN Trades_Mean NYSE -3 .0721 0.2622 0.9657 3.3 182 (0. 1660) (0.36 15) (0.20 1 4) (0.0668) NYSE 2.004 1 {0. 1 191)  ( 1 )  (2) (3) Adj. R 2 0.0515 Adj. R 2 0.0906 Adj. R 2 0.00458 
-
00 
Table 20: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results on the NYSE and Nasdaq using 2% Price Threshold The following two stage least squares regression model is estimated using three simultaneous equations. In equation ( 1 ), the dependent variable is the average VNET computed for each of the following two-week trading periods for Nasdaq listed companies: Apr 1 9, 1 999 - Apr 30, 1 999, Apr 5, 2001 - Apr 1 8, 2001 , Apr 1 9, 2001 - May 2, 2001 ,  and Apr 1 9, 2002 - May 2, 2002. VNET is averaged over the following two-week trading periods for NYSE listed companies: Jan 29, 1 999 - Feb 1 1 , 1 999, Jan 15 ,  2001 - Jan 26, 200 1 ,  Jan 29, 2001 - Feb 9, 2001 ,  and Jan 29, 2002 - Feb 1 1 , 2002. The independent variables are the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the lagged natural logarithm of trade volume, the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, the natural logarithm of the forecast of eptime, the error from the forecast of eptime, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the Small Order Execution System (SOES). The independent variables are averaged over the same time periods as VNET. The probability of informed trading (PIN) is the independent variable in equation (2). PIN is estimated over the detailed two-week trading periods. The independent variables are the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades, VNET, the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, and the proportion of trades executed with the SOES. The independent variables are averaged over the specified time periods. In equation (3), the time-weighted average bid-ask spread is the independent variable and is averaged over the described two-week trading periods. The independent variables are (the stock price x PIN), the proportion of quotes submitted to Nasdaq by ECNs, the proportion of trades executed with SelectNet, the proportion of trades executed with the SOES, and the lagged natural logarithm of the number of trades. The independent variables are averaged over the specified time periods. The model is: VNET_Meani = a +  (31TWA_Meani + f3iVol_Meani + f33Trades_Meani + f34Eptime_Meani + f35Ptime_err_Meani + ( 1 )  f36NYSEi + Ej PINi = a + (3 1 Trades_Meani + (32 VNET _Meani + f33NYSEi + Ei TW A_Meani = a + (31 (Price_Mean x PIN)i + (32 Trades_Meani + f33NYSEi + Ei Equation 1: VNET_Mean on the NYSE and Nasdaq (N=626) Intercept TW A_Mean Vol_Mean Trades_Mean Eptime_Mean Ptime_err_Mean 6. 1442 -0.3 1 07 0. 145 1  0.9 1 56 -0.0040 -0.0379 (0.0001 )  (0. 1 624) (0.0108) (0.0001 )  (0.9061 ) (0.04��) Equation 2: PIN on the NYSE and Nasdaq (626) Intercept Trades_Mean VNET _Mean NYSE 0.3645 -0.0057 -0.0 166 -0.0687 (Q.0024) (0.741 5) (0.357 1L_ co.0001 )  Equation 3: Time-Weighted Average Spreads (TWA) on the NYSE and Nasdaq (626) Intercept Price_Mean x PIN Trades_Mean NYSE -0.3799 0.0748 0. 1261 l .3934 (0.0571 )  (0.0020) (0.0769) (0.0001 )  NYSE 0.4592 (0.21 78) (2) (3) Adj. R 2 0.3877 Adj. R 2 0. 170 1  Adj. R 2 0. 1 8 1 92 
outweighs the costs of enhanced trader anonymity. Comparatively, higher proportions of 
trading through SelectNet are related to decreased depth and increased spreads. Thus, the 
increased trading time associated with negotiated trades appears to be more costly than 
the benefit of improved trade terms. 
NYSE listing is associated with increased time-weighted average bid-ask spreads. 
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Conclusions and Future Research 
Estimates of the immediate effect of decimalization on market depth show VNET 
decreased on the NYSE from pre-decimalization 2001 to post-decimalization 2001. This 
is consistent with previous findings that smaller tick sizes reduce liquidity. 
Comparatively, decimalization caused no immediate impact on depth on the Nasdaq. 
Long-term evidence of the impact of decimalization on depth differs greatly for the 
Nasdaq compared to the NYSE; VNET increased on the Nasdaq, but decreased on the 
NYSE. Therefore, prior research findings that decimalization caused tighter bid-ask 
spreads, resulting in lower trading costs on the NYSE are not complete and may be 
misleading. 
The impact of Alternative Trading Systems on depth for Nasdaq listed companies 
has been significant. In general, higher proportions of quote activity through ECNs are 
related to increased depth. Comparatively, higher proportions of trading through 
SelectNet are related to decreased depth and increased spreads. 
Estimates of the relationship between the proportions of quotations placed 
through ECNs and the probability of informed trading show the probability of informed 
trading to decrease as the proportion of ECN quotations increases. However, estimates of 
the relationship between the proportion of trades executed through SOES and SelectNet 
and the probability of informed trading are inconclusive. Together, these findings suggest 
that traders may consider adverse selection costs in choosing their execution venue. 
Several areas of possible research arise from this study. Four possible ways in 
which market participants may change quotation behavior in a manner consistent with 
decreasing spreads are identified in this study. The ask or supply curves and bid or 
120 
demand curves are presented to show how quoted volumes may increase or decrease 
depending on either movements along the curves or shifts in the curves. However, 
rationales are not offered for why these possible changes in the curves occur. What 
information or events cause movement up of down a curve? What is (are) the appropriate 
technique(s) to measure a supply or demand curve? How much shift in a curve is 
necessary to be considered something other than noise? In other words, if bid and ask 
curves are not simple, straight nonstochastic lines, but instead vibrate within some normal 
range, then how much vibration is should be considered noise instead of a shift? 
Lastly, the effects of price or returns volatility were not considered in this work. 
However, market depth may be affected by changes in volatility. In the presence of 
positive inventory holding costs, traders may wish to quote smaller share amounts when 
volatility increases. Additionally, heightened volatility could cause a trader to reconsider 
his choice of trading venue. Differences in the speed of order execution across trading 
systems may cause investors to choose faster execution systems during periods of 
increased volatility. 
1 2 1  
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Appendix 1 Table A: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
for Nasdaq Companies During 1999 Period 
PJN = 
µ(l - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(l - P. (t)) 
1999 ALPHA 
ADSK 1 .0000 
(0.0000) 
ALKS 0.3000 
(0. 1 87 1 )  
ALXN 0.2002 
(0. 1 5 1 1 )  
AMAT 1 .0000 
(0.0000) 
AMKR 0.3000 






(0. 1 87 1 )  
APLX 0.2000 
(0. 1633) 
ASCA 0. 1 726 
(0.2287) 
ASFC 0.4000 
(0. 1 85 1 )  
ATGI 0.481 6  
(0.2094) 
AULT 0.3004 
(0. 1 869) 















(0. 1 736) 
CAND 0. 1 000 
(0. 1 1 34) 
DELTA 
0. 1998 





0.2 1 93 





































ETA MU PIN 
500.8602 197.8355 0 . 1 649 
(44.85 10) (35.4359) 
76.7714 1 1 1 .8578 0 . 1 794 
(8.6395) (48 . 1539) 
23.7207 50.7499 0. 1 764 
(2.4150) (2.4088) 
1 26.3098 14.3791 0.0539 
(50.7801 )  (9.0807) 
287.4 l 1 8  43 1 .5882 0. 1 838 
(41 .0910) ( 1 17.3989) 
148 .4375 1 69.3 1 25 0. 1 858 
( 19.4243) (33 . 1 505) 
75 .6250 75.3749 0. 1 662 
( 1 1 .8 1 52) ( 15 . 1749) 
47 . 1765 1 1 3 .8235 0.2657 
( 1 1 . 1 547) (1 2.33 10) 
52.9447 99.5532 0. 1 583 
(9. 1990) (27.6922) 
3.6030 1 2.7 1 1 3  0.2334 
( 1 .2527) (9.7880) 
1 54.0629 99.9378 0 . 1 148 
(9.982 1 )  (33 .4444) 
5.0033 14.52 1 1  0.41 14  
( 1 .9022) (2.8750) 
21 . 1 746 33. 1 259 0. 1 903 
(3.4459) (5 .9862) 
7.53 17  1 1 .2 1 27 0.2430 
( 1 .0378) (3 .5829) 
299.8752 257.6238 0. 1466 
(29.9 175) (73 .6388) 
5 18 .2941 304.0392 0.0809 
(46.9235) (80.6226) 
5.5 1 89 8.3063 0.2299 
(2.4333) (8.2595) 
42.2701 52.0267 0.2706 
(9. 1494) (14 .3408) 
18 . 106 1  1 8. 1 285 0. 1 826 
(3 .0778) (3 .4271 )  
3 .5832 19.4 1 17  0.4363 
( 1 . 19 17) (5.9497) 
7.4 155 7 .6488 0.2585 
( 1 .9880) ( 1 .7760) 
1 06.0526 415 .9474 0. 1 639 
(29.2033) (29.2033) 
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Appendix 1 Table A Continued 
PIN = µ(
l - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
1999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
CBUK 0.9765 0.0000 25.4842 2 1 .2344 0.2892 
(0.02 1 1 )  (0.0000) (7.0506) ( 12.5853) 
CELL 0.4923 0.4740 754.373 1 74 1 .708 1 0. 1 949 
(0.293 1 )  (0.0015) ( 129.8488) (95 1 .7849) 
CENT 0.3000 1 .0000 49.0000 105.6667 0.2444 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) (3.9958) ( 15 . 1 898) 
CHIR 0.6990 0.4277 356.0024 1 82.702 1 0. 152 1  
(0. 1 860) (0.2424) (2 1 .8809) (29.4974) 
COMS 1 .0000 0.0000 1 09 . 1 689 5.7679 0.0257 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (49.8822) (9.4877) csco 1 .0000 1 .0000 122.0 1 30 1 2.0570 0.047 1 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (35.3776) (20.4034) 
DAVX 0.3925 0.7448 63. 1 1 29 75. 1 022 0. 1 893 
(0.2014) (0.340 1 )  (7.6663) (41 . 142 1 )  
DIAN 1 .0000 0.6487 1 .0728 2.8543 0.5709 
(0.0000) (0.2 143) (0.6763) (0.7242) 
ORTE 0.9985 0.0000 88 .8556 70.3 174 0.2832 
(0.001 1 )  (0.0000) ( 1 2.8495) (28.7249) 
DRYR 0.5002 0.3998 41 .5990 45.9882 0.2 166 
(0.2039) (0.2825) (6.3920) (9.7359) 
DSTM 0.9339 0.0000 72. 1 375 73.565 1 0.3226 
(0.0276) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .3669) (20.9380) 
DTPI 0.2000 0.5001  33 .0554 69.9400 0. 1746 
(0. 1632) (0.4558) (5.9704) (26.4483) 
DUCK 0.5 1 57 0.0000 2.8098 3.9695 0.2670 
(0.2439) (0.0000) (0.6657) (l .6215) 
EMMS 0.4275 0.5000 55.6097 62.8834 0. 1 946 
(2.2848) (0.32 10) (48.4052) ( 1 7 1 . 1 1 90) 
EXBT 0.2007 0.5003 36.2 158  52.6688 0. 1 273 
(0. 1 629) (0.460 1 )  (4.91 59) ( 1 6.2440) 
FSII 0.2000 1 .0000 27.3333 66.6656 0. 1 96 1  
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (3.25 1 7) (9.8 143) 
FUTR 0.2222 0.4999 1 5.3 1 36 61 .6962 0.3092 
(0. 1 857) (0.4772) (5.0700) (29.4326) 
GLFD 0.3061 0.0000 37.6436 45.4456 0. 1 560 
(0. 1 685) (0.0000) (5.5637) (1 5.97 12) 
HGSI 0.3942 0.5074 40. 1466 38.3209 0. 1 584 
(0. 1 98 1 )  (0.3399) (2.97 1 0) (6.2779) 
HLYW 1 .0000 0.5957 149.5896 75. 1 247 0.2007 
(0.0000) (0. 1 58 1 )  (34.9684) ( 16.3702) 
HMSY 0.74 1 3  0.6445 53. 1 304 39.8476 0.2 1 75 
(0.7053) (0. 3 103) ( 1 5.7049) ( 16.8 1 22) HOFF 0.301 3  0.6677 1 8 .2339 23.6750 0. 1 636 
(0. 1 868) (0.3499) (2.4579) (3.6483) 
HRLY 0. 1 046 0.0000 14 .5562 24.7345 0.08 16  
(0. 1 143) (0.0000) (2.0608) ( l .7408) 
HUBG 0.3899 0.7563 7.5 173 2 1 .4574 0.3575 
(0. 1775) (0.3079) (2.6 1 33) (8.2343) 
INSP 1 .0000 1 .0000 223.008 1 67.5 124 0. 1 3 15 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (86.9903) (2 1 .6270) 129 
Appendix 1 Table A Continued 
PIN = µ(I - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
1 999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN INTC 1 .0000 0.2036 1 20.9566 1 1 .6437 0.0459 
(0.0000) (0. 1 329) (46.5945) (8.4449) 
ITIG 0.9999 1 .0000 106.2966 67.7741 0.2417 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 6.88 12) (41 .77 1 5) LARS 0.298 1 0.0000 2 1 . 1 984 26.8457 0. 1 588 
(0. 1727) (0.0000) (2.2567) (7.2221 )  LNCB 0.3989 0.4986 8.76 1 1 34.0376 0.4366 
(0. 1 973) (0.3329) (3.263 1 )  ( 1 2.6709) 
LTRE 0.4385 0.7629 6. 1 477 1 3 .0099 0.3 169 
(0. 1 900) (0.291 2) (l .8796) (2. 19 14) 
LUFK 0.5007 0.5988 10.20 17 20.3640 0.3332 
(0.2031 )  (0.2824) (2.0928) (4.4702) 
MDEA 0. 1000 0.0000 1 3 .0000 66.0000 0.2025 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (4.22 18)  (4.22 1 8) 
MEDI 1 .0000 0.3865 326.7923 149.6996 0. 1 864 
(0.0000) (0.2 1 14) (65.3908) (23.7395) MEDX 0.7289 1 .0000 24.4955 19.2 1 84 0.2224 
(0.2039) (0.0000) (2.5086) (4.098 1 )  MINI 0.5000 0.6000 28. 1 999 62.3992 0.3562 
(0.2041 )  (0.2829) (4.9570) ( 12.3 1 16) MSFf 0.0000 0.0264 106.60 19  4.2585 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.3975) (44.5322) (9.0520) NATR 0.4000 0.7501 3 1 .7503 44.4985 0.2 1 89 
(0.2000) (0.2795) (4.6917) (9.6788) 
NEOG 1 .0000 1 .0000 5.8000 9.0000 0.4369 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9192) (1 .34 16) NETM 0.2000 0.5000 84.9444 142.5555 0. 1437 
(0. 1 633) (0.4564) ( 1 1 .7464) ( 16.2446) NTAP 0.9988 1 .0000 381 .4040 175.9140 0. 1 872 
(0.0008) (0.0000) (61 .3867) ( 103.8696) 
ODET 0.0839 1 .0000 1 1 .7790 1 9.0657 0.0636 
(0.0457) 0.0000 (2.0323) (3 .4794) OPTI 0.2989 0.6655 1 2.8361 35.5530 0.2928 
(0. 1 841 )  (0.3644) (3. 1 5 1 5) (1 1 .72 1 8) ORCL 1 .0000 0. 1743 1 33.4788 1 8.7469 0.0656 
(0.0000) (0. 1 760) (50.7477) ( 1 1 .7 143) OSIP 0.5029 0.2034 38.535 1 26.7027 0. 1484 
(0.2041 )  (0.2320) (2.8335) (3.0947) 
PCCC 0.3000 0.6667 59.2941 86.7059 0. 1 799 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (9.410 1 )  (24.2078) PCDI 0.2757 1 .0000 5.4002 9.4287 0. 1 940 
(0. 1 626) (0.0000) ( 1 .37 10) (2.6587) PENX 0.2486 0.5685 7.3603 1 5 .2050 0.2043 
(0. 1 195) (0.5 145) (2. 1030) (4. 1276) PETM 1 .0000 0.6395 208. 1 9 1 3  1 37.9749 0.2489 
(0.0000) (0. 1 602) (46.5840) (46.8620) 
PLFE 0.3000 1 .0000 1 6.8235 32.841 7  0.2265 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) (3. 1 340) (4. 1332) PRST 0.2000 0.5000 1 1 5 .2778 288.7222 0.2003 
(0. 1 633) (0.4564) (22.5709) (78.6677) 
1 30 
Appendix 1 Table A Continued 
PIN = µ(l - P, (t)) 
2£ + µ(I - P, (t)) 
1 999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PSFT 1 .0000 1 .0000 225.2957 73.3028 0.1 399 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (8 1 .5500) (53.6720) 
PTEN 0.997 1 0.0000 354.0284 167.8 1 84 0. 1 9 12  
(0.001 1 )  (0.0000) (60.8736) ( 175.0442) 
QADI 0.89 19  0.0000 24. 1 1 79 25.3348 0.3 190 
(0.0939) (0.0000) (8.4198) (27.4412) 
QDIN 0. 1 1 1 1  0.0000 1 2.2941 76.7059 0.2574 
(0. 1283) (0.0000) (2.7610) (2.7610) 
RCCC 0.2000 0.5000 15.8333 47.6667 0.23 14 
(0. 1633) (0.4564) (4.0485) (4.0227) 
REMC 0.2000 1 .0000 67.4444 1 53.0556 0. 1 850 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) ( 10.4957) (20.0382) 
RGBK 0.3000 0.3333 241 .5883 208.7453 0. 1 147 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) ( 1 6.3293) (80.41 1 5) 
RICK 0.2000 0.0000 29.6667 1 1 3.3333 0.2764 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) (8.7 148) (41 .0255) 
SANM 0.5000 0.4000 589.2000 356.8000 0. 1 3 1 5  
(0.2041 )  (0.2828) (63.4209) (87.5359) 
SCFS 0.7880 1 .0000 1 8.7955 14.4783 0.2328 
(0. 1 848) (0.0000) (2.0964) (4.0684) 
scsc 0. 1000 1 .0000 1 3.6842 72.3 1 58 0.2090 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (5. 1470) (5 . 1470) 
SMXC 0. 1972 0.0000 10. 1906 28.4880 0.2 16 1  
(0. 1465) 0.0000 (2.6401 )  ( 1 1 .7357) 
SNAP 0.5000 1 .0000 7 .4667 29.7333 0.4989 
(0. 1 890) (0.0000) (1 .69 19) (4.0892) 
SOTR. 0.5006 0. 1998 235.8374 176.0331 0. 1 574 
(0.2029) (0.2295) (20.5 197) (32.2628) 
SPLN 0.8237 1 .0000 373.08 16  273.4334 0.23 1 8  
(0.0848) (0.0000) (46.8279) (88 .8527) 
TACT 0.4976 0.397 1 1 3 .0952 33.5832 0.3895 
(0. 1 967) (0.2926) (3.9833) (6.5668) 
TACX 0.3333 0.0000 5.9336 35.4010 0.4986 
(0. 1 924) (0.0000) ( 1 .9629) ( 12.80 1 8) 
TECU 0.3000 0.3335 1 06.765 1 135 .2353 0. 1 596 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) ( 14.5229) ( 15.8829) 
THRO 0.0000 1 .0000 10.9444 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (2.7657) 0.0000 
TOPP 0.2000 0.0000 174.6543 1 92.2652 0.0992 
(0. 1 773) (0.0000) (28.6 164) ( 1 3 1 .7083) 
TRAC 0.9999 0.0000 203.9739 1 1 1 .3267 0.2144 
(0.001 3) (0.0000) ( 1 90.7445) ( 1 336.0728) 
TWMC 0.5000 0.0000 276.5333 227.2667 0. 1704 
(0. 1 890) (0.0000) (46.7406) (5 1 .3398) 
VTSS 0.57 10  0.0000 867.7454 300.7 1 64 0.0900 
(0. 178 1 )  (0.0000) (5 1 .259 1 )  (63.2762) 
VNWK 0.3003 0.4584 1 28.3694 204.3 168 0. 1929 
(0. 1 872) (0.3794) (21 .6421 )  (63.4258) 
WCOM 1 .0000 0.2978 1 24.8608 1 3.5210  0.05 14  
(0.0000) (0. 19 19) (48 .6859) (8.0834) 
1 3 1  
Appendix 1 Table A Continued 
PIN = µ(1
- P. (t)) 
2e + µ(1 - P. (t)) 1999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WORK 0.3057 1 .0000 164.9077 88.4666 0.0758 (0. 1 901)  (0.0000) (15 .7283) (25.69 1 1 ) 
YHOO 1 .0000 0. 1689 124.4077 12.8 124 0.0490 (0.0000) (0. 1 1 14) (49.0095) (6.6605) 
ZIGO 0.7889 0.8733 13 .5423 29.0464 0.4583 (0. 1 774) (0. 1524) (2.5300) (8 . 3725) 132 
Appendix 1 Table B:  The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
for Nasdaq Companies During 200 1 Pre-Decimalization Period 
PIN = 
µ(I - P0 (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
ADSK 1 .0000 0.4000 557.6799 1 88.5736 . 0. 1446 
(0.0000) (0. 1 567) (94.0554) (38.2804) 
ALKS 1 .0000 0.0000 448.21 28 261 .9586 0.2261 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (52.777 1 )  (54.0856) 
ALXN 0.3000 0.0000 293. 1 1 76 230.5490 0. 1055 · 
(0. 1 732) ( 0. 0000) (1 3.9863) (66.6229) 
AMAT 1 .0000 0.8 158  1.4015 0.0350 0.01 23 
(0.0000) (0.0696) (0.5537) (0.0359) 
AMKR 1 .0000 0.0000 462.5829 234.81 54 0.2024 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (66.641 7) (66.2561 )  
ANAD 1 .0000 0.4790 33 1 .9240 1 30.5865 0. 1644 
(0.0000) (0.1 666) (85.7046) (29.8009) 
ANSR 0.39 15  0.0000 100.8 1 38 54.9041 0.0963 
(0.5240) (0.0000) (1 8.8160) (53. 1485) 
APAC 0.2997 1 .0000 4 1.0052 63.01 99 0. 1 872 
(0.1 725) (0.0000) (6.7505) ( 14.8941 )  
APLX 0.2003 1 .0000 22.4998 28.9553 0. 1 1 42 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0. 0000) (3.2440) (5.402 1 )  
ASCA 0.2999 0.0000 1 1 .7073 35.9664 0.3 1 54 
(0. 1 726) (0.0000) (3.4944) ( 14.61 1 7) 
ASFC 0.4479 0.4561 320.21 2 1 1 29.2265 0.0829 
(0.6864) (0.6799) (52.3829) (88.5667) 
ATGI 0.4437 0.67 16 1 5.9326 3 1.8581  0.3073 
(0.5065) (1 .025 1 )  (7.6803) (22.5799) 
AULT 0.6995 0.8570 1 0.622 1 1 9.6637 0.3930 
(0. 1 861 )  (0. 1 7 1 2) (2.8304) (6.0654) 
AVTR 0.2230 1 .0000 4.5615  1 5.393 1 0.2734 
(0.1 694) (0.0000) ( 1 .3981 )  (3.4402) 
BAMM 0.2000 0.5000 25.6 1 1 1  83.8886 0.2467 
(0.1 633) (0.4564) (7.0653) (20.7639) 
BBBY 1 .0000 1 .0000 276.4700 92.7980 0. 1437 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (9 1 .3 1 1 8) (44.0543) 
BITS 0.3834 0.6691 1 3.881 3  1 3.9205 0. 16 13  
(0.1 969) (0.7346) (3.2640) (3.5446) 
BKUN 0.0000 (0.0000) 54.9000 2.9 1 27 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 (14.677 1 )  (2.2085) 
BSTE 0.4979 0.0000 1 72.2494 1 77.3396 0.2040 
(0. 1672) (0.0000) (26.8401 )  (65.9292) 
BTRN 0.985 1 1 .0000 1 8.4420 20.8460 0.3576 
(0.0077) (0.0000) (3.2229) ( 14.64_74) 
BVAS 0.3000 1 .0000 14.3529 32.6454 0.2544 
(0.1 732) ( 0. 0000) (2.2788) (4.3986) 
CANO 0.7839 0.6502 1 2.2296 8.2 168 0.2084 
(0. 1 487) (0.3005) (2.9749) (3 .4449) 
1 33 
Appendix 1 Table B Continued 
PIN µ(l - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(l - P, (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN CBUK 0.4989 0.7996 2 1 .7512 50.5069 0.3668 
(0. 1999) (0.2345) (5.78 1 9) (1 0.6698) 
CELL 0.7915  0.37 12  1 83.9 129 1 1 5.82 19  0. 1 995 
(0. 1 557) (0.2223) (23. 1 5 1 3) ( 1 8 .9936) 
CENT 0.8004 0.0000 55. 12 12  30.9334 0. 1 834 
(0.522 1 )  (0.0000) (8. 1 078) ( 12.39 1 8) CHIR 1 .0000 1 .0000 461 .8263 1 95.0045 0. 1743 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (64.8 167) (0.0000) 
COMS 1 .0000 1 .0000 223.4768 69.3675 0. 1 343 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (73.2144) (34.9676) 
csco 0. 1268 0.0983 101 .9378 1 .5385 0.00 10  
(0.05 1 8) (0.5676) (45.0784) (7.41 89) DAVX 0.5007 0.8 1 1 8  48. 1 320 30.4308 0 . 1 366 
(0. 1 943) (0.24 15) (5.531 1 )  (5 .5399) DIAN 0.3976 0.0000 24.0927 33.2352 0.2 1 52 
(0. 1 805) (0.0000) (4.634 1 )  ( 1 1 .6 128) ORTE 0.2000 0.0000 276. 1 1 1 1  202.3889 0.0683 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (2 1 .6498) ( 17.77 1 8) DRYR 0.2000 0.0000 89. 1666 144.3326 0. 1 393 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (8.6705) (56.21 55) DSTM 0.5000 0.6000 30.9335 45.6664 0.2696 
(0.2041 )  (0.2829) (2.2 1 17) (8.6645) DTPI 1 .0000 0 . 1 795 178 .8647 74.2308 0. 1 7 1 8  
(0.0000) (0.0887) (26.9953) ( 1 9.6593) 
DUCK 0.7660 0.8448 1 .3542 5 .439 1 0.6060 
(0.2477) (0.2 129) (0.5822) ( l .7694) EMMS 1 .0000 0.2026 1 69. 1063 78.8730 0. 1 891  
(0.0000) (0. 1 1 87) (26. 1070) (20.8360) 
EXBT 0.6094 0.6458 59.2778 61 .2797 0.2395 
(0. 1 652) (0.2384) ( 1 3.0325) ( 19 .2012) 
FSII 0.4883 0.5798 129. 1 880 92.001 3  0. 148 1  
(0.2144) (0.3600) ( 14.9839) (36.7680) 
FUTR 0.4373 0.741 1 4.55 1 8  10.9435 0.3445 
(0.2282) (0.3065) (0.9573) (2. 1470) 
GLFD 0.4868 0.3429 1 1 0.2082 74. 1224 0. 1407 
(0. 176 1 )  (0.3522) ( 10.3376) (27.4440) HGSI 1 .0000 0. 1 508 1 5 1 . 1401 27. 1 106 0.0823 
(0.0000) (0. 1 609) (56.91 94) ( 1 2.0689) HLYW 0.4984 0.7492 37. 1 1 62 59.4807 0.2854 
(0.2408) (0.3075) (9.9333) (20.0978) HMSY 0.3999 0.4999 6.5632 24.687 1 0.4293 
(0. 1 998) (0.323 1 )  ( 1 .8905) (5.96 1 8) 
HOFF 0.4005 0.25 10  1 35 .73 1 1  1 38.4077 0. 1696 
(0. 1 985) (0.2665) (2 1 .2994) (21 .0868) HRLY 0.2759 0.3739 1 8.3734 2 1 .5764 0. 1 394 
(0. 1665) (0.3648) (3. 1 372) (7.627 1) 
HUBG 0.6885 0.5766 2.2872 8.3 1 67 0.5559 
(0. 1 866) (0.2450) (0.8758) ( 1 .2590) INSP 1 .0000 1 .0000 753.0097 370.2928 0. 1 974 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (41 .7522) (2.775 1 )  
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Appendix I Table B Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P, (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P, (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
INTC 0.0000 0.0843 104.3865 2.4147 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0541 )  (45.596 1 )  (2. 1 837) 
ITIG 0.2858 0.5852 1 4.6 105 30.7 1 80 0.23 10 
(0. 1 790) (0.571 2) (6.03 1 8) ( 10.6382) 
LARS 0.2957 0.66 1 5  8.8622 32.7224 0.353 1 
(0. 1732) (0.4055) (3.4478) ( 16.0201 )  
LNCB 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 .4000 2.4000 0.46 1 5  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8641 )  ( 1 . 1 888) 
LTRE 0.7487 1 .0000 199.3970 109.6291 0. 1707 
(0. 1 236) (0.0000) (3 1 .8773) (26. 1068) 
LUFK 0.295 1 0.3389 7 . 1633 38.2017 0.4404 
(0. 1789) (0.3352) (3.9095) ( 17.3566) 
MDEA 0.4008 0.7505 40.0 102 52.34 1 1 0.2077 
(0. 1 973) (0.29 1 8) (8.48 17) ( 14.67 17) 
MEDI 1 .0000 1 .0000 192.3050 49.2229 0. 1 1 35 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (66.2322) ( 17.9382) 
MEDX 1 .0000 0. 1743 1 3.2330 14.2872 0.3506 
(0.0000) (0. 1 763) (6.23 10) (9.4032) 
MINI 0.3 127 0.0000 99.4027 76.4033 0. 1073 
(0. 1 588) (0.0000) ( 10.0505) (7. 1 692) 
MSFf 0.0000 0. 1 772 104.9646 2.8876 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0. 1 47 1 )  (45.6104) (4. 1 302) 
NATR 0.3934 0.745 1 1 9.9620 32.4778 0.2424 
(0. 1942) (0.3549) (5.2353) ( 1 3 .4304) 
NEOG 0.4998 0.3999 2 1 .0043 28.7929 0.2552 
(0.2035) (0.2840) (4.2669) (4.46 1 7) 
NETM 0.3999 0.7435 44.3822 58.8530 0.2096 
(0. 1 997) (0.2891 )  (7.7022) ( 15.3405) 
NTAP 1 .0000 0.05 10  122.7426 12.5 1 40 0.0485 
(0.0000) (0.0603) (47.0955) (9.0977) 
ODET 1 .0000 1 1 .7790 1 9.0657 0.0636 0.0017  
0.0000 2.0323 3.4794 0.0000 
OPTI 0.4023 0.7494 1 0.3667 25 .2688 0.3290 
(0. 1 975) (0.2800) (2.5409) (8.0488) 
ORCL 1 .0000 0.0698 105.6422 3 . 1 1 6 1  0.0 145 
· (0.0000) (0.35 19) (42.7846) (4.2062) 
OSIP 0.6000 0. 1 667 502.07 15  300.0948 0. 1 520 
(0.2000) (0. 1 965) (47.7028) (7 1 .7223) 
PCCC 0.9990 1 .0000 56.6493 40.3947 0.2626 
(0.002 1 )  (0.0000) (9.5344) (27.8340) 
PCDI 0.20 18  0.5002 4.8284 1 8 .5503 0.2794 
(0. 1 640) (0.4564) ( 1 .3736) ( 1 .3704) 
PENX 0. 1000 0.0000 7.2 105 40.7895 0.2205 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (2.5079) (2.5079) 
PETM 0.6000 1 .0000 1 23.357 1  102.3095 0. 1 992 
(0. 1 852) (0.0000) ( 1 5.473 1 )  (2 1 . 1 385) 
PLFE 0.3460 0.2893 28.4626 27.9632 0. 1453 
(0.2327) (0.3944) (3 . 1729) (5.8427) 
PRST 0.2000 0.0000 1 23 .6667 106.8333 0.0795 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) ( 1 0.9785) (23.5936) 
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Appendix 1 Table B Continued 
PIN = µ(l - P.
(r)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PSFT 1 .0000 0.48 1 1  144.6308 23.8970 0.0763 
(0.0000) (0. 1 900) (53.8062) ( 1 2.7084) 
PTEN 1 .0000 0.2000 440.287 1 203.3467 0. 1 876 
(0.0000) (0. 1 1 7 1 )  (55.3260) (33.6468) 
QADI 0. 1000 1 .0000 1 5.7895 55.2 105 0. 1488 
(0. 1 1 34) ( 0. 0000) ( 1 .6520) ( 1 .6520) 
QDIN 0.3783 1 .0000 3 .0303 6.8889 0.3007 
(0.2524) (0.0000) (1 .0359) (3.7903) 
RCCC 0.5954 0. 1 680 97 .5919  103.3239 0.2396 
(0. 1 800) (0.2007) ( 1 1 .3763) (2 1 .0604) 
REMC 1 .0000 0.5573 276.647 1 104.0731  0. 1583 
(0.0000) (0. 1 575) (37.3252) (2 1 .721 8) 
RGBK 1 .0000 0.5666 648.833 1 1 86.0631 0. 1 254 
(0.0000) (0. 1 826) (3 1 . 1 1 17) (47.5279) 
RICK 0. 1000 0.0000 2.3684 23.63 16  0.3328 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (0.58 1 3) (0.58 1 3) 
SANM 1 .0000 0.43 1 1  170.4733 36.6030 0.0969 
(0.0000) (0. 1 902) (64.0270) ( 14.4340) 
SCFS 0.44 14  0.2275 3 1 .88 1 2  44.2589 0.2345 
(0.2 1 88) (0.2583) (6.401 1 )  (1 9.7936) 
scsc 0.6570 0. 1 557 32.3582 24.4789 0. 1991 
(0.2 127) (0. 1 989) (5.0983) (6.4345) 
SMXC 0. 1 987 0.0000 3.4005 1 1 .5675 0.2526 
(0. 1488) 0.0000 (1 .2 105) (3.3546) 
SNAP 0.4102 0.5 1 50 3.9969 10.2541 0.3448 
(0.2034) (0.3 172) (0.7930) (2.5262) 
SOTR 1 .0000 0.4555 527.8953 178.67 1 9  0. 1447 
(0.0000) (0. 1939) (63 . 1 407) (36.2706) 
SPLN 0.3000 0.6667 56.3529 1 55.3 1 37 0.2925 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (10.8689) (46.2224) 
' TACT 0.2500 0.0000 5. 1 429 28.857 1 0.4 1 22 
(0. 1936) (0.0000) ( 1 .2 149) (4. 1 804) 
TACX 0.3522 0.77 14 1 .5656 3 .8868 0.3042 
(0.7045) (0.8893) ( 1 .4489) (3.0096) 
TECU 0.5000 0.2000 141 .7333 124.2670 0. 1798 
(0.2041 )  (0.2309) ( 17.0652) (25 .81 95) 
THRO 0.0000 1 .0000 2.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 . 1 8 1 5) (0.0000) 
TOPP 0.5933 0.83 19  1 36.8006 87.469 1 0. 1 594 
(0.22 14) (0. 1 930) ( 15 . 1583) (26.4955) 
TRAC 0.3994 1 .0000 46. 1 375 55.6399 0. 1 941  
(0. 1 839) (0.0000) (7.5007) (8.361 5) 
TWMC 0.4368 0.7491 43.053 1 33.4097 0. 1449 
(0. 1785) (0.3063) (5.5262) (4.493 1 )  
VTSS 1 .0000 0. 1 1 82 1 1 9. 1 733 10.6643 0.0428 
(0.0000) (0.0965) (46.881 3) (6.2890) 
VNWK 0.5000 0.4000 1 2 1 .0668 102.53 19  0. 1747 
(0.204 1 )  (0.2828) ( 1 6.3415) ( 17 .9402) 
WCOM 1 .0000 0. 1 827 1 1 7.638 1 9.276 1 0.0379 
(0.0000) (0.0769) (45.9735) (4.7342) 
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Appendix 1 Table B Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P, (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WORK 0.3001 0.6668 . 29. 1 1 66 47.8683 0. 1979 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 1 8) (3.2907) (5.4052) YHOO 1 .0000 0.0978 1 1 3.4079 6.7760 0.0290 
(0.0000) (0. 1 1 12) (43.9 192) (5.3042) ZIGO 0.0000 1 .0000 376.4000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (49.2981 ) (0.0000) 
1 37 
Appendix 1 Table C: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
for Nasdaq Companies During 200 1 Post-Decimalization Period 
PIN = µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA 
ADSK 0.3000 
(0. 1732) 













(0. 1921)  
APLX 0.3096 
(0. 1 748) 
ASCA 0.6048 











BBBY 1 .0000 
(0.0000) 
BITS 0. 1975 
(0. 1486) 
BKUN 0.4017  






















































ETA MU PIN 
467.3530 3 16.9806 0.0923 
(22.4437) (84.7785) 
450. 1589 1 86.9922 0. 1720 
(5 1.6590) (29.8284) 
208.6693 87. 1 8 19  0.0000 
(29.3798) ( l .69E+IO) 
1 06.9772 3.3338 0.0 1 53 
(4 1 .5401)  (2.42 1 1 ) 
575.8064 1 39.7395 0. 1082 
(82.5930) (37. 1790) 
308.5375 1 68.3300 0.2 1 43 
(83.4037) (37.7841)  
78.5963 38.678 1 0. 1942 
( 16.3748) (50.34 14) 
29.4774 30.9787 0. 173 1  
(4.5558) (7.08 14) 
1 4.5453 22.6403 0.1942 
(3.1326) (3.2 16 1 )  
1 7.4927 1 6.7248 0.2243 
(3.9432) (4.0985) 
253.9567 1 07.2382 0. 1 743 
(33.3772) (26.3207) 
1 6.4698 20.361 1  0.3006 
(3.0666) (4.4082) 
8.0936 23.65 1 6  0.3283 
(4.0225) ( 17.32 1 1 )  
7.7867 1 2.4404 0.3669 
( 1.7344) (4. 1040) 
1 6.9434 33.2633 0.3290 
(2.7 1 30) (8.363 1 )  
1768.7880 432.41 1 1  0.1089 
( 152. 1254) (78.8687) 
1 0.5752 22.0257 0. 1706 
( 1 .9469) (7.5 154) 
61.5329 77.9950 0.2029 
( 1 2.5080) (25.2348) 
230.78 1 8  143.3836 0.2370 
(45.8694) (30.0622) 
44.0000 1 63.0000 0.2703 
( 14.3538) ( 14.0633) 
1 0.6996 1 3.6024 0.2074 
( 1.3707) (3.0677) 
48.8333 10 1 . 1667 0.17 16 
( 1 2. 1054) (3 1.59 1 5) 
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Appendix 1 Table C Continued 
PIN = µ(l - P, (t)) 
2£ + µ(l - P, (t)) Post 2001 ALPHA CBUK 0.4860 (0.2288) CELL 0.9465 (0.03 1 8) 
CENT 0.8090 (0. 1 5 1 1) CHIR 1 .0000 (0.0000) 
COMS 1 .0000 (0.3706) csco 0. 1 205 (0.0492) DAVX 0.5000 (0.2041 )  DIAN 0.3000 (0. 1732) 
ORTE 0.3000 (0. 1 87 1 )  DRYR 0.0000 (0.0000) DSTM 1 .0000 (0.0000) DTPI 1 .0000 (0.0000) DUCK 0.7370 (0.280 1)  EMMS 1 .0000 (0.0000) 
EXBT 0.2500 (0.2 1 65) 
FSII 0.400 1 (0.2000) 
FUTR 0.21 68 (0. 1 697) 
GLFD 0.3000 (0. 187 1 )  HGSI 1 .0000 (0.3706) HLYW 0.5000 (0.2041 )  HMSY 0.3025 (0. 1 853) HOFF 0.3000 (0. 1 732) HRLY 0.4996 (0.2020) 
HUBG 0.6000 (0. 1 998) INSP 1 .0000 (0.0000) DELTA 0.0000 (0.0000) 1 .0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.6652 (0. 1 33 1 )  1 .0000 (0.0000) 0.0874 (0.3726) 0.7999 (0.23 1 1 )  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.3333 (0.35 1 3) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.7895 (0. 1 562) 1 .0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.4567 (0. 1566) 0.5000 (0.5000) 0.2529 (0.2822) 1 .0000 (0.0000) 0.3333 (0.35 1 4) 1 .0000 (0.0000) 0.2000 (0.2309) 0.3628 (0.3852) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.2002 (0.2309) 0. 1 667 (0. 1 965) 0.3743 (0. 1979) ETA MU 32.8545 38.66 1 8  (5.7503) ( 1 0.6652) 1 9 1 . 1 265 92.3 103 (22. 1 683) (43.3506) 41 .6987 30.9057 (3.7424) (3.6 1 8 1 )  2015.0522 647.3592 ( 1 1 2.8088) (84.5647) 445.2 1 14 180.9754 ( 1 39.0836) (62.4765) 1 03.7 132 2.0694 (45 . 1 748) (3.6 1 79) 47.2003 5 1 .9953 (5.3647) (8.6558) 95. 1 765 159.8235 ( 1 9.9804) (30.5053) 224.8238 1 60.8438 (22.6053) (52.8548) 87.2 164 35.49 14  ( 1 8.3399) (1 1 .4 1 27) 25.8299 17 .6401 (3.230 1 )  (4.4588) 338. 1 936 154.6791 (58. 1 692) (74.5269) 2.0678 4. 1 576 (0.792 1 )  ( 1 .4875) 226.5869 98.0338 (34.2236) (35.8472) 59.3572 141 . 1428 ( 1 3 .6496) (60.9005) 97.0048 60.4679 (7.8260) (8.7838) 5 . 1 809 1 3 .5494 (0.9405) (3 . 1 427) 1 06.647 1 9 1 .6862 (8.8062) (25.41 30) 1 70.8690 36. 1 577 (53.9338) (27.4981 )  86.9333 1 83 .0667 (25.361 9) (3 1 .9844) 20.7648 29.6578 (4.6865) (4.8278) 1 40.647 1 163.6863 ( 1 6.7781 )  (47.8834) 1 4.7385 36.8757 (5.029 1 )  ( 10.3374) 12.5006 47.0009 (4.5994) ( 1 1 .5853) 158 .0 1 7 1  32. 1 224 (62.01 24) ( 1 5.5 1 34) 
1 39 
PIN 0.2224 0. 1 860 0.2307 0. 1 384 0. 1 689 0.00 12  0.2 1 59 0.2012 0.0969 0.0000 0.2545 0. 1 861 0.4256 0. 1779 0.2291 0. 1 1 09 0.2209 0. 1 1 42 0.0957 0.3449 0. 1 776 0. 1 486 0.3846 0.5301 0.0923 
Appendix 1 Table C Continued 
PIN 
µ(I - P� (r)) 
2£ + µ(I - P, (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
INTC 1 .0000 0. 1 82 1  1 1 1 .2567 4.6658 0.0205 
(0.0000) (0.0950) (42.6302) (3.2950) 
ITIG 0.2001 0.0000 20.6656 5 1 . 8 14 1  0.2006 
(0. 1 5 10) (0.0000) (4.0784) (4.4233) 
LARS 0.2988 1 .0000 2 1 .0 1 5 1  38.3887 0.2 144 
(0. 1 692) (0.0000) (5.9058) ( 1 2.0207) 
LNCB 0.3001 0.3332 3.7057 1 8.9554 0.4342 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 1 2) ( 1 .4933) (3.2332) 
LTRE 0.4005 0.25 10  1 49.9264 92.0007 0. 1 094 
(0. 1995) (0.2822) (9.3733) ( 1 7.9557) 
LUFK 0.5937 0. 1 685 8 .2595 1 8.6650 0.4015  
(0. 1 9 1 3) (0.2043) (2.4940) (4. 1 1 92) 
MDEA 0.4000 0.25 17  64.2527 58.737 1 0. 1 546 
(0.2000) (0.28 1 1 ) (9.7482) . ( 1 1 .228 1 )  
MEDI 1 .0000 1 .0000 366. 1239 1 30.7 19 1  0. 1 5 1 5 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (1 I 8.4689) (54.9984) 
MEDX 0.20055 (0.00000) 1020.5337 743.5238 0.068 1 
(0. 1 3857) (0.0000) (2.7956E+06) (4.4376E+07) 
MINI 0.6460 0.0000 6 1 .845 1 35 .0799 0. 1 548 
(0. 1 678) (0.0000) (7.8869) ( 1 6.99 1 3) 
MSFT 0.0000 0.0574 108.2032 4.3848 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0426) (44.6969) (3.0230) 
NATR 0.5581  0.4889 1 2.3 199 1 3.9055 0.2395 
(0. 1 879) (0.3 1 68) ( 1 .6027) (4.3905) 
NEOG 0.3002 0.6668 57.6449 70.9972 0. 1 560 
(0. 1 869) (0.3525) (6.4703) (I 7.4735) 
NETM 0.4000 0.0000 53.8 1 54 62.3759 0. 1 882 
(0. 1 85 1 )  (0.0000) (8.7 1 1 6) ( 12 . 1 880) 
NTAP 1 .0000 0.0886 1 1 7 .3437 9.5994 0.0393 
(0.0000) (0.0735) (46.8339) (4.7655) 
ODET 0.4000 0.5000 30.6875 59.3 1 23 0.2788 
(0.2000) (0.3228) (6.4395) ( 1 0.2348) 
OPTI 0.6961 0.7069 1 1 .8 1 63 22.7955 0.40 17  
(0. 1 800) (0.2290) (3.2538) (5.5209) 
ORCL 0.0000 0. 1445 1 03.7064 2.37 1 0  0.0000 
(0.0000) (0. 1 249) (46. 1 934) (4. 1771 )  
OSIP 0.5000 0.4000 389. 1 333 303.0667 0. 1 630 
(0.2041 )  (0.2828) (38.3755) (57.7238) 
PCCC 0. 1000 0.0000 1 39.7368 244.2632 0.0804 
(0. 1 I 34) ( 0. 0000) ( 1 1 .3389) ( 1 1 .3389) 
PCDI 0.30 10  0.67 1 0  2.8275 1 3. 1084 0.4 109 
(0. 1 846) (0.3580) (0.8683) (4.0046) 
PENX 0.29 12  0.6566 9.3605 24.6525 0.2772 
(0. 1 807) (0.4570) (4.01 94) ( 1 1 .9402) 
PETM 0.4000 0.5000 1 88.0000· 3 1 3 .2500 0.2500 
(0.2000) (0.3227) (4 1 . 1 375) ( 1 37.6548) 
PLFE 0.5943 0.0000 50.67 1 2  37.7873 0. 1 8 14 
(0. 1789) (0.0000) (5.0263) ( 10.3764) 
PRST 0.4000 0.2500 1 46.6876 1 24.3 1 26 0. 1 449 
(0.2000) (0.2795) ( 1 7.0 162) (23.99 10) 
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Appendix 1 Table C Continued . 
PIN 
µ(I - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(I - P. (t)) Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PSFf 1 .0000 0.4609 1 34.448 1 17 .7255 0.0618  (0.0000) (0. 1 872) (53.0456) (7.0322) 
PTEN 1 .0000 0.0000 604. 1 765 41 1 .0975 0.2539 (0.0000) (0.0000) (36.701 8) (209.7755) 
QADI 0.3864 0.4653 17 .7822 22.6053 0. 1 972 (0. 1 789) (0.3357) (4. 1 1 45) (8.46 19) 
QDIN 0.3 14 1  1 .0000 4.4594 9. 1 7 1 5  0.2442 (0. 1 7 1 7) (0.0000) ( 1 .2829) ( 1 .0770) 
RCCC 0.5973 0. 1 629 6 1 .7804 60.67 1 6  0.2268 (0. 1 865) (0.2 1 1 6) ( 1 2.2040) ( 14.0884) 
REMC 0.6124 0.5 1 02 295. 1 292 150.4479 0. 1 350 (0.2688) (0.3930) (44.2 1 90) (64.8967) 
RGBK 0.0148 1 .0000 0.8484 1 .03 10  0.0089 (0.0056) (0.0000) (0.3 1 80) (0.4229) 
RICK 0.3270 1 .0000 2. 1 887 5.7263 0.2996 (0.2075) (0.0000) (0.6080) ( 1 .7052) 
SANM 1 .0000 0.2832 1 39.47 1 9  20. 1 995 0.0675 (0.0000) (0. 1 673) (53. 1 69 1 )  ( 1 1 .394 1 )  SCFS 0.4270 0.7605 27.0206 33.8599 0.2 1 1 1  (0.2 1 64) (0.2909) (4.5979) ( 1 2. 1 07 1 )  scsc 0.5076 0. 1 970 59.0805 65.2824 0.2 1 90 (0. 1 846) (0.2463) ( 1 1 .281 9) ( 1 3.8814) 
SMXC 0.2260 0.5390 4.9977 1 5.7545 0.2626 (0. 1 82 1 )  (0.4902) ( 1 .9372) (2.4838) 
SNAP 0.3436 1 .0000 5 .4837 6.7890 0. 1 754 (0.2 1 02) (0.0000) ( 1 .0720) ( 1 .9758) 
SOTR 1 .0000 0.4000 5 1 7.4059 288.3037 0.2 1 79 (0.0000) (0. 1789) (78.4556) (40.9961 )  
SPLN 0.500 1 0.5996 42.4673 48.721 6  0.2229 (0.2035) (0.2826) (6.9447) (8.5336) 
TACT 0.4770 0.5707 5 .0433 1 1 . 1385 0.3450 (0. 1 872) (0. 3 122) ( 1 .3725) (2.2520) 
TACX 1 .0000 0.5383 1 .3309 2. 1 954 0.4520 (0.0000) (0.32 10) (0.4656) ( 1 .0792) TECU 0.0483 0.6 102 1 82.9353 145 .8024 0.01 89 (0.03 1 1 ) (0.2727) ( 1 6.540 1 )  (3 1 .6 192) 
THRO 1 .0000 0.5 168 0.5590 1 .7 1 54 0.6054 (0.0000) (0.3895) (0.3964) ( l . 1 503) 
TOPP 0.3000 0.6667 1 1 9.0588 1 1 8.6078 0. 1 300 (0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (8.4248) (9.7580) 
TRAC 0.5997 0.8332 149.01 74 144.3536 0.225 1 (0. 1982) (0. 1 966) (22.0407) (48.2555) 
TWMC 0.600 1 0.3370 62.5768 73 .2363 0.2599 (0. 1 999) (0.25 14) (9. 1 299) ( 1 1 .6591 )  
VTSS 1 .0000 0.0000 1 24.8097 1 3. 1 562 0.0501 (0.0000) (0.0000) (44.7725) (5.6532) 
VNWK 0.5990 0.0000 1 1 3.4688 1 14. 1 267 0.23 1 5  (0. 1 803) 0.0000 ( 1 3 . 1 908) (25.0126) 
WCOM 0.9543 0.5334 1 19.4524 10.6654 0.0409 (0.3896) (0.2083) (49.6205) (5 .6617) 
1 4 1  
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Appendix 1 Table C Continued 
PIN = µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2e + µ(I - P. (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WORK 0.5086 0.5 105 32.7782 44. 1 3 1 8  0.2550 
(0. 1 835) (0.4346) (9.1 2 17) ( 1 1 . 1 622) 
YHOO 1 .0000 0.3385 129.6868 1 5 .7786 0.0573 
(0.0000) (0. 1 7 14) (50. 1 530) (6.7756) 
ZIGO 1 .0000 0.0438 535.4983 257.7645 0. 1940 
(0.0000) (0.052 1 )  (68.2095 ) (80.0687) 
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Appendix 1 Table D: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) for Nasdaq Companies During 2002 Period 
PIN 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(I - P. (t)) 2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
ADSK 1 .0000 1 .0000 552.2689 253.4983 0. 1 867 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ALKS 1 .0000 0.5000 669.7256 184.3984 0. 12 10 (0.0000) (0. 1700) (8 1 .0377) (3 1 .8086) 
ALXN 1 .0000 0.595 1 147.0717 75. 1244 0.2034 (0.0000) (0. 1 595) (28.4268) (28.60 1 8) 
AMAT 1 .0000 0.0000 1 17.4217  7.6820 0.03 17  (0.0000) (0.0000) (4 1 .6922) (3.6923) 
AMKR 1 .0000 1 .0000 84.8669 75.5934 0.308 1 (0.0000) (0.0000) (29.0620) (23 .9024) 
ANAD 0.9999 0.0000 429.7646 161 .6 17 1  0. 1 583 (0.0001) (0.0000) (27.29 13) (36.3784) 
ANSR 0.2996 0.6842 123.7406 86.8536 0.095 1 (0. 1 855) (0.3554) ( 10.8438) (28.7729) 
APAC 0.3026 0.3305 39.7885 60.8885 0. 1 880 (0. 1 875) (0.3369) (5 .5426) (22.61 8 1 )  
APLX 0.2000 0.0000 17.7778 65.2222 0.2684 (0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) (2.21 53) (10.7859) 
ASCA 1 .0000 1 .0000 250.3340 134.8621 0.2 122 (0.0000) (0.0000) (40.0436) (95.9977) 
ASFC 1 .0000 0. 1 634 482.8019 189.7343 0. 1 642 (0.0000) (0.0877) (6 1 .6800) (35.8395) 
ATGI 0.5682 1 .0000 3.2675 5.922 1 0.3399 (0.2378) (0.0000) (0.6293) ( 1 .8920) 
AULT 0. 1250 1 .0000 5.6000 32.4000 0.2656 (0. 1479) (0.0000) (2.9360) (2.9359) 
AVTR 0.6980 0.2090 6.4260 14.5384 0.4412 (0.2874) (0.2849) (2. 1 569) (7.8410) 
BAMM 0.4006 1 .0000 16.3096 29.4058 0.2653 (0. 1 853) (0.0000) (3.3947) (3.5507) 
BBBY 1 .0000 0.9996 557.8722 236.3342 0. 1748 (0.0000) (0.0002) ( 17 1 .2027) (69.4436) 
BITS 0.2992 1 .0000 9.8326 39.5590 0.3757 (0. 1725) (0.0000) ( 1 .5838) (20.3822) 
BKUN 0.5003 0.0014 201 .4998 21 5.8341 0.2 1 1 3  (0.2041 )  (0.001 2) (35.8 1 1 3) (47 . 1 376) 
BSTE 0.9000 0.7500 444.7 199 447.7942 0.3 1 1 8  (0.0456) (0.3062) ( 1 33.8010) (385. 1019) 
BTRN 0.957 1 1 .0000 0.5779 0.69 1 3  0.3641 (0.36 18) (0.0000) (0.2168) (0.3917) 
BYAS 0.8378 0.6094 19.0638 21 .4826 0.3207 (0.2043) (0.2493) (4.9982) (6.2941)  
CANO 0.2000 0.0000 1 72.9938 501 .5666 0.2248 (0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (43 . 1427) ( 195.0482) 
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Appendix 1 Table D Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2e + µ(l - P, (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
CBUK 0.2999 0.7 147 7 1 .8687 1 10.2558 0. 1870 
(0. 1 856) (0.4767) (2 1 .5902) (46.9737) 
CELL 0.3000 1 .0000 1 22.9421 2 1 1 .7306 0.2053 
(0. 1730) (0.0000) (23.2240) · (54.7790) 
CENT 0.4002 0.4593 36. 1 985 27.2423 0. 1 309 
(0. 1968) (0.3535) (4.6201 ) . (4. 1 662) 
CHIR 1 .0000 1 .0000 226. 1 250 64.4037 0. 1 247 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (74.6145) (38 . 1605) 
COMS 0.957 1 1 .0000 0.5801 0.6942 0.3642 
(0.36 18) (0.0000) (0.2249) (0.2797) 
csco 1 .0000 0.0000 1 07.621 8 4.3464 0.0 198 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (38.7033) ( 1 .9749) 
DAVX 0.2999 0.6666 34.6497 62.3554 0.2 125 
(0. 1 866) (0.3558) (6.3087) (26. 1495) 
DIAN 1 .0000 0.6221 356. 1 582 163.4474 0. 1 866 
(0.0000) (0. 1660) (54.6827) (4 1 .5392) 
ORTE 0.6066 0.0000 1 66.6267 82.2987 0. 1 303 
(0. 1597) (0.0000) ( 18 .7 160) (27.5529) 
DRYR 0.3000 0.0000 242. 1 176 1 89.2 157 0. 1 049 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) (17.4988) (23.9896) 
DSTM 0.3999 0.7502 54.2529 70.5055 0.2062 
(0. 1 996) (0.28 10) (9.8997) (2 1 .4827) 
DTPI 0.2962 1 .0000 84.5 1 54 43.45 12 0.0707 
(0.2688) (0.0000) (23.8794) (5 1 .9337) 
DUCK 0.5877 0.3400 1 3.0368 1 8.08 19 0.2895 
(0. 1992) (0.26 1 9) (2.7027) (2.763 1 )  
EMMS 0.3242 1 .0000 7 1 3.7750 25 1 .6166 0.0541 
(0. 1644) (0.0000) (44.3687) ( 1 3 1 .3850) 
EXBT 0.3000 0.6665 27.7062 49.6267 0.2 1 1 8  
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (4.8584) ( 1 3.6600) 
FSII 0.0000 0.0000 79.4469 45.8741 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 6. 1933) ( 1 .56E+09) 
FUTR 0.3 14 1  0.7397 1 .8527 3.6669 0.237 1 
(0.2901)  ( 1 .0655) ( 1 .0663) (2. 1787) 
GLFD 0.3000 1 .0000 195.5294 222.4706 0. 1458 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) ( 1 8. 1044) (5 1 . 1 8 18) 
HGSI 1 .0000 1 .0000 735.9428 3 1 2.6643 0 . 1752 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 92.4401 )  (59.3083) 
HLYW 1 .0000 1 .0000 559. 1039 266.38 12 0. 1 924 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
HMSY 0.3997 1 .0000 27. 1 927 70.0808 0.3400 
(0. 1 843) (0.0000) (5.5930) (28 . 1809) 
HOFF 1 .0000 0.6373 195.5990 1 1 3.2643 0.2245 
(0.0000) (0. 1474) (47.3491 )  (25.6472) 
HRLY 1 .0000 0.405838 1 409.46784 300.22659 0.2683 
(0.0000) (0.2447) (88.8599) (2 1 5.8947) 
HUBG 0. 1 395 0.0000 1 .7757 9.4869 0.27 15  
(0. 1 559) (0.0000) (0.5422) ( 1 . 1 365) 
INSP 0.5000 0.8000 4 15.0666 306.3328 0.1 558 
(0.2041)  (0.2309) (50.7023) (6 1 .2927) 
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Appendix 1 Table D Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P, (t)) 
2e + µ(I - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
INTC 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 12.7756 6.6743 0.0287 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (32.5298) ( 19.5 1 14) 
ITIG 0.6735 0.5593 10.6976 1 2.0345 0.2747 
(0. 1445) (0.27 19) (3.3 156) (3.5993) 
LARS 0.221 9  0.0000 2.5034 1 5.9960 0.4148 
(0. 1692) (0.0000) (0.8337) (6.4622) 
LNCB 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 .6667 1 .2222 0.2683 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4364) (0.6849) 
LTRE 0.2995 0.6658 82.3683 76.3506 0. 1 2 1 9  
(0. 1 858) (0.3506) ( 1 1 .5039) (27 .8383) 
LUFK 0.37 1 0  0.0000 24.7420 45.5910  0.2548 
(0.623 1 )  (0.0000) (14.9002) (43.65 1 4) 
MDEA 0.0000 0.5555 14.2969 8.3662 0.0000 
(0.0000) ( 1 .7490) (5.0631 )  (2.3 1 95) 
MEDI 1 .0000 0.0282 230.49 12  78.8840 0. 1 46 1  
(0.0000) (0.0169) (82.3993) (27.2007) 
MEDX 1 .0000 0.7632 848.0486 31 8.2348 0 . 1 580 
(0.0000) (0. 1 298) (1 03.2735) (66.4630) 
MINI 0.2000 0.5000 2 1 8.2778 487.2222 0. 1 825 
(0. 1633) (0.4564) (53.2 10 1 )  ( 1 39. 1 274) 
MSFf 1 .0000 0.0000 1 10.2019 5.5793 0.0247 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (38.9788) (2.7355) 
NATR 0.501 1 0.2 156 39.3360 42.9578 0.2 148 
(0.2007) (0.2406) (5.2928) (1 1 .9500) 
NEOG 0. 100 1  0.0000 1 2.8417  30. 1 374 0. 1 05 1  
(0. 1 1 35) (0.0000) ( 1 .7383) ( 1 .7297) 
NETM 0.4004 0.7482 42.3 1 10 53.891 1 0.2032 
(0. 1 957) (0.28 1 3) (8 . 1020) (1 1 .8018) 
NTAP 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 46.4472 23.9323 0.0755 
(0.3706) (0.0000) (46.4998) (25.5735) 
ODET (0.0000) 0.6036 17.5500 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (2.7 174) (0.0000) 
OPTI 0.2222 1 .0000 4.6875 30. 8 125 0.422 1 
(0. 1 697) (0.0000) (2.3483) (4.9921 )  
ORCL 0.5444 0.53 1 8  1 08 . 1 337 3.9879 0.0099 
· (0.2222) (0.2 1 1 1 ) (48.357 1 )  (3.0252) 
OSIP 1 .0000 1 .0000 94 1 .77299 692.6830 1  0.2689 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 0. 0000) (0.0000) 
PCCC 0.3001 0.6668 52.8809 88.4373 0.2006 
(0. 1 870) (0.3524) (5. 1 067) (29.6795) 
PCDI 0.3297 0.8 1 52 2.2499 5.3085 0.2800 
(0.5364) ( 1 .34 17) ( 1 .6022) (3. 1 964) 
PENX 0. 1997 0.5007 10.6701 44.8640 0.2957 
(0. 1623) (0.4642) (2.2338) (2 1 .68 17)  
PETM 1 .0000 0.3302 421 .5275 1 83.8503 0.1 790 
(0.0000) (0. 1 86 1 )  (84.3570) (69.7392) 
PLFE 0.5704 0.4590 94.7539 60.4683 0. 1 540 
(0.235 1 )  (0.2766) ( 1 3.2217)  (8.7534) 
PRST 0.5348 0.4395 67. 1 802 59.7272 0. 1 92 1  
(0. 3554) (0.5434) ( 12 . 1 362) (23.6601 )  
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Appendix 1 Table D Continued 
PIN 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PSFf 1 .0000 0.7473 1 5 1 .7784 26. 1 9 10  0.0794 
(0.0000) (0. 1 175) (57.2220) ( 1 1 .8 172) 
PTEN 1 .0000 0.2 1 53 924.9050 1 84. 1 536 0.0905 
(0.0000) (0. 1 577) (65.5248) (32.9326) QADI 0.4940 0.7976 1 9.27 12  28.8602 0.2700 
(0.2007) (0.2327) (2.8993) (9. 143 1 )  
QDIN 1 .0000 0.4906 5. 1 396 7.8209 0.432 1 
(0.0000) (0. 1 939) ( 1 .5005) ( 1 .5868) 
RCCC 0.2952 0.4228 70.8317 76.3501 0. 1 373 
(0. 17 19) (0.4359) ( 1 1 .3603) (28. 1 364) 
REMC 0.3974 0.5032 1 54.34 1 5  103.7 104 0. 1 178 
(0. 1 920) (0.3396) ( 1 7.8436) ( 17.02 16) 
RGBK 1 .0000 0.5544 730. 1268 23 1 .7 128 0.1 369 
(0.0000) (0. 1 598) (58.4693) (41 .9857) 
RICK 0. 1250 1 .0000 3.4000 27.6000 0.3366 
(0. 1479) (0.0000) (0.9886) (0.9886) 
SANM 1 .0000 0.0000 1 92.8697 50. 1703 0. 1 1 5 1  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (7 1 .0577) ( 19.5006) 
SCFS 0.49 12  0.4003 1 49.804 1 67.3632 0.0995 
(0.2036) (0.3306) ( 17.2885) ( 1 8.05 12) 
scsc 0.4000 0.4765 65.7677 78.66 16 0. 1 930 
(0.2000) (0.3307) ( 1 1 .2660) ( 1 3 .3864) 
SMXC 0.0000 0.5801 4.2222 (0.0000) 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .3455) (0.0000) 
SNAP 0.8 1 54 1 .0000 3.82 14 10.8625 0.5368 
(0. 1622) (0.0000) ( 1 .0303) ( 1 . 1049) 
SOTR 1 .0000 0.2280 1 1 74.7056 270.9270 0. 1 034 
(0.0000) (0. 1588) (82.4915) (67.3173) 
SPLN 0.41 14 0.8476 22. 1 8 12 20.0240 0. 1566 
(0. 1 978) (0.3890) (2 .6416) (5.5249) 
TACT 0.4955 0.791 8  8.3059 1 9.3520 0.3660 
(0. 1 938) (0.238 1 )  (2.4637) (5 .0509) . 
TACX 0.442 1 0.0000 6.4482 1 1 .7962 0.2879 
(0. 1 994) (0.0000) ( 1 .6753) (2. 1 873) 
TECU 0.9560 0.2056 326.0010  268.6629 0.2826 
(0.0283) (0. 1 762) (77.2545) (73.7870) 
THRO 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 .0000 2.0000 0.5000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7303) (0.5 1 64) 
TOPP 0.0000 0.0000 90.7549 46.5 1 84 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 16. 1 988) (25.2919) 
TRAC 0.5450 1 .0000 19.7759 29.8 1 1 1  0.29 12 
(0.2584) (0.0000) (3.0856) (9. 1 1 99) 
TWMC 0.4989 0.3757 37.9099 50.4694 0.2493 
(0. 1 982) (0.2963) ( 1 0. 1690) ( 12.7 1 1 5) 
VTSS 1 .0000 1 .0000 244.2528 74. 1996 0. 1 3 1 9  
(0.3706) (0.0000) (80.738 1 )  (39.6966) 
VNWK 0. 197 1  0.0001 2 14.7380 2 12.1 127 0.0887 
(0. 1 6 1 5) (0.0001 )  (27.2365) (50.6203) 
WCOM 0.0000 0.0099 1 03.44 1 8  2.3 1 74 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0064) (44.8436) (4.6439) 
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Appendix 1 Table D Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (I)) 
2£ + µ(I - P. (t)) 2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WORK 0. 1999 1 .0000 65 .5620 3 1 5 .5344 0.3248 (0. 1474) (0.0000) (27.0957) ( 167.8532) 
YHOO 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 36.0990 18.84 13  0.0647 (0.3706) (0.0000) (42.0050) (23.9200) ZIGO 0.4000 1 .0000 81 .7499 108.7494 0.2 101  (0. 1 852) (0.0000) ( 15 . 1466) (2 1 .6293) 
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Appendix 1 Table E: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) for NYSE Companies During 1 999 Period 
PIN = µ(I - pn (t )) 
2£ + µ(I - Pn (I )) 
1 999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
AC 0.5 1 16  0.3422 81.7082 1 3 1.4387 0.0896 
(0.2926) (0.301 1 ) (9.1 968) (8.7 100) 
AGE 0.3457 0.6706 25 1 . 1008 72.0302 0.0472 
(0.2039) (0.5402) (20.7739) (25.1 033) 
AHG 0. 1000 1 .0000 72.7368 1 1 4.263 1 0.0728 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (6. 1 790) (6.1790) 
AK 0.4907 0.2586 1 1 .3006 7 . 1295 0.1 341 
(0.2638) (0.3483) ( 1 .7268) (2.4336) 
ALZ 0.7 1 79 1.0000 5.2652 2 .3256 0.1 368 
(0.5506) (0.0000) ( 1 .0680) ( 1 .45 16) 
AMN 0.2939 0.0000 1 1 .7093 2 1.0329 0.2088 
(0.1940) (0.0000) (2.1 683) (9.601 1 )  
AMU 0.53 1 5  0.8335 4.0944 5.1008 0.2487 
(0.3 1 59) (0.4526) (1.3583) ( 1 .561 1 )  
APA 0.5000 0.2000 35 1.2000 300.2000 0. 1 761 
(0.204 1 )  (0.2309) (47 .5952) (61 .6953) 
APX 0.1 8 1 1 0.0000 9.4424 7.2610  0.065 1 
(0.2059) (0.0000) (1 .208 1 )  (4.3797) 
ATS 0.4382 0.0000 8.6350 7.8279 0. 1 657 
(0.21 1 1 )  (0.0000) ( 1 .0545) (2.3288) 
BA 0.4020 0.7497 1490.7073 742.9360 0.0910  
( 1 3 .0908) ( 1 3 . 1 237) (3.93E+06) (2.67E+07) 
BAC 1 .0000 0.9922 1498.2473 740.2734 0. 1 98 1  
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 92.5967) (0.0000) 
BAX 1 .0000 0.5895 378 .7340 1 1 3.8755 0.1 307 
(0.0000) (0. 1 800) (25.533 1 )  (23.7025) 
BKH 0.599 1 0.5990 3 1.3078 27.3482 0.2074 
(0.1 969) (0.2843) (4.91 1 3) (5.8930) 
BLX 0.4000 0.0000 22 .875 1 33 .372 1 0.2259 
(0.1 85 1 )  (0.0000) (4.669 1)  (5.4977) 
BMT 0.7 1 33 0.395 1 10.5287 8.61 1 6  0.2258 
(0.2 10 1 )  (0.2692) (1.6382) (1 .9852) 
BNO 0.5586 0.5 194 31.1085 26.4626 0.1920 
(0.3565) (0.2853) (5.6787) (6.9605) 
BQT 0.8525 0.0000 14.9363 10.2379 0.2261 
(0.3357) (0.0000) (1.5557) (3.5078) 
C 0.6000 0.3332 2504.0015 617.8283 0.0689 
(0.2000) (0.2484) ( 127 .8835) ( 132.8099) 
CBA 0.6936 0.8739 6.500 1  7.9290 0.2973 
(0.1 733) (0.1 843) ( 1.709 1)  ( 1 .7699) 
CD 0.2472 0.0000 1320.3035 578.5650 0.05 1 4  
(0. 1435) (0.0000) ( 1 1 8.9172) ( 1 8 1.3693) 
CNE 0.5674 0.2010  15.5365 12.209 1 0. 1 823 
(0. 1993) (0.2366) (2. 1 758) (4.1080) 
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Appendix 1 Table E Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
1 999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
COE 0.5337 0.6 178 15 . 1040 1 2.5379 0. 1 8 14  
(0. 1476) (0.3360) (2.3617) (3.8827) . .  coo 0. 1000 0.0000 104.7895 1 55.2105 0.0689 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (9.2298) (9.2298) 
DEL 0.4240 0.0000 20.4539 12.4812  0. 1 1 46 
(0. 1 557) (0.0000) (2.7846) (3.5730) DIS 1 .0000 1 .0000 409.8678 170. 1 742 0. 1 7 19  
(0.3706) (0.0000) (62. 1 220) (9.7509) 
DOL 0.3000 0.0000 1 22.7057 98.9587 0. 1 079 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) ( 1 1 . 1420) ( 1 1 .029 1 )  
DY 0.2000 1 .0000 104.7222 12 1 .7778 0. 1 042 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) ( 12.5 1 8 1 )  (29.7586) 
E 0.8924 0. 1076 45 .5145 32.0174 0.2389 
(0. 1 355) (0. 1 352) (5. 1230) (5.3906) 
EGP 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 9.9000 1 1 .7000 0.2272 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .9650) (2.275 1 )  
EL 0.3968 0.2523 145.9874 1 06.6579 0. 1266 
(0. 1 869) (0.2790) (20.8309) (4 1 .5672) 
ESF 0.4961 1 .0000 50.4826 48.2470 0. 1916  
(0. 1903) (0.0000) (5.0500) (9.9983) 
ETN 0.4958 0.0000 281 .7570 2 15.7924 0. 1 596 
(0. 177 1 )  (0.0000) (36.4070) (66.6990) 
E'IT 0.2999 0.0000 36. 1 192 68.5555 0.2216 
(0. 1727) (0.0000) (9.2610) (25.0960) 
FCF 0.525 1 0. 1 899 16.7450 1 8.4914 0.2248 
(0. 1993) (0.2266) (2.9839) (3.4795) 
FOE 0.6094 0.0000 57.5685 25.5385 0. 1 1 91 
(0.2233) (0.0000) (6.8814) (7. 1608) 
FRT 0.6171  0.0000 58.9640 36.3946 0. 1 600 
(0. 1563) (0.0000) (5.2217) (7.8266) 
FTS 0.3000 0.3333 46.3529 73.3 1 37 0. 1 9 1 8  
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (5.6355) ( 1 3.5661 )  
GAM 0.2532 1 .0000 14.6401 9.95 18  0.0792 
(0.2024) (0.0000) ( 1 . 1 7 1 3) (2.8276) 
GFF 0.4060 0.0000 26. 1948 9.8791 0.071 l 
(0.3580) (0.0000) (2.4996) (5.8748) 
GLW 0.2000 0.0000 344.7778 209.7222 0.0573 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (23.3295) (23.6400) 
GRB 0. 1000 1 .0000 36.7368 45.2587 0.0580 
(0. 1 134) (0.0000) (3.7212) (3.7 180) 
GVA 0.3084 0.2660 61 .6983 54.4859 0. 1 1 99 
(0. 1739) (0.3859) (8.3336) ( 13 .0386) 
HMX 0.445 1 0.5315 30.2244 17.6412 0. 1 150 
(0. 1783) (0.3657) (3.9226) (4.5 1 88) 
IMT 0. 1 820 1 .0000 1 1 .7 1 88 2.5408 0.0194 
(0.6250) (0.0000) ( 1 .3969) (3.6804) 
ION 0.5279 0.6 1 1 0  35. 1 3 14 25.0756 0. 1 585 
(0. 1 922) (0.2968) (5.0229) (5.6724) 
IPP 0.3607 1 .0000 23.3697 1 9.8543 0. 1 329 
(0. 1702) (0.0000) (2.0534) (6.663 1 )  
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Appendix 1 Table E Continued 
PIN = 
µ(I - P. (t)) 
2t: + µ(I - P. (t)) 
1 999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
IQM 0.2630 1 .0000 7. 1485 9.5 1 85 0. 1 490 
(0. 1 630) (0.0000) (0.8404) ( 1 .9643) 
JP 0.9000 0.0000 210. 1825 94.5957 0. 1 684 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) ( 19.2753) (20.6617) 
KSS 0.5592 0.7230 424.38 1 3  79.2844 0.0496 
(0.2446) (0.2732) (20.8926) (22. 1 358) 
LDG 0.41 54 0.0000 1 38.6084 49.545 1 0.069 1 
(0. 1 797) (0.0000) (7.7440) (6.5699) 
LFG 0.4 1 82 0.6 1 7 1  40. 1485 2 1 .0476 0.0988 
(0. 1 657) (0.3542) (4.2097) (4.5750) 
LU 1 .0000 0.0000 176.2 1 67 39.9987 0. 1 0 1 9  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (60.8746) ( 15.5303) 
MDA 0.2996 0.0000 37.2483 36.7248 0. 1 287 
(0. 172 1 )  (0.0000) (4.0129) (9.6555) 
MHK 0.59 1 0  0.0000 52.90 16  53 .4633 0.2300 
(0.2030) (0.0000) (7.7704) ( 1 2.6653) 
MHO 0.3555 0.2857 4.6858 1 3 .8640 0.3446 
(0. 1 784) (0.3720) ( 1 .3933) (5.5 178) 
MIL 0.30 1 0  0.6697 159.627 1 100.47 1 9  0.0865 
(0. 1 856) (0.3580) ( 15 .8567) ( 1 7.8634) 
MM 0.4926 0.6090 48.4664 47.4367 0. 1942 
(0. 1 899) (0.3263) (6.7854) (9.2709) 
MO 1 .0000 1 .0000 35 1 .78 19  1 33.2374 0. 1 592 
(0.3706) (0.0000) ( 122.5768) (56.7361)  
MU 1 .0000 0.0014  1 557.0777 745. 1 33 1  0. 1 93 1  
(0.0000) (0.000 1 )  ( 146.7070) (0.0 1 10) 
MUO 0.6993 0.7 133 7.24 1 0  1 6. 1 852 0.4387 
(0. 1 876) (0.2209) ( 1 .5346) (3.5448) 
NGI 0.3617  1 .0000 5.6456 10.2529 0.2472 
(0.2553) (0.0000) ( 1 .0936) (3.441 1 )  
NR 0.6560 0.0000 57.8405 2 1 .6759 0. 1 095 
(0. 1 658) (0.0000) (4.086 1 )  (5.5688) 
NUC 0.3503 0.0000 10.3504 9.4 175 0. 1 375 
(0.2007) (0.0000) (0.9854) ( 1 .7 1 88) 
PAI 1 .0000 0.3645 4.3229 5.7542 0.3996 
(0.0000) (0.2052) (0.8620) ( 1 .605 1 )  
PCG 0.4044 1 .0000 243.8400 142.477 1 0. 1 057 
(0. 1 826) (0.0000) ( 14.4 1 5 1 ) (3 1 .8950) 
PEI 1 .0000 0. 1 32 1  20. 1738 10.8523 0.2 120 
(0.0000) (0. 1 549) (2. 1625) (3.0978) 
PIM 0.5654 1 .0000 43.9507 2 1 .75 1 2  0. 1 227 
(0. 1 905) (0.0000) (3.0299) (4.77 1 3) 
PKE 0.37 15  1 .0000 35 .9248 20.0573 0.0940 
(0. 176 1 )  (0.0000) (3. 1 509) (5.2205) 
PNM 0.3989 0.0000 57. 1 1 68 33.5 108 0. 1 048 
(0. 1 808) (0.0000) (5.9245) (7.4201 )  
POS 0.4800 0.2648 99.0847 56.7256 0. 1 208 
(0. 1 368) (0.3 1 1 6) ( 16 . 1 247) ( 1 2.2 1 87) 
PPL 0.3 173 0.6737 1 96.5225 65.0862 0.0499 
(0. 1 822)  (0.361 3) (8.05 1 3) ( 1 0.2068) 
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Appendix 1 Table E Continued 
PIN = 
µ(l - P. (t)) 
2e + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
1999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PPM 0.8 1 24 0. 1 620 5.26 12  4. 1 573 0.2430 
(0.3665) (0.2 1 90) ( 1 .3959) ( 1 . 1 1 77) 
PSA 0.8282 0.9548 64.6770 34.9506 0. 1 829 
(0.4007) (0. 1428) (9.6238) (8.7543) 
PZL 0.6966 0.5693 1 23.792 1 64. 1 944 0. 1 530 
(0. 1 803) (0.2476) ( 1 2.7864) (9.7279) 
RI 0.4262 0.2332 54.60 19  40.3452 0. 1 360 
(0. 1794) (0.2598) (7.6658) (7.8529) 
RYL 0.2882 0.0000 77.8642 54.3780 0.09 14 
(0. 1 598) (0.0000) (6.9369) ( 14.2227) 
SBR 0. 1000 1 .0000 9.7368 32.2626 0. 142 1  
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) ( 1 .36 19) ( 1 .36 1 8) 
SCL 0.7585 0. 1 706 7 .7 1 64 7.47 1 6  0.2686 
(0.2580) (0.2 14 1 )  ( I .  1 653) (2. 1 1 1 3) 
SEL 1 .0000 0.3444 4.0371 1 .7258 0. 1 76 1  
(0.0000) (0.37 1 0) ( l .4402) ( 1 .9382) 
SKP 1 .0000 0.9004 6. 1054 9.2892 0.432 1 
(0.0000) (0. 1 1 35) ( 1 . 1 442) ( 1 . 1 1 54) 
SLB 1 .0000 0. 1008 69 1 .2763 253.2265 0. 1 548 
(0.0000) (0. 1 028) (96.0322) (52.0109) 
STW 0.4276 0.0000 4.8722 8 .08 1 1 0.26 18  
(0.2020) (0.0000) (0.7957) (2.0674) 
T 1 .0000 1 .0000 265.245 1 89.8589 0. 1449 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (86.0045) (30.7979) 
TDP 0.3001 0.6532 52.7790 35.4672 0.09 16 
(0. 1 870) (0.36 1 8) (2.9691 )  (4.9706) 
TEO 0.2000 1 .0000 1 1 8.4444 1 02.0556 0.0793 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) ( 1 2.8686) (24.834 1 )  
TLD 0.4843 0.0000 26.6450 1 9.2247 0. 1 487 
(0. 1 687) (0.0000) (4.6950) (4.3363) 
TSM 0. 1 000 0.0000 1 39.0000 1 54.0000 0.0525 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (8.9500) (8 .9499) 
TSO 0. 1 954 0.5 124 54.9680 42.8 1 27 0.0707 
(0. 1 632) (0.5 1 63) (5. 1 305) ( 1 5.3079) 
ucu 0.3654 0.5394 1 37.0140 35.4990 0.0452 
(0.2 1 62) (0.562 1 )  (6.8707) ( 1 3 .3003) 
usu 0.7722 0.89 1 2  7 1 .9 144 38.4242 0. 1 7 1 0  
(0.2598) (0. 1 880) ( 10.76 19) (8 . 149 1 )  
vcv 1 .0000 0.0000 3.9000 0.4000 0.0488 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7323) (0.7937) 
VIM 0.4829 0.7 1 32 3.9787 6.921 7  0.2958 
(0.4019) (0.3362) ( 1 .03 1 8) (3.407 1 )  
VLY 0. 1 000  0.0000 32.0524 37.9332 0.0559 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) ( 1 .8836) ( 1 .8841 )  
WES 0.3322 0.3067 8.2 170 1 1 .0369 0. 1 824 
(0.2 1 85) (0.3627) ( 1 .5778) (4.5328) 
WLT 0.5392 0. 1 377 50. 1 1 45 22.5705 0. 1 083 
(0.31 50) (0.5723) ( 10.9867) (6.6642) 
WNC 0. 1002 0.0000 64.6825 62.2538 0.0460 
(0. 1 1 35) (0.0000) (4. 1 1 1 7) . (4.0602) 
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Appendix 1 Table E Continued 
PIN = µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2E + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
1999 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN WPI 0.2991 0.0000 252.4507 121 .0259 0.0669 
(0. 17 14) (0.0000) (16. 1 854) (39.9809) WRC 0. 1000 0.0000 96.63 16 109.3678 0.0536 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (7.8485) (7.8468) ZAP 0.9329 1 .0000 122.2 106 47.5732 0. 1 537 
(0.2046) (0.0000) (7.44 19) (9 .5503) 
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Appendix 1 Table F: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
for NYSE Companies During 2001 Pre-Decimalization Period 
PIN 
µ(l - P. (t)) 2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
AC 0.5000 0.0000 23 1 .8667 177.9333 0. 16 10  
(0. 1 890) (0.0000) ( 16. 1 949) (21 .3624) 
AGE 0.5993 0.0000 496.4919  1 77.4122 0.0967 
(0. 1782) (0.0000) (43.0440) (46.6973) 
AHG 0.4000 0.5000 205.2485 1 64.49 16  0. 1 382 
(0. 1 997) (0.3230) (33 .4964) (36.9377) 
AK 0.4427 0.0000 44. 1 603 45. 1 323 0. 1 845 
(0.3473) (0.0000) ( 1 3.8692) (20.3990) 
ALZ 0.6453 0.3908 9.8480 5.4298 0. 1 5 10  
(0.2256) (0.389 1)  (1 .9530) (2.8265) 
AMN 0.5683 0.0622 24.3867 23.9790 0.2 1 84 
(0. 1453) (0.3357) (8.5291 )  (8.3 163) 
AMU 0.3971  0.7479 8.7 105 14.3026 0.2458 
(0. 1 966) (0.2828) (1 .4970) ( 1 .9387) 
APA 0.7999 0.0000 1079.7676 343.3802 0. 1 1 28 
(0. 1 509) (0.0000) (40. 1046) (27.7647) 
APX 0.3589 0.0000 1 2.2286 8.4777 0. 1 106 
(0. 1 847) (0.0000) (1 .701 9) (2. 1 992) 
ATS 0.3925 1 .0000 1 0.2223 10.5876 0. 1689 
(0. 1 791 )  (0.0000) (1 .6003) (1 .5034) 
BA 1 .0000 0.30 12  1 305.5648 242.2853 0.0849 
(0.0000) (0. 1448) ( 145.07 10) (54.9545) 
BAC 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 53 1 .4000 744.9482 0. 1 956 
0.0000 0.0000 ( 179.6 1 8 1 )  ( 1007.9161 )  
BAX 1 .0000 0.32 10  763. 1 1 96 262. 1440 0. 1466 
(0.0000) (0. 1801)  (9 1 .9530) (48.7022) 
BKH 0.3002 0.0000 1 66.6443 92.9890 0.0773 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) (9.2934) ( 12.0400) 
BLX 0.4698 0.2407 12.9305 19.8765 0.2653 
(0. 1687) (0.27 1 1 )  (3 . 1482) (3 .5899) 
BMT 0.4269 0.5 155 10.0307 4.7760 0.0922 
(0.2099) (0.6 166) (2.2084) (3.4228) 
BNO 0.4506 1 .0000 32.4897 15 . 1 375 0.0950 
(0. 1 835) (0.0000) (2.6289) (3.807 1 )  
BQT 0.2032 0.0000 1 9.4873 23.2528 0. 1 08 1  
(0. 1 526) (0.0000) ( 1 .5285) ( 1 .9630) 
C 1 .0000 1 .0000 307.2774 1 10.6963 0. 1 526 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (98.5745) (35.8933) 
CBA 0.5798 0.2998 36.3 1 10 25.8325 0. 1 7 10  
(0. 1704) (0.2903) (6.6484) (6.0527) 
CD 1 .0000 0.0000 722.4466 33 1 . 1001 0.1 864 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (73.4501 )  (67.2404) 
CNE 0.4825 0. 1 965 4.24 1 5  3.35 16 0. 160 1  
(0.3 1 12) (0.5836) ( 1 . 1055) (2.4340) 
1 53 
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Appendix 1 Table F Continued 
PIN 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2e + µ(1 - P. (t)) Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN COE 0.2996 0.3269 20.2474 37.4053 0.2 167 (0. 1 843) (0.3541 )  (3.4667) (9.961 5) 
coo 0.7942 0. 1259 87.76 16 73. 1 303 0.2486 (0. 1454) (0. 1 530) ( 1 5.0569) ( 1 3 .9504) DEL 0.7892 0.0000 9.9 1 83 20.48 14  0.4490 (0. 1 527) (0.0000) ( 1 .5515)  (4.2974) DIS 0.9999 0.0000 1652.8838 548.8937 0. 1 424 (0.000 1 )  (0.0000) (80.7 1 32) (206.5060) DOL 0.4027 0.2738 1 89.41 83 93.2763 0.0902 (0. 1 924) (0.3 125) (23.9280) (29.7308) 
DY 1 .0000 0.0000 355 . 1 673 154.5723 0. 1787 (0.0000) (0.0000) (82.5752) (38.0233) E 0.4000 0.2056 90.9930 7 1 .0350 0. 1 350 (0.2000) (0.2854) (8.67 16) ( 1 1 .2543) EOP 0.4973 0.4266 38.067 1 30.6960 0. 1670 (0. 1 97 1 )  (0.2995) (5.9033) (6.4576) EL 0.798 1 0.0000 270. 1 993 148.5973 0. 1 800 (0. 1492) (0.0000) ( 19.3434) ( 1 8.8287) ESF 0.2001 0.5002 82.72 1 1  96.7607 0. 1048 (0. 1 632) (0.4563) ( 1 0.4855) ( 1 3.9 1 73) ETN 1 .0000 0.8419 37 1 .7 169 158.2554 0. 1755 (0.0000) (0.06 14) (45. 1741 )  (3 1 .2 1 69) ETT 0.5 192 1 .0000 12.46 10  8.2398 0. 1465 (0. 1 641 )  (0.0000) ( 1 .8774) (2.0775) FCF 0.3209 0.0000 36.0972 25 .2552 0. 1 009 (0.2040) (0.0000) (4.5 1 5 1 )  (7.23 10) FOE 0.2000 0.5000 1 30.0555 95.4439 0.0684 (0. 1 633) (0.4564) (9.0723) ( 15 . 1 393) FRT 0.5796 0. 1 876 61 .3487 45.0336 0. 1 754 (0.2005) (0.2 1 10) (8.3653) (6. 8 12 1 )  FTS 0.5000 0.0000 1 59.6667 123. 1 334 0. 16 16 (0. 1 890) (0.0000) ( 1 8.3456) (3 1 .4803) 
OAM 0.6000 0.0000 40.3859 27.2 122 0. 1682 (0. 1 8 1 9) (0.0000) (4.7 168) (4.2726) OFF 0.2958 0.0000 24.8696 26.5763 0. 1 365 (0. 1 7 14) (0.0000) (3.501 1 )  (5.9464) 
OLW 1 .0000 0.0000 1 1 7.5 149 10.7917 0.0439 (0.0000) (0.0000) (44.7655) ( 1 2.4974) ORB 0.693 1 0.0000 32.0455 22.9545 0. 1 989 (0. 1 695) (0.0000) (4.322 1 )  (4.2749) 
OVA 0.2085 0.0000 106.2557 69.505 1 0.0638 (0. 1458) (0.0000) (8.4085) ( 1 1 .8674) 
HMX 0.2098 0.485 1 2 1 .0834 21 .606 1 0.097 1 (0. 1662) (0.4830) (2.658 1 )  (4.3347) IMT 0.2397 0.5542 9.1 823 1 1 .8303 0. 1 337 (0. 1 709) (0.5122) ( 1 .4063) (2.39 19) ION 0.4004 0.0000 64.9956 60.465 1 0. 1 570 (0. 1 849) (0.0000) (8.4775) ( 1 0.9172) IPP 0. 1 026 0.0000 34.0822 43 .2362 0.061 1 (0 . 1 1 50) (0.0000) (2 .9005) (2.4690) 
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Appendix 1 Table F Continued 
PIN = 
µ(I - P. (t)) 
2E + µ(1 - P. (t)) Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
IQM 0.4079 0.736 1 1 3 .9545 8 .0688 0. 1055 (0.2288) (0.4642) (2. 1 288) (3.0358) 
JP 0.6000 0. 1 667 491 .5721 1 5 1 .5936 0.0847 (0.2000) (0. 1 965) (32.4676) (33.3077) KSS 0.4972 0.4972 973.331 8  973.33 1 8  0. 1 99 1  (0. 1 865) (0.0000) (35.3883) (37.2446) 
LOG 0.7753 0.2799 1 50.4659 4 1 .3599 0.0963 (0. 1 377) (0.23 1 8) ( 1 5 .3957) ( 14.2065) 
LFG 0.3009 0.6638 1 50.2728 1 15 .8488 0. 1 039 (0. 1 839) (0.3764) ( 1 9.2974) (45 .7395) 
LU 1 .0000 0.0000 1 3 1 .773 1 17.5421 0.0624 (0.0000) (0.0000) (49.8 1 96) (9.7467) 
MDA 0.405 1 0.5461 1 5 .7457 1 6.5621 0. 1 756 (0.3903) (0.7579) (4.5782) (9.7321 )  
MHK 0.4041 0.0000 1 52.9984 76.2247 0.09 1 5  (0. 1 828) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .7255) ( 1 6.9958) 
MHO 0.7935 0.0000 34.2672 33.73 19 0.2809 (0. 1 435) (0.0000) (4.7842) (7.2057) 
MIL 0.3000 0.3333 679.6473 308.0176 0.0637 (0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (53 .3743) (57.3 174) 
MM 0.3 162 0.5994 75.89 1 5  57.6083 0. 1072 (0. 1 896) (0.6069) ( 1 3.5776) (21 .6462) 
MO 0.5636 0.0000 1 536.5900 254.7676 0.0446 (0. 1 657) (0.0000) (78.6457) ( 1 1 6.8572) 
MU 1 .0000 1 .0000 2 1 2.6791 58.0845 0. 1201 (0.3706) (0.0000) (72.6939) (42.992 1 )  
MUO 0.0000 0.0000 6.2000 1 3 .77 12  0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .342 1 )  (3 .8872) 
NGI 0.2859 1 .0000 3.84 12  7.4060 0.2 161  (0.2043) (0.0000) (0.8764) ( 1 .9552) 
NR 0.2987 0.0000 93.8 1 99 68.5060 0.0983 (0. 1686) (0.0000) (1 1 .3 1 93) ( 19.5225) 
NUC 0. 1 936 0.5 1 63 1 3 .6090 22.6342 0. 1 387 (0. 1 555) (0.5344) (2.3466) (7.4541 )  
PAI 1 .0000 1 .0000 6.9000 1 .0000 0.0676 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8580) ( 1 .2041 )  
PCG 1 .0000 0.0000 1 250.6374 703.9746 0.2 196 (0.0000) (0.0000) (140.8727) (99.2887) 
PEI 0.5928 0.0603 3 1 . 8089 35.8998 0.2507 (0. 1 878) (0.2067) (4.7769) (8 .2405) 
PIM 0.6595 0. 1 539 52.0057 28.0347 0. 1 509 (0.2573) (0.2106) (6. 1 380) (7.3338) 
PKE 0.4993 0.0000 1 70.7656 124.5070 0. 1 540 (0. 1 83 1 ) (0.0000) (25.2508) (28.7907) 
PNM 0.4528 0.2204 142.7306 68.3254 0.0978 (0.2050) (0.2856) ( 1 7.6003) ( 12.0847) POS 0.3000 0.3000 25 1 .294 1 25 1 .2941 0. 1 304 (0. 1 732) (0.0000) (55.083 1 )  ( 1 86.4614) 
PPL 0. 1000 0.0000 576.9474 412 .0526 0.0345 (0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (22.3092) (22.3092) 
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Appendix 1 Table F Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN PPM 0. 1 522 1 .0000 10.2505 9.8455 0.068 1 (0. 169 1 )  (0.0000) ( 1 .7 100) (4. 1 5 1 5) PSA 0.5015 0.601 1 50.9839 50.5 1 50 0. 1 990 (0.2022) (0.2846) (7.0689) (I 1 .0474) PZL 0.6640 0.0000 1 42.0709 46.02 1 8  0.0971 (0. 1 363) (0.0000) ( 1 6.9787) ( 14. 1 095) RI 0.3000 0.0000 1 33.1 176 1 1 8.5483 0. 1 178 (0. 1 732) (0.0000) (8.3803) (26.0086) RYL 1 .0000 0.0000 254.1 1 56 1 09.24 16 0. 1 769 (0.0000) (0.0000) (47.2888) ( 1 5 .2444) SBR 0.3567 0.0000 1 4.0389 13 .7989 0. 1492 (0.2460) (0.0000) (2.4439) (7. 1 1 38) SCL 0.3000 0.0000 24.5879 58.0742 0.2616 (0. 1 73 1 )  (0.0000) (8.523 1 )  ( 19.4 1 5 1 )  SEL 0.7203 1 .0000 5.2582 6.502 1 0.308 1 (0.2035) (0.0000) (0.8472) ( 1 .3459) SKP 0.6 125 0.8784 1 7.5444 1 8.63 1 1  0.2454 (0.4482) (0.5667) (8.5802) (6.4 1 37) SLB 1 .0000 0.0000 1 572.0336 457.7 149 0. 127 1  (0.0000) (0.0000) (96.9605) (7 1 .2763) STW 0.3000 0.0000 24.5294 56.8039 0.2578 (0. 1 732) (0.0000) (5.2248) ( 1 4.2064) T 1 .0000 0.6693 12.9585 3.6857 0. 1 245 (0.0000) (0. 1726) (5.0888) ( 1 .5769) TOP 0.4982 0.0000 8.51 16 10.9928 0.2434 (0. 1 8 1 4) (0.0000) ( 1 .7 124) (2. 1 673) TEO 0.298 1 0.0000 177.0 1 34 1 1 9.6760 0.09 1 5  (0. 1643) (0.0000) ( 1 8.3 1 12) (34.9000) TLD 0. 1000 0.0000 40.9473 45.0468 0.0521 (0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (4.205 1 )  (4.2016) TSM 0.0000 0.6005 445.2094 1 84.5669 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.5077) (0. 1 293) (0. 1 1 1 2) TSO 0.5259 0.0000 82.3 194 4 1 .95 1 8  0. 1 1 82 (0. 1 634) (0.0000) (9.7336) (7.5779) 
ucu 0.8968 1 .0000 350.2658 141 .0754 0. 1 530 (0.0452) (0.0000) (23.9472) (44.2333) 
usu 0.4862 0.0000 68.7 1 79 52.9897 0. 1 579 (0. 1 626) (0.0000) (7.451 6) (9.2205) 
vcv 0. 1 795 0.0000 5.4779 9 . 1 578 0. 1 305 (0. 1445) (0.0000) ( 1 .0852) (2.45 12) VIM 0.5 1 29 0.9049 6.2 195 6.358 1 0.2077 (0. 1 940) (0.3247) ( 1 .4935) (2.3935) VLY 0.5598 0.8278 90.2 1 24 48.7 1 97 0. 1 3 1 3  (0. 1 898) (0.2060) ( 1 1 . 1022) ( 1 2.2435) WES 0.3855 0.0840 1 9.6600 27.7046 0.2 1 36 . (0. 1 587) (0.4550) (6.3 106) (9.0045) WLT 0.2000 0.0000 37.9999 75.4990 0. 1 658 (0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (7.0669) ( 1 3. 1 37 1 )  WNC 0.3022 1 .0000 85. 1 500 59.2296 0.095 1 (0. 1 703) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .0425) ( 1 0.6 1 17) 
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Appendix 1 Table F Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Pre 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WPI 1 .0000 0.0000 457.7238 220.5432 0. 1 94 1  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (34.396 1) (22.8723) 
WRC 0.301 1 0.0000 10.0597 22.85 15  0.2548 
(0. 1737) (0.0000) ( 1.4360) (8.491 1 )  
ZAP 0.3071 0.6535 22.7730 1 6.4580 0.0999 
(0. 1747 ) (0.7267) (3 .7709) (4. 6 1 19) 
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Appendix 1 Table G: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) for NYSE Companies During 2001 Post-Decimalization Period 
PIN = µ(1 - p� (t)) 
2E + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
AC 0.3009 1 .0000 383.6584 398 .4346 0. 135 1  
(0. 1 735) (0.0000) (6 1 .0026) ( 144.61 85) 
AGE 0.3996 0.2502 483.21 62 227.63 1 8  0.0860 
(0. 1979) (0.2799) (30.9855) (49.55 18) 
AHG 0.3995 0.0000 197 . 1435 1 03.9057 0.0953 
(0. 1 844) (0.0000) (1 1 .05 14) (3 1 .7732) 
AK 0.2000 0.501 1 55 .0562 1 30.4379 0. 1915  
(0. 1633) (0.4583) (16.893 1 )  (43.0849) ALZ 0.8575 0.87 10 4.9832 4.8203 0.2932 
(0. 1 73 1 )  (0.2277) (1 .3806) . (2.2368) 
AMN 0.0000 0.5783 14.4798 8 .4864 0.0000 
(0.0000) (1 .78 12) (5 .0966) (2.4697) 
AMU 0. 1000 1 .0000 8 .42 1 1 1 8 .5767 0.0994 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (1 .4042) ( 1 .4044) 
APA 1 .0000 0.0000 921 .29 12 270.4642 0. 1280 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (62.0104) (50.4414) 
APX 0.4985 0.0000 10.8845 8.2866 0. 1595 
(0.7399) (0.0000) (1 .6536) (7.9328) 
ATS 0.2006 0.5015 5.9432 17.5 150 0.2282 
(0. 1635) (0.4585) (0.9339) (2.5887) 
BA 0.5882 0.4572 1 4 14.3289 262.2 1 1 4  0.0517  
(0. 1 861)  (0.3232) (5 1 .5502) (61 .3 194) 
BAC 1 .0000 1 .0000 5 1 8.2864 216.2664 0. 1726 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 
BAX 0.4012 0.497 1 699.932 1 232.39 10 0.0624 
(0. 1966) (0.3209) (36.2656) (36.0652) 
BKH 0.645 1 1 .0000 127.2027 33.01 10  0.0772 
(0. 1 564) (0.0000) ( 12 . 1 152) ( 1 1 .905 1) 
BLX 0.8974 0.7794 5.2024 1 3.2555 0.5334 
(0. 1228) (0. 1 803) (1 .7 1 1 4) ( 1 .7058) 
BMT 1 .0000 0.0000 1 1 .0000 7.8000 0.2617  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (2 .8240) ( l .48 15) 
BNO 0.42 1 8  0.7593 20.03 10 2 1 .6647 0. 1 857 
(0.2461 )  (0.3146) (3 .05 16) (8.8614) 
BQT 0.6976 1 .0000 20. 1593 8.0006 0. 12 16  
(0.3530) (0.0000) (2.2025) (3.5709) 
C 1 .0000 1 .0000 326.2997 122.2683 0 . 1 578 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 102 . 1 917) (39.0272) 
CBA 0.2666 1 .0000 20.3491 1 9.5 132 0.1 1 33 
(0. 1460) (0.0000) (2.57 1 8) (4.9635) 
CD 1 .0000 1 .0000 779.2040 428 .3936 0.2 156 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (53 .4156) ( 199.4575) 
CNE 0.4371 0.2244 5.03 14  8.7790 0.2761 
(0.2229) (0.2707) (1 .7661 )  (2.5484) 
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Appendix 1 Table G Continued 
PIN = µ(l - P0 (t)) 
2E + µ(l - P. (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
COE 0.3243 0.6749 26.6860 15 . 1934 0.0845 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.5 1 5 1 )  (3 .6743) (4.65 12) coo 0.6839 0.0000 106.6305 62.4941 0. 1669 
(0. 1 5 17) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .3404) ( 10. 1 086) 
DEL 0.2826 0.4376 1 7.0476 25. 1399 0. 1724 
(0. 1 601 )  (0.5016) (4.9663) ( 1 0.308 1 )  
DIS 0.0000 1 .0000 1861 .9000 936. 1551  0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (86.653 1 )  (0.0000) 
DOL 0.4778 0.5025 1 88.3027 93 .3257 0. 1 059 
(0.30 12) (0.5938) (33 .8692) (37 . 1703) 
DY 0.5982 1 .0000 463 . 1 883 153 . 1732 0.0900 
(0. 1 835) (0.0000) (24.57 10) (32.6209) 
E 0.58 1 5  0.0000 56.7973 44.3739 0. 1 85 1  
(0. 1 902) (0.0000) (5.65 17) (8.6566) 
EGP 0.5478 0.0000 39.3645 22.7667 0. 1 367 
(0.3973) (0.0000) (6.8428) (1 1 .4931 )  
EL 1 .0000 0.4 1 1 3  428.0427 1 3 1 .27 1 5  0. 1 330 
(0.0000) (0. 17 18) (24.0099) (37.3863) 
ESF 0.49 1 8  0.7541 35.9280 22.4570 0. 1 332 
(0. 1 939) (0.2790) (3.6742) (4.6056) 
ETN 0.4943 0.0000 282.4493 96. 1003 0.0776 
. ( l .0069) (0.0000) (52.4229) (85 .7988) 
ETT 0.5332 0.6334 1 1 .278 1 12.2722 0.2249 
(0. 16 14) (0.2796) (2.3367) (2.4969) 
FCF 0.2046 1 .0000 20.53 16  28 .5326 0 . 1 245 
(0. 1 523) (0.0000) (2.561 9) (3.566 1)  
FOE 0.4079 0.2422 98.3204 34.7 106 0.0672 
(0. 1 7 16) (0.492 1 )  ( 10.201 4) (9.4843) 
FRT 0.79 17 0.0000 59.085 1 31 .7420 0. 1 754 
(0. 1565) (0.0000) (4.8382) (2.9998) 
FTS 0.4868 0.7202 1 35.4701 1 02.637 1 0. 1 557 
(0.2894) (0.3369) (33.022 1)  (49.0568) 
GAM 0.3206 0.6478 20.8449 1_5.6258 0. 1073 
(0. 1787) (0.41 94) (2.8080) (2.7603) 
GFF 0.3962 0.7504 32. 1 307 56.8850 0.2597 
(0. 193 1 )  (0.2834) (6.9559) ( 1 8 .7286) 
GLW 1 .0000 0.7 16 1  144.7377 25 .7810 0.08 1 8  
(0.0000) (0. 1 880) (53 .3903) ( 1 8.4941 )  
GRB 0.5947 0.6669 38.867 1  32.2303 0. 1 978 
(0. 1 9 10) (0.25 1 3) (5.4047) (6.2967) 
GVA 0. 1000 0.0000 1 1 5.6842 12 1 . 3 158 0.0498 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (8.988 1 )  (8.988 1 )  
HMX 0.2046 1 .0000 1 9.2608 24.3294 0 . 1 1 44 
(0. 1 473) (0.0000) (3.2725) (7.0400) 
IMT 0.2061 1 .0000 10.8974 1 2.6421 0. 1068 
(0. 1527) (0.0000) ( 1 .4 1 24) ( 1 .7808) 
ION 0.3036 0.2438 37.8945 25.7272 0.0934 
(0. 1 832) (0.8264) (4.9862) (5.2882) 
IPP 0. 1 000 0.0000 26.6841 40.3 1 03 0.0702 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) ( 1 .0629) ( 1 .0607) 
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Appendix 1 Table G Continued 
PIN = 
µ(l - Pn (t)) 
2£ + µ (l - Pn (t)) Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
IQM 0.7 140 1 .0000 6.8509 8.8205 0.3 149 (0.2027) (0.0000) ( 1 .2 193) (2. 1069) JP 1 .0000 0.2 106 342.2374 103.6367 0. 1 3 1 5  (0.0000) (0.2070) (36.8570) (34.063 1 )  
KSS 0.3000 0.6666 1 2 17.5854 284.3866 0.0338 (0. 1 870) (0.35 1 8) (60.9 1 10) (63.3255) LDG 0.3960 0.0000 1 36.2386 82.8800 0. 1075 (0. 1752) (0.0000) (9.6949) ( 17 .8287) LFG 0.3048 0.3492 101 .4470 79.4064 0. 1 066 (0. 1 83 1 )  (0.4225) (14.5401 )  (22.6880) LU 1 .0000 0.5553 1 24. 1 732 13 .42 17 0.05 1 3  (0.0000) (0. 1942) (47.8672) (10.08 16) 
MDA 0.3766 0.2336 25.0348 36. 1 898 0.2 140 (0.2994) (0.9759) (8.4252) (i0.7208) 
MHK 0.0000 0.0000 97.7898 46.6041 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (2 1 .633 1 )  ( 15 .79 17) 
MHO 0.707 1 0.7 189 14.5017 1 6.8234 0.2909 (0.6547) (0.4496) (6.6278) (5 .6270) 
MIL 0.3000 0.0000 348.9420 262.7289 0. 1 0 1 5  (0. 173 1 )  (0.0000) (23.7837) (65.3076) 
MM 0.2000 1 .0000 87.8333 88. 1 667 0.09 12 (0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (6.8909) (9.5299) 
MO 1 .0000 0. 1 000 1706.0445 565 . 1924 0. 142 1  (0.0000) (0. 1 1 15 )  (80.8752) ( 102.9633) 
MU 1 .0000 0.0000 2674.7604 460.2392 0.0792 (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 146.2 156) (93.5369) MUO 1 .0000 0.2946 5.3 1 62 13. 1 676 0.5533 0.0000 (0. 1736) (2. 172 1 )  (2. 1 052) 
NGI 1 .0000 1 .0000 2.9000 2.9000 0.3333 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3335) (0.8 1 32) 
NR 0.6 173 0.0000 1 10.4660 54.863 1 0. 1 329 (0. 1 857) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .3699) (9. 1 533) 
NUC 0.0000 1 .0000 8.5000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (1 . 1 279) (0.0000) 
PAI 0.8249 0.2916  4.6 1 79 6. 1 390 0.3541 (0.2 147) (0.2415)  ( 1 .2296) ( 1 .9701 )  
PCG 0.0000 1 .0000 891 .4997 338. 1721 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (97. 1 1 45) (2.38E+ 17) 
PEI 0.4790 0.0000 45.0014  29.4333 0. 1 354 (0.3659) (0.0000) (8.4499) ( 13 .9601) 
PIM 0.8586 0.4737 59.0679 19.0593 0. 12 17  (0.3299) (0.2573) (7. 1 1 34) (3.7435) 
PKE 0.5985 0.0000 1 3 1 .7855 53 . 1 820 0. 1 077 (0. 1774) (0.0000) ( 1 1 .3485) ( 14.8 1 30) 
PNM 0.5004 0.2898 220.2962 95.5425 0.0979 (0.2028) (0.3322) (30.455 1 )  (30.7230) POS 0.4000 0.0000 162.7500 104.2500 0. 1 1 36 (0. 1 852) (0.0000) (1 1 .9 184) (14.0295) PPL 0.0000 1 .0000 424.6939 1 38.8343 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (308.587 1 )  ( 1 8 103.7634) 
1 60 
Appendix 1 Table G Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2E + µ(1 - P. (t)) Post 2001 .ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
PPM 0.2 193 0.0000 8.4628 12 . 1928 0 . 1 364 (0. 1637) (0.0000) ( 1 .2970) (2. 1 1 98) 
PSA 0.3667 0.8262 54.6275 22.2 1 03 0.0694 (0.5441)  ( 1 .4292) (9.0772) ( 10.5091) 
PZL 0.4083 0.3565 1 83.7486 57.0684 0.0596 (0.3682) (0.4499) ( 1 9.8263) (23 . 19 10) 
RI 0.4003 0.4749 143.0557 54.6797 0.07 1 1 (0. 1 897) (0.3664) (1 5.0378) (20. 1722) 
RYL 0.5000 0.6000 269.0000 1 52.4000 0. 1241 (0.2041)  (0.2828) (23 .2033) (33.5400) 
SBR 0.7652 0.4868 6.4336 9.8445 0.3693 (0.3050) (0.2622) (1 .2 166) (2.2094) 
SCL 0.2000 1 .0000 7.2778 34.7222 0.3230 (0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (2.565 1 )  (3.4607) 
SEL 0.3823 1 .0000 5.9743 5 . 1040 0. 1404 (0. 1 357) (0.0000) ( 1 .357 1 )  ( 1 .5596) 
SKP 0.3772 0.5274 1 1 .2367 17 .0357 0.2224 (0. 1 802) (0.4345) (3.0358) (3 .0708) 
SLB 0.8996 0.0000 1 640.41 1 1  5 1 8.3222 0. 1244 (0. 1 127) (0.0000) (66.9635) (91 .3638) 
STW 0.5005 0.0000 1 9.2074 25.7469 0.25 1 2  (0. 1878) (0.0000) (4.0572) (4.5802) 
T 1 .0000 0.795 1 3.6881 1 .3 144 0. 1 5 1 2  (0.0000) (0. 1 540) ( 1 .43 1 2) (0.6169) 
TOP 0.2000 0.5000 10.5558 33.9454 0.2433 (0. 1633) (0.4567) ( 1 .3866) ( 12.0493) 
TEO 0.0000 0.0000 172.4379 57.7291 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 3.70 18) ( 18 .5474) 
TLD 0.2995 1 .0000 29.3032 3 1 .7030 0. 1 394 (0. 1 7 1 8) (0.0000) (3.6 1 08) (5.6529) 
TSM 0.5943 0. 1 587 5 17.4363 244.8557 0. 1 233 (0. 1 934) (0.3069) (54.4736) (46.5649) 
TSO 0.5007 0. 1997 1 10.5 166 108.3853 0. 1 971 (0.2000) (0.2302) ( 1 6.8528) (28 .6575) 
ucu 0.7988 0. 1 244 276.8994 92.01 80 0. 1 172 (0. 1558) (0. 15 18) (33.8202) (33. 1028) 
usu 0.5556 0.7046 64.5 1 37 26.7707 0. 1034 (0.9963) (0.3657) (1 4.5223) (20. 1 3 1 5) 
vcv 0.0000 1 .0000 6.7000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .3908) (0.0000) 
VIM 0.0000 1 .0000 6.6500 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .23 16) (0.0000) 
VLY 0.3979 0.4737 62.5656 4 1 . 1 366 0. 1 157 (0. 1906) (0.447 1 )  (9. 1 362) (12.7 193) 
WES 0. 1000 1 .0000 34.7895 63.2 105 0.0833 (0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (5 .4061)  (5.406 1 )  
WLT 0.2927 0.6456 16. 1 902 19.8804 0. 1 523 (0. 1783) (0.3708) (2.5998) (4.0076) 
WNC 0.5094 1 .0000 80.6905 33.2 16 1  0.0949 (0.9235) (0.0000) ( 1 8 . 1 668) (23.5576) 16 1  
Appendix 1 Table G Continued 
PIN == 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
Post 2001 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN WPI 0.8993 0.0000 422.2305 1 30.9253 0. 1 224 
(0. 1 1 24) (0.0000) (2 1 . 8748) (20.3700) WRC 0.5934 0.4770 9.7622 10.4072 0.2403 
(0.2 144) (0.2847) (2.2650) (2.6937) ZAP 0.3352 1 .0000 25.9832 34.7061 0. 1 829 
(0. 1 856) (0.0000) (8 .2745) ( 1 2.9455) 
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Appendix 1 Table H: The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
for NYSE Companies During 2002 Period 
PIN = 
µ(1 - Pn (t)) 
2£ + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
AC 1 .0000 0.0000 347.5866 1 43.6879 0. 1 7 13  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (55 .4940) (29.698 1 )  
AGE 1 .0000 0.0000 857.7222 278 .7287 0. 1398 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (90.3 1 1 8) (39.8840) 
AHG 0.3000 0.0000 319.4 1 07 1 69.579 1 0.0738 
(0. 173 1 )  (0.0000) (28.9433) (32.8958) 
AK 0.5228 1 .0000 240. 1091  76.6685 0.0770 
(0.21 1 1 ) (0.0000) (28. 1 8 1 9) (27.3943) 
ALZ 0.8484 1 .0000 4.0199 3 . 1357 0.2486 
(0.5632) (0.0000) ( 1 .0883) ( 1 .6646) 
AMN 0.0000 1 .0000 56.4226 2 1 .5 1 84 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (9. 1 872) (6.3730) 
AMU 0.1492 1 .0000 7.9791 1 2.3458 0. 1 035 
(0. 1 6 1 8) (0.0000) (0.9305) (4.0534) 
APA 1 .0000 0.0000 1 484.4258 699.9 164 0. 1 908 
(0.0000) (0.0089) (77.58 13) ( 196.5675) 
APX 0.4365 0.5 1 82 5.9385 9.6745 0.2623 
(0. 1966) (0.3240) ( 1 . 1 5 1 6) ( 1 .5260) 
ATS 1 .0000 1 .0000 3 .0000 2.2222 0.2703 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 1 .0690) (0.5849) 
BA 0.0000 0.0000 2127.3000 1039.473 1 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (74.03 1 3) ( 17343.544 1 )  
BAC 1 .0000 0.2230 175.4884 38.2702 0.0983 
(0.0000) (0. 1635) (64.5 1 89) ( 14.4824) 
BAX 1 .0000 1 .3874E- 1 8  1 49.8277 14 1 .8555 0.32 1 3 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (48.01 54) (39.2300) 
BKH 0.48 15 0.2076 248.3743 124.9327 0. 1080 
(0.2527) (0.3024) (35.4261) (35 . 1 834) 
BLX 0.3990 0.7337 77.3499 90.2 152 0.1 888 
(0. 1939) (0.3 1 35) ( 13 .5483) (3 1 . 1066) 
BMT 0.383 1 1 .0000 8.0968 3.67 10 0.0799 
(0.3322) (0.0000) ( 1 . 1 1 08) (2.9456) 
BNO 0.4389 0.4555 20.3633 23.6323 0.2030 
(0.2234) (0.4772) (3.43 16) (9.3239) 
BQT 0.1000 1 .0000 16.9473 39.0486 0.1033 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (l .5438) ( l .5423) 
C 1 .0000 0.41 73 174.571 1  38. 1 708 0.0986 
(0.0000) (0. 1 875) (64.2080) ( 14.9973) 
CBA 0.2000 0.0000 65 .5000 1 10.5000 0. 1444 
(0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) ( 14.901 6) ( 16.3637) 
CD 1 .0000 0.5535 166.543 1 34.5555 0.0940 
(0.0000) (0. 1 858) (66.061 7) ( 14.2297) 
CNE 0. 1 345 0.0000 6.1 388 9.0899 0.0905 
(0. 1 183) (0.0000) ( 1 .2995) (2.3874) 
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Appendix 1 Table H Continued 
PIN = 
µ(l - P. (t)) 
2e + µ (l - P. (t)) 2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
COE 0.2000 0.0000 23.3889 35.6 109 0. 1 32 1  (0. 1 5 1 2) (0.0000) (2.0039) (4.2785) 
coo 0.3007 1 .0000 253.6267 1 33.8606 0.0735 (0. 1727) (0.0000) ( 1 2.4704) ( 1 3 . 1 1 33) 
DEL 0.2001 0.5076 38.0057 37.9300 0.0908 (0. 1 633) (0.4663) (4.398 1 )  (5.8867) 
DIS 1 .0000 1 .0000 289.3986 99.9840 0 . 1473 (0.0000) (0.0000) (94.3677) (32.65 1 5) 
DOL 0.9962 1 .0000 526. 1 343 194.7726 0. 1 557 (0.001 6) 0.0000 (24. 1745) (40.4 144) 
DY 0.5995 0. 1 661  293 .8842 122. 1498 0. 1 1 08 (0. 1974) (0. 1 977) (28.4034) (30.9223) 
E 0.5393 0.0000 1 30.7876 8 1 .4434 0. 1438 (0.491 9) (0.0000) (30.6837) (36.7703) 
EGP 0.5612 0.0000 92.952 1 3 1 .8860 0.0878 (0.3325) (0.0000) ( 1 2.9834) ( 10.8607) 
EL 0.4001 0.2499 555.61 85 269.59 17  0.0885 (0. 1995) (0.2793) (44. 1 929) (85 . 1 507) 
ESF 0.5679 0.8035 30.5038 24.9922 0. 1 887 (0. 1728) (0.2369) (9.323 1 )  (8. 1 8 1 5) 
ETN 0.5357 0.0000 529.9674 1 1 1 .7577 0.0535 (0.2487) (0.0000) (32.5545) (32.6 1 1 9) 
ETT 0.4125 0.6892 8.6264 1 1 .9928 0.2228 (0. 1 963) (0.4399) (2. 1449) ( 1 .82 1 1 )  
FCF 0.3010 0.6529 79.6448 59.8326 0. 10 16  (0. 1 860) (0.3560) (8.3572) ( 1 2.3078) 
FOE 0.5006 1 .0000 250. 120 1  1 04.7936 0.0949 (0. 1 872) (0.0000) (27. 1 424) (3 1 .2627) 
FRT 0.0000 0.0000 136.8433 60. 1 220 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (7.41 14) (25.7061 )  
FfS 0. 1 997 0.0000 345 .5295 430.2894 0. 1 106 (0. 1474) (0.0000) (43.40 1 1 )  (205 .6 169) GAM 0.2782 0.6 1 90 25.5967 20.5 1 26 0. 1 003 (0. 1 906) (0.4062) (3. 1 694) (6.5366) 
GFF 0.0000 1 .0000 1 87 .0282 8 1 .0 126 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (26.4286) (29.7052) GLW 1 .0000 1 .0000 1 90.9758 5 1 .9657 0. 1 1 98 (0.0000) (0.0000) (67.6926) (24.2273) GRB 0.2000 0.5005 76.667 1 9 1 .3255 0. 1 064 (0. 1 632) (0.4582) (9.7835) (28.0348) GVA 0. 1000 1 .0000 499.9474 40 1 .0526 0.0386 (0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (34.2549) (34.2549) HMX 0.45 1 1  0.4691 1 7. 1764 1 5.3993 0. 1 682 (0. 1 944) (0.3780) (3.5498) (2.6307) IMT 0.7963 1 .0000 8 .6755 5 .587 1  0.2041 (0.509 1 )  (0.0000) (2.2415) (2.5339) 
ION 0.0000 0.6695 99.0704 43.3910 0.0000 (0.0000) (2.9630) ( 1 4.9675) (0.0000) 
IPP 1 .0000 0.9 194 2 1 .6621 8.3757 0. 1 620 (0.0000) (0. 1535) (2.8797) (3.0578) 
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Appendix 1 Table H Continued 
PIN = 
µ(I - P. (t)) 
2e + µ(I - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN IQM 0.0000 0.7965 8 .8000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (1 .0253) (0.0000), JP 1 .0000 0.0000 687.9272 250.0796 0. 1 538 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (74.47 14) (22.2 1 12) KSS 1 .0000 0.0967 1 309.0653 265.4829 o:·0921 
(0.0000) (0. 1 143) (95. 1 677) (65.5825) 
LOG 0.5433 0.3575 357.7972 7 1 .0547 0.05 12  
(0.2642) (0.2990) (23.5256) (20.791 1 ) 
LFG 0.2000 1 .0000 153.2222 1 37.7778 0.0825 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) ( 16.6422) (38.7644) 
LU 0.5874 0.9937 2.2737 0.4334 0.0530 
(0.2398) (0.008 1 )  (0.9567) (0.2852) MDA 0.297 1 1 .0000 8.3969 12.475 1 0 .1 808 
(0. 17 13) (0.0000) (1 .6026) (2.9561 )  MHK 1 .0000 0.3734 538.2990 220.57 19  0. 1700 
(0.0000) (0. 1377) (97.9057) (47.2473) MHO 0.5002 0.8046 21 2.2802 1 1 5.2375 0. 1 1 95 
(0.2035) (0.2300) ( 19.5560) (24.8 1 39) MIL 1 .0000 0.0000 441 .7556 1 34. 1 167 0. 1 3 1 8  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (38 . 1 079) (28.9 123) MM 0.4000 0.7499 143. 3 12 1  127.4335 0. 1 5 10 
(0. 1999) (0.2797) ( 16.6299) (22.6734) MO 0.0000 0.0000 2494.5500 787.0744 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 152.8304) (0.0000) MU 1 .0000 0. 1998 90.2578 35 .2896 0. 1635 
(0.0000) (0. 1 5 1 1) (33.3 154) ( 13 .4330) 
MUO 0.6000 0.5000 29.2857 224.2142 0.6967 
(0.2000) (0.2635) ( 1 0.8340) (42.5472) NGJ 0.57 18  1 .0000 2.6598 5.3874 0.3667 
(0.2728) (0.0000) (0.5952) ( 1 .4406) NR 0.7003 0.7 197 145.4950 76.9840 0. 1 563 
(0. 1 865) (0.2201)  ( 1 5.01 38) (1 8.2482) 
NUC 0.5 196 0.0000 9.8940 9.068 1 0. 1 923 
(0.2588) (0.0000) (1 .6393) (4.0846) PAI 0.6 188 0.7323 3.8914 4.8758 0.2794 
(0.3 199) (0.3 128) ( 1 .2458) ( 1 .4337) 
PCG 0.2000 1 .0000 976.5556 400.9444 0.0394 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) (45.698 1 )  (74.0123) 
PEI 0.3748 0.2741 63.8537 46.9348 0. 12 1 1 
(0.4065) (0.3742) ( 1 1 . 1 292) (29.9668) PIM 0.2564 1 .0000 65.2837 28 .5982 0.0532 
(0. 1960) (0.0000) (3. 177 1 )  ( 10.0 1 1 2) PKE 0.0000 0.0000 206.2807 70.0706 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (127 154.9570) ( l .99E+09) PNM 0.2000 1 .0000 5 10.3877 163.0902 0.0310  
(0. 15 12) (0.0000) (19 .7367) (23.3357) 
POS 0.6969 0.0000 346. 1698 132.5307 0. 1 177 
(0. 1 694) (0.0000) ( 1 8.4541 )  ( 1 4.6990) PPL 0.4000 0.0000 91 1 .5625 309.4375 0.0636 
(0. 1 852) (0.0000) (41 .288 1 )  (47.5207) 
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Appendix 1 Table H Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2E + µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN PPM 0. 17 14  1 .0000 6.8906 5.3604 0.0625 
(0. 1766) (0.0000) (0.8689) (2.6257) 
PSA 0.6841 0.0000 156.8907 7 1 .2 1 38 0.1 344 
(0.3658) (0.0000) (17 .6243) (1 0.8806) PZL 0.6008 0.5357 298.6 1 1 9  90.8324 0.0837 
(0. 1928) (0.2961 )  (2 1 .9893) (25.8953) RI 0.3000 0.0000 541 .0588 307.6078 0.0786 
(0. 1732) (0.0000) (46. 1029) (54.0393) RYL 1 .0000 0.0000 9.7004 2.5878 0.1 177 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (3.3662) (1 .2035) SBR 0.4899 1 .0000 74.3840 46.2005 0. 1 320 
(0.1 549) (0.0000) (1 1 .6402) ( 12.0505) 
SCL 0. 1000 0.0000 19.842 1 45. 1 578 0. 1022 
(0. 1 1 34) (0.0000) (3.0920) (3.09 19) 
SEL 0.0000 0.6279 9.5500 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (2.3749) (0.0000) SKP 0.6022 0.8353 37.301 3 26.2309 0. 1747 
(0. 198 1 )  (0. 1976) (2.7725) (6.0328) SLB 1 .0000 0.0000 2 1 19.3505 394.2904 0.0851 
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( 143.6450) (68.0677) STW 0.2000 0.0000 5 1 .8333 75 .6666 · 0. 1274 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) (8 .3 167) ( 1 6.36 1 1 )  
T 1 .0000 0.9000 2276.6933 45 1 .72 1 8  0.0903 
(0.0000) (0. 1 1 1 5) (1 1 8 .3806) (92.1 257) TDP 0.2059 0.5502 5.2895 1 1 .2743 0. 1799 
(0. 1638) (0.4342) (0.8054) (3. 1 576) 
TEO 0.4000 0.7500 169.3 125 1 1 0.6873 0. 1 1 56 
(0.2000) (0.2795) (2 1 . 1 372) (23.2785) 
TLD 0.3009 0.0000 75.6917 76.8355 0. 1 325 
(0. 1707) (0.0000) ( 1 6.0540) (24.0938) TSM 1 .0000 0.5763 1033.8742 2 19. 1 037 0.0958 
(0.0000) (0. 1 655) ( 1 1 9.9335) (55.6504) 
TSO 0.3000 0.3331 229.6477 1 89.3486 0. 1 1 01 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 12) ( 19.7032) (59.8047) 
ucu 0.4989 1 .0000 670.7386 1 5 1 .7875 0.0534 
(0. 1 860) (0.0000) (29.6 1 1 9) (30.6026) 
usu 0.4000 0.5000 135.5010  101 .7390 0. 1 306 
(0. 1997) (0.3228) ( 17.3964) (32.5842) 
vcv 0.9654 0.0000 3.2006 2.38 13  0.2642 
(0.5504) (0.0000) (0.4054) ( 1 .5933) VIM 0.383 1 0.4083 6. 1443 9. 1646 0.2222 
(0.2443) (0.4329) ( 1 .4955) (3. 1677) VLY 0. 1997 0.0000 90.7300 63.3038 0.0651 
(0. 1 506) (0.0000) (7.61 80) ( 1 8.3814) WES 0.3001 0.3337 54.4687 65 . 1 772 0. 1 522 
(0. 1 868) (0.3522) (7.8798) ( 1 0.3740) WLT 0.3001 0.3338 142.5852 126.0461 0. 1 1 7 1  
(0. 1 865) (0.3472) ( 14.3424) (44.2899) WNC 0.2000 1 .0000 84.8889 1 33. 1 1 1 1  0. 1 356 
(0. 1 5 12) (0.0000) ( 1 3 .4502) (20.8347) 
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Appendix 1 Table H Continued 
PIN = 
µ(1 - P. (t)) 
2£ + µ(I - P. (t)) 
2002 ALPHA DELTA ETA MU PIN 
WPI 0.3000 0.6667 838.3529 373.9803 0.0627 
(0. 1 87 1 )  (0.35 14) (47.6225) ( 1 20.6906) 
WRC 0.4990 0.0000 1 92. 1 069 82.73 1 0  0.0970 
(0. 1 857) (0.0000) ( 1 6. 1 933) ( 1 9.898 1 )  
ZAP 0.2956 0.7 1 90 3.7760 7.9420 0.2372 
(0. 1789 )  (0.4360) ( 1 .0596) ( 1 .25 1 8) 
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